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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the reform and improvement of Chinese legislation on 
Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs), to develop the PFIP model in 
China, under the protection of Chinese laws, so that its implementation in China 
may reach international standards.  
 
Existing Chinese laws are found to be insufficient in reducing risks to PFIPs because 
of certain shortcomings. Therefore, it is necessary to reform and improve Chinese 
legislation on PFIPs, to prevent their failure. 
 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions drafted by UNCITRAL are treated as 
the international standards to guide Chinese legislation reform on PFIPs. Other 
countries’ laws on PFIPs provide supplementary reference.  
 
This thesis addresses its aim in four steps: First, the current Chinese legislative and 
institutional framework on PFIPs is reviewed, with discussion on establishing a 
more appropriate legislative and institutional framework, to facilitate the 
development of PFIPs in China through the principles of transparency, fairness, 
long-term sustainability and the elimination of undesirable restrictions. Second, 
Chinese laws on the concessioner selection procedure in PFIPs are reviewed, with 
discussion on possible improvements to the laws to achieve international standards 
of fairness and transparency. Third, current Chinese laws and policies which affect 
the various contracts involved in PFIPs are reviewed, with discussion on these may 
be improved to achieve international standards. Fourth, the PFIP dispute settlements 
that may be used in China are reviewed, with discussion on the necessity to remove 
certain undesirable restrictions in relevant Chinese laws. 
 
Following the rapid rise in the practical use of PFIPs in China, this thesis offers a 
strong theoretical basis for suggesting a reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs. It 
also provides a general basis for any national reform of laws on PFIPs in any other 
countries. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 The aim and objectives of the thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to research how the Chinese laws on PFIPs might be 
improved so as to reach international standards and so that Privately Financed 
Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs) can be developed in China under the protection of 
relevant Chinese laws. 
 
Current Chinese laws on PFIPs have many defects. Only if the laws on PFIPs are 
improved and reformed, can the model of PFIPs develop sustainably in China. This 
thesis aims to find the most appropriate way to improve and reform the Chinese laws 
on PFIPs, based on the research and analysis of three issues: 
 The international guidance on PFIPs made by international organizations—
this thesis follows the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL as a guideline. 
 The successful legislative experience on PFIPs made by other countries will 
provide supplementary references. 
 The specific background of legislation on PFIPs in China. 
 
In this thesis, the Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects 
(2001) (hereafter refers to “Legislative Guide”) and Model Legislative Provisions on 
Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (2003) (hereafter refers to “Model 
Provisions”), made by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(hereafter refers to “UNCITRAL”), are used as the international standard in the 
improvement and reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs, and provide guidance for the 
development of a legal model for PFIPs. However, international guidance has its 
own shortcomings. Legislation made by certain countries such as Britain may offer 
better guidance. Even if the international guidance by UNCITRAL and the samples 
of legislation on PFIPs by other countries offer examples of the legal model of 
PFIPs, the most important element in the legislative reform in China is the specific 
- 2 - 
 
 
Chinese context. Therefore, the reform of legislation on PFIPs in China should 
consider all three aspects to eliminate undesirable restrictions on Private Sector 
participation in infrastructure development and make laws more able to facilitate 
PFIPs. 
 
In order to achieve the aim proposed above, the objectives of this thesis are to solve 
the following six research questions: 
 Prove that the PFIP model can benefit China, but that the current Chinese 
laws on PFIPs hinder its development and may bring adverse effects to 
China.  
 Prove the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions made by UNCTRAL 
are the best international standard for Chinese legislative reform on PFIPs, 
while drawing on the progressiveness of laws on PFIPs in countries such as 
Britain as supplemental references.  
 Analyse the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, 
the supplemental references from other countries and the specific Chinese 
context, to work out the defects in current Chinese laws on the general 
legislative and institutional frameworks of PFIPs and discuss how to 
improve and reform the laws. 
 Analyse the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, 
the supplemental references from other countries and the specific Chinese 
context, to work out the defects in current Chinese laws on the concessioner 
selection procedure of PFIPs and discuss how to improve and reform the 
laws.  
 Analyse the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, 
the supplemental references from other countries and the specific Chinese 
context, to work out the defects of relevant laws in China on the agreements 
involved in PFIPs and discuss how to improve and reform the laws. 
 Analyse the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, 
the supplemental references from other countries and the specific Chinese 
context, to work out the defects in current Chinese laws on the dispute 
settlement of PFIPs and discuss how to improve and reform the laws. 
- 3 - 
 
 
1.2 The background 
1.2.1 The background of PFIPs 
Traditionally, offering and developing public infrastructure and services, such as 
public transportation and public health, is the responsibility of Public Sector. This 
responsibility is not only the fundamental function of the Public Sector, but is also 
confirmed by the laws in various countries and by certain international agreements. 
For example, in UK, the Infrastructure Planning Commission was established under 
the Planning Act 2008
1
 which made provision about the authorisation of projects for 
the development of nationally significant infrastructure. The government has 
increased this responsibility by issuing further official documents. The first 
infrastructure plan for the UK was the National Infrastructure Plan of 2010
2
, which
 
was published by the Government in October 2010 and which outlines the scale of 
the challenge UK infrastructure faces and the investment needed to ensure 
sustainable growth. In China, the Constitution of The People’s Republic of China 
clearly states that the Public Sector are responsible for the development of education 
and health services.
3
 The United Nations core publication, Agenda 21, declares that 
all countries should promote and support the investment and infrastructure required 
for sustainable economic growth and diversification on an environmentally sound 
and sustainable basis.
4
 
 
However, as the need for public infrastructure increases, Public Sector are also 
feeling increasing pressure on budgets, and are finding it difficult to afford these 
high costs, especially during the post-September 2008 recession. For example, in the 
UK, the high investment in public infrastructure combined with the national deficit 
                                                 
1
 Planning Act 2008 (c. 29) Introductory Text 
2
HM Treasury, ‘National Infrastructure Plan 2010’ (25 October 2010), < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/ppp_national_infrastructure_plan.htm> accessed on 28
th
 June 2013 
3
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on March 14, 2004: 
      Article 19: The state develops socialist educational undertakings and works to raise the scientific 
and cultural level of the whole nation. The state runs schools of various types, makes primary 
education compulsory and universal, develops secondary, vocational and higher education and 
promotes pre-school education… 
     Article 21: The state develops medical and health services,…, encourages and supports the setting 
up of various medical and health facilities by… 
4
 UNDSD ‘Agenda 21’ (1992) 2.37 (d) A/CONF.151/26/REV.1 (VOL.I) 
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has led to insufficient delivery of services by public infrastructure. At the end of 
December 2012, the UK government debt was £1,387.4 billion, equivalent to 90.0% 
of the GDP.
5
 In China, there is serious conflict between a huge population and a lack 
of infrastructure. Some poor areas in China still lack essential infrastructure such as 
transportation links, energy supplies and clean water. In the international situation, 
the ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) has 
estimated that approximately $600 billion per annum is required in infrastructure 
investment in Asia-Pacific region, but that there is a $200 billion funding gap per 
year.
6
   
 
It is noteworthy that some critics doubt that China is rich enough to afford the cost 
of its infrastructure development because it is investing enormously in US treasury 
securities. These critics point out that, as China has the capacity to buy so many US 
treasury securities, Chinese financial resources should be adequate. As of February 
2013, China, as the largest creditor of US treasury securities, already held $1.223 
Trillion in US treasury securities.
7
 However, China’s huge investment in US 
treasuries is due to many other reasons rather than its budget surplus.   
 
Firstly, the foreign-exchange reserves
8
, rather than the government revenue, are the 
main means by which China buys US treasury securities. China has kept increasing 
                                                 
5
 Office for National Statistics, ‘Government Deficit and Debt Under the Maastricht Treaty, 
Calendar Year 2012’, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/psa/eu-government-debt-and-deficit-
returns/march-2013/stb---march-2013.html> accessed 28
th
 June 2013 
6
 UN news, ‘ESCAP is looking for the solution to the Asia-Pacific region lack the infrastructure’ 
<http://www.un.org/chinese/News/fullstorynews.asp?newsID=7458> accessed 12th  July 2010 
7
 Huang Qianwei, ‘China February increases holding of US treasury securities’ Newspaper Nanfang 
Daily(Guangdong, 18th, April 2013) A17 <http://epaper.nfdaily.cn/html/2013-
04/18/content_7182906.htm> accessed on 3rd, July 2013 
8 
Foreign-exchange reserves comprise the foreign currency held by a government or central bank. Not 
all currency could be foreign-exchange reserves; most reserves are made up of United States 
dollars, and to a lesser extent the euro, the United Kingdom pound sterling, and the Japanese 
yen. 
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foreign-exchange reserves for certain inevitable reasons.
9
 However, foreign-
exchange reserves cannot be used directly to develop domestic infrastructure.
10
 At 
the same time, with the exception of the US treasury securities, the Chinese foreign-
exchange reserves are not appropriate for investment in other international hard 
currency or gold or petrol.
11
 
 
Secondly, the Chinese government buys US government bonds because China hopes 
to stabilize the exchange rate of Chinese Yuan to US dollar, in case of shrinkage of 
Chinese foreign exchange reserves. It is not to earn the interest on the investment.  
When China reduces its holding of US treasury securities, United States will have to 
print more currency notes to bailout its market, which would result in a risk of 
devaluation for the US dollar. The devaluation of the US dollar would shrink the 
value of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves.
12
   
 
                                                 
9 
Firstly, China foreign trade has huge trade surplus in the past decades, i.e. Chinese export is much 
more than its import. Therefore, Chinese central bank has been increasing foreign currency 
reserves. Secondly, since 1994 China implements mandatory foreign exchange system. Under 
mandatory foreign exchange system, except the specific foreign exchange accounts allowed by 
state, either the enterprises or the individuals must sell the foreign exchange to the authorized 
business banks. And then the authorized business banks must sell the position which is higher 
than the limitation by State Administration of Foreign Exchange to central bank. In this 
mandatory system, the central bank is the largest disk access and forms the state’s foreign 
change reserves. Though this mandatory restriction was relaxed after 2008 through amending 
the Foreign Exchange Law, the huge foreign exchange reserve has already formed. Song Guo-
you, “China’s Purchase of American Treasury Securities : Source , Prof it and Impact” (Fudan 
Journal(Social Sciences Edition), 2008,No.4) P31-38 
10
 There are two reasons why Foreign-exchange reserves could not be directly used to develop 
domestic infrastructure: firstly, in the central bank's balance sheet, foreign currency reserve 
assets are consistence with the equal liabilities on RMB. If the foreign currency reserve assets 
are used to build infrastructure rather than return the liabilities, it would result the central bank 
insolvency to bankruptcy. Secondly, it may cause inflation or other serious consequences 
because of abusing RMB. When these foreign currencies are sold to foreign banks, equal 
amount of RMB is issued. If these foreign currencies are sold in the foreign exchange market to 
exchange RMB to build infrastructure, it will be eventually purchased by central bank by RMB 
and form a secondary issue and the RMB in the market will more than needed. Tian Jun-rong, 
“whose foreign exchange reserves?” (Newspaper People’s Daily, 17th, October 2011) 017, 
<http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/15911496.html> accessed on 5th, July 2013   
11
 Compared with American dollar, the other international hard currency such as euro, the United 
Kingdom pound sterling, and the Japanese yen are more unstable because of economic crisis. 
The gold and petrol has no such huge supply in the market to satisfy with Chinese demand. 
Yuan Dong-mei,& Liu Jian-jiang, “The reasons why China hold so much US treasury 
securities” (Contemporary Economic Research,2012, No 12)P28-32 
12
 Jiang li-li, ‘Analysis the inevitability  and appropriate radio of China holding US Treasury 
securities’ (Special Zone Economy,2010, No12) P90-92 
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Thirdly, China aims to protect the Chinese export industry with its large holding of 
US treasury securities. Since US is the largest market importing Chinese products, 
any American recession would negatively impact the Chinese export industry. 
Meanwhile, if American dollar were to devalue, the Chinese export industry would 
suffer higher costs and lower profits.
13
 
 
Finally, the reason why the Chinese government buys US government bonds 
includes an underlying political purpose: China offers the US economic funding in 
exchange for the US’ support of its policy making or diplomacy.14 
 
Therefore, there is no conflict between the seemingly generous investment in US 
treasury securities by China and its lack of funding for developing infrastructure 
within China. As a matter of fact, most countries in the world are facing similar 
funding shortages. 
 
In this case, private finance is enormously in demand in the Public Sector for the 
development of infrastructure. 
1.2.2 The definition of PFIPs 
PFIPs, in this thesis, stands for Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, which are 
public infrastructure projects (the physical facilities that provide essential services to 
the general public) financed by Private Sector. 
 
A Private Sector partner establishing a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
15
 has the 
financial responsibility, and undertakes physical construction, repair or expansion 
                                                 
13
 Jiang li-li, “Analysis the inevitability  and appropriate radio of China holding US Treasury 
securities” (Special Zone Economy,2010, No12) P90-92 
14  
Tao jie-yun, “The advantages and disadvantages of China holding of US treasury 
securities”(Commercial Times, 2010, No 12) P42 
15
 SPV (special purpose vehicle): a special purpose entity is a legal entity (usually a limited company 
of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or 
temporary objectives, e.g. a specific project. The Project Company as an SPV cannot carry out 
any other business that is not part of the specific project. E. R. Yescombe, ‘Public-Private 
Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance’(ELSEVIER 2007) P109 
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works of infrastructure for the Public authority under the Project Agreement. The 
Private Sector is authorized to operate the infrastructure and charge a price to the 
facility users (the public or public authorities) to enable it to recover both its 
investment and operating expenses as well as a reasonable rate of return.
16
  
 
Therefore, a complete PFIP involves at least four relationships (see Figure 1.1).  
 
The first relationship is between the Public Authority and the Private Sector. A 
concession is allowed by the Public Authority in the form of Project Agreement, 
while the SPV established by the Private Sector plays a role as a concessioner.  
 
The second relationship is between the Private Sector and the Financier, who may be 
Investors such as shareholders or lenders such as banks. The SPV established by the 
Private Sector is obliged to finance the projects. 
 
The third relationship is between the Private Sector and the Subcontractors who may 
be constructors, operators or maintainers. The SPV who obtains the concession from 
the Public Authority may be a single entity composed of constructors, operators and 
maintainers or it needs to subcontract with other entities after acquiring the 
concession. The SPV established by the Private Sector is obliged to construct, 
operate and maintain the project infrastructure. 
 
The fourth relationship is between the Private Sector and the Customers. The SPV 
operates the projects to pay back its investment on the project, service debt and 
operating costs, and to raise reasonable profits during the concession period. The 
SPV established by the Private Sector has the right to charge the facility users. 
                                                 
16
 ‘Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Project’ (2001)UNCITRAL 
(A/CN.9/SER.B/4), Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, paras. 8; E. R. 
Yescombe, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance’(ELSEVIER 
2007)P2-3   
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Figure 1.1 The structure of general PFIPs 
1.2.2.1 Replacing “BOT” with “PFIPs” 
It is worthy to explain where the word “PFIPs” is from. 
 
“BOT”17 was originally used to describe infrastructure financed by private investors. 
Before long, however, “PFIPs” was considered to describe such projects more 
exactly and replaced the outdated “BOT”.  
 
The first time UNCITRAL paid attention to the area of Privately Financed 
Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs) was at the congress on International Trade Law—
“Uniform commercial law in the 21st century”—held in May 1992 in New York as 
                                                 
17
 BOT is the fundamental and typical selection. The government grants a Private Sector a concession 
to build an infrastructure, and operate it during the concession period to cover the cost and 
reasonable profit, and then to transfer the infrastructure back at the end of the concession period 
without charge. 
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part of the 25
th
 session of the Commission. However, as the term “PFIPs” had not 
been developed at that time, “BOT” was used. The Build-Operate-Transfer (“BOT”) 
project is a project in which a government grants a concessioner a period of time to 
develop a project; the private concessioner builds, operates and manages the project 
for a number of years; the concessioner is permitted to refund their construction 
costs and derive reasonable profits from the operation and commercial exploitation 
of the project; and at the end of the concession period, the project’s infrastructure 
ownership is transferred to the government without charge.
18 
During the Congress in 
1992, it was proposed that the Commission consider undertaking work in the field of 
BOT project financing.
19 
 
 
As a consequence of that proposal, the following Commission sessions paid 
attention to BOT. At the 26
th
 session in 1993, the Secretariat informed the 
Commission that it was monitoring the work by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) on the preparation of “Guidelines for the 
Development, Negotiating and Contracting of BOT Projects”.20 At the 27th session 
in 1994, the Commission emphasized the relevance of BOT and requested the 
Secretariat to prepare a note on possible future work on the subject of BOT 
projects.
21
 At the 28
th
 session in 1995, the Commission discussed the requested 
note.
22
 At the 29
th
 session in 1996, the Commission decided to prepare a legislative 
guide on BOT and related types of projects.
23
 
 
The word “BOT” was officially replaced by “PFIPs” at the 30th session in Vienna in 
1997: 
“The Commission may wish henceforth to use the words 
‘privately-financed infrastructure projects’ to refer to its 
work in this field, rather than the words ‘build-operate-
                                                 
18
 UNCITRAL, 27
th
 Session, A/CN.9/399-Build-operate-transfer projects, P2 
19 
Ibid P1 
20
 UNCITRAL, 26
th
 Session, A/CN.9/378-Possible future work : proposals for possible future work 
made at the UNCITRAL Congress : note / by the Secretariat, P5  
21
 UNCITRAL, 27
th
 Session,  A/CN.9/399-Build-operate-transfer projects, P1-3 
22
 UNCITRAL, 28
th
 Session, A/CN.9/414-Possible future work: Build-Operate-Transfer projects  
23
 UNCITRAL, 29
th
 Session, A/CN.9/424-Possible Future Work: Build-Operate-Transfer projects, 
P21 para89 
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transfer’ (BOT), which had so far been used.”24 
The precise use of the word “BOT” refers to only one particular type of 
infrastructure project with private funding, i.e., Build-Operate-Transfer. However, as 
the BOT model evolved in practice, various other types were formed, which do not 
follow a pure “BOT” model, such as “build-own-operate” (BOO)25, “build-own-
operate-transfer” (BOOT) 26 , “build-own-lease-transfer” (BOLT) or “build-rent-
transfer” (BRT). Therefore, the word “BOT” is not appropriate as a generic 
expression for the different forms of private financing of public infrastructure 
projects. However, the Commission’s work in this field expected to cover all types 
of public infrastructure projects involving private financing, including, but not 
limited to, BOT models and its evolved types.
27
 Therefore, the term “Privately 
Financed Infrastructure Projects” (PFIPs) was developed to replace “BOT” as a 
generic term. It is worth noting that, in China, BOT (and its types) is accepted and 
used widely. This means that the word “BOT” (and its types) is popular in Chinese 
academic discourse, while the more precise “PFIPs” is still strange to Chinese 
scholars. 
1.2.2.2 Other two similar concepts 
It is to be noted that features of PFIPs distinguish it from other two similar concepts 
(Public Procurement and Public-Private Partnerships) as follows: 
 
PFIPs vs. Public Procurement 
PFIPs financed by the Private Sector are different from infrastructure projects 
purchased by conventional public procurement.  
 
                                                 
24
 UNCITRAL, 30
th
 Session, A/CN.9/438-Privately-Financed Infrastructure Projects: Draft Chapters 
of a legislative guide on privately-financed infrastructure projects, P1 footnote 
25 
BOO is similar as the BOT, but the Private Sector owns the facility permanently and is not under 
an obligation to transfer it back to the contracting authority. 
26
 BOOT is similar as the BOT that the government grants a Private Sector a concession to finance 
and build an infrastructure, and operate it during the concession period to cover the cost and 
reasonable profit, and then to transfer the infrastructure back at the end of the concession period 
without charge. However, under this arrangement the Private Sector owns the infrastructure 
facility and its assets until it is transferred to the contracting authority. 
27
 (n 24) 
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The primary difference between PFIPs and Public Procurement is the source of 
finance. Infrastructure projects purchased in conventional public procurement are 
financed by Public Sector funding, using tax revenues or public borrowing, whereas 
PFIPs are financed by private investors. In conventional procurement, the Public 
Sector funds the whole infrastructure project: it provides the initial capital of the 
project, manages the operation and maintenance costs and covers any cost overrides. 
In PFIPs, once the project is handed to the Private Sector, the Private Sector covers 
the costs of the project. The SPV (special purpose vehicle) takes all the 
responsibility of the debt of the project. It is no longer the financial responsibility of 
the Public Sector. Therefore, PFIPs allow the government to meet public 
infrastructure delivery, but do not have to pay for the construction, operation and 
maintenance of that infrastructure.  
 
Additionally, in PFIPs, the risks of infrastructure projects are partly or wholly 
transferred from the Public Sector to the Private Sector. In conventional 
procurement, although the Public Sector rarely designs or builds large public assets 
like power stations, roads, rail systems and buildings alone (they contract with 
relevant specialists to provide such services), the Public Sector, which funds these 
projects, has to cover unforeseen costs, by way of example those due to time delays. 
The private investor is only a supplier who offers products to government, and the 
relationship is terminated once the purchase is complete. The risks of the project 
remain with the Public Sector, and therefore the taxpayers. However, in PFIPs, the 
SPV receives payments (‘service fees’) for the project in a pre-agreement, which are 
intended to repay the financing costs and give returns to investors. The service fees 
are subject to deductions for any failure to meet output specifications, and there is 
generally no allowance for cost overruns which occur during construction or 
operation of the facility.
28
 In some cases, the Private Sector takes responsibility for 
both the construction of the asset and the provision of related services, such as the 
maintenance of the road, etc.
29
 Moreover, even if the project turns out to be less 
profitable than originally envisaged because of a breach of duty by government or 
                                                 
28
 Yescombe E. R., ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance’(ELSEVIER 
2007) P4; Peter Trepte, ‘Regulating procurement’(Oxford University Press, 2004) p28 
29
 Hartley Keith, ‘problems of using partnering and similar private sector practice in the Public 
Sector environment: the example of PPPs/PFI’ in Arrowswith Sue and Trybus Martin (eds), 
Public procurement: the continuing revolution (Kluwer law international 2003) p191 
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force majeure, the SPV has to bear the loss first and only then has recourse against 
the government rather than the government bearing the risks directly. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
PFIPs vs. PPP 
Though the PFIPs and Public-Private-Partnership (PPP)
30
 overlap in their scopes and 
structures, and are often used synonymously, their foci partially differ. 
 
PFIPs and PPP can be shown in similar structures, as in the following: BOT (Build, 
Operate, Transfer)
31
; BTO (Build, Transfer, Operate)
32
; ROT (Refurbish, Operate, 
Transfer)
33
; BOOT (Build, Own, Operate, Transfer)
34
; BROT (Build, Rent, Operate, 
Transfer)
35
;
 
 PFI (Private Finance Initiative)
36
; MO (Maintain and Operation)
37
; 
DBFO (Design, build, finance, operate)
38
; BOO (Build, own, operate)
39
 and so on.
40 
However, the structures of PPP are not limited to the above structures, which are 
based on infrastructure projects, but also include all partnerships between the public 
and Private Sector, such as programme cooperation with government or licensing for 
the exploitation of natural resources or the privatization of government property. By 
                                                 
30
 PPP is a partnership between the Private Sector and the Public Sector, which covers a number of 
arrangements in which Private Sector have a role in projects to develop Public Sector 
infrastructure. 
31
 (n 17) 
32
 BTO emphasize that the infrastructure is transferred to the contracting authority immediately upon 
its completion, and then the concessioner is awarded the right to operate the facility for a certain 
period. 
33
 ROT means the Private Sector needs not to build a new infrastructure. The existing infrastructure 
facilities are turned over to Private Sector to refurbish, while the Private Sector is authorised to 
operate for a given period of time. At the end the infrastructure is transferred back to the public 
authority after the concession period without charge. 
34
 (n 26) 
35
 BROT, in addition to the obligations and other terms usual to BOT projects, the concessioner rents 
the physical assets on which the facility is located for the duration of the agreement. 
36
 PFI, a Public Sector body contracts with a Private Sector provider to purchase services it requires 
on a long-term basis. Typically this will involve the provider in the design, construction, 
financing and operation of a new capital asset (e.g. a road). On completion of the project, the 
Public Sector buys the services, but not the capital asset itself. 
37
 M&O (or O&M Maintain and Operation) means the Private Sector finances on the maintenance of 
the existing infrastructure and then operates the facility to return its cost and reasonable profits 
during the allowed period. 
38
 DBFO is used to emphasize the Private Sector additional responsibility for designing the facility 
and financing its construction. 
39
 (n 25) 
40
 ‘Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Project’ (2001)UNCITRAL 
(A/CN.9/SER.B/4) p5-6 
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contrast, PFIPs just refer to partnerships in infrastructure project.
41
 Therefore, the 
scope of PFIPs is not as wide as the scope of PPP. 
 
Even when both PPP and PFIPs refer to infrastructure projects, their emphases are 
different. PPP does not consider the extent of private finance or participation in the 
infrastructure project. Any joint venture between the private and Public Sector may 
be called a PPP. PFIPs not only emphasise the sourcing of finance from the Private 
Sector but also requires a certain level of participation by the Private Sector in the 
infrastructure project, i.e. it pays attention to the operation and organisation of a 
project financed by the Private Sector with the aim being the successful completion 
of these projects.   
1.2.3 The feasibility of the PFIPs 
This thesis focuses on PFIPs. However, this does not mean that the PFIP model 
solves all infrastructure problems. Developing countries such as some countries in 
Africa without experience in PFIPs do not want to bear high administrative costs so 
they often apply for loans with low interest or no interest from their domestic banks 
or World Bank. Although the PFIP model is not a perfect solution, it has a number 
of advantages which prove its feasibility under the proper circumstances, and can be 
considered as a solution for countries such as China. 
 
Fiscal expenditure reduced 
The fundamental advantage of PFIPs is that they reduce fiscal expenditure. The 
investment in a PFIPs falls outside the public budget and is offered by private 
investors. From the Public Sector’s perspective, the PFIPs provide “off-balance 
sheet” finance for public service assets. This means that any borrowing from the 
private investor incurred by the SPV implementing PFIPs is not considered to be 
public borrowing, but the debt of the SPV.
42
 Although in countries such as China, it 
is not difficult for the Public Sector to borrow money from banks or other financial 
                                                 
41
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, paras.8; E. R. 
Yescombe, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance’(ELSEVIER 2007) 
P2-3 
42
 Vinter Graham D., ‘Project finance’ (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) p422 
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institutions, the risks to national debt and deficit increase at the same time. For 
example, access to capital at low interest rates after adopting the Euro may have 
played a role in Greece’s debt crisis in 2010, in addition to domestic factors. 
Perceptions of stability conferred by their Euro membership allowed Greece to 
borrow at a more favourable interest rate than would likely have been the case had 
they remained outside the Euro zone. However, access to artificially cheap credit 
allowed Greece to accumulate high levels of debt and postpone debt maturity. When 
the national debt crisis began, this debt became difficult to control.
43
 
 
It is noteworthy that recently the UK Treasury Committee have criticised the off-
balance sheet and outside department budget treatment of the PFI
44
 debt in UK and 
the fact that such debt is recorded outside departmental budgets. The report argues 
that it is unreasonable to put PFI debt outside the national deficit statistics and 
budget, because it will contribute to  misuse of PFI and encourage poor investment 
decisions in the long term.
45
 
 
Although the UK government agreed with these arguments in the case of PFI in the 
UK and has tried to add the PFI debt into its balance sheet and department budget,
46
 
these arguments cannot deny the positive impact of the PFIPs model into fiscal 
expenditure.  
 
Firstly, PFI is only one type of PFIP. The PFI model is criticised because the current 
fiscal account just shows that there is no immediate high-level payment so that the 
departments might be under their budget limitation. It cannot show that the total of 
the instalment may be higher than the once-off payment, which may increase the 
                                                 
43
 Nelson Rebecca M. and others, ‘Greece’s Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and 
Implications’ (Congressional Research Service, 14, May, 2010) P6 
44
 (n 36) 
45
 House of Common Treasury Committee, ‘Private Finance Initiative’ 17th Report of session 2010-
12 (House of Commons, 18
th
 July 2011), Chapter 2. Accounting and budgetary incentives, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1146/1146.pdf> 
Accessed on 10th July 2013 
46
 House of Common Treasury Committee, ‘Private Finance Initiative: Government, OBR and NAO 
Responses to the Seventeenth Report from the Committee’ 25th Report of session 2012-12 
(House of Commons, 19
th
 December 2011), Appendix 1: Government Response, P8-9  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1725/1725.pdf> 
Accessed on 10th July 2013 
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real fiscal debt.
47
 However, in other types of PFIPs such as BOT, the Private Sector 
charges the public user rather than the Public Sector, which means there is no fiscal 
expenditure of government in the past or future (there may be some subsidy under 
contract) and so no increase in fiscal debt. Therefore, the criticisms of PFI for 
accounting and budgetary reasons cannot apply to all the PFIPs because the other 
types of PFIPs effectively reduce fiscal expenditure.  
 
Secondly, even in the case of PFI in the UK, the PFI model avoids increasing 
national debt, eases fiscal pressure and reduces fiscal expenditure. At the beginning, 
there is not too much fiscal expenditure on public infrastructure because the Public 
Sector spends comparatively less on payments for service due to it does not have to 
make a huge investment in the construction and operation. The UK budget is not 
large enough to support the demand for infrastructure and the government cannot 
accept more Public Sector borrowing.
48
 In the case of budgetary limitations, 
borrowing limitations and an increase in demand for infrastructure, the PFI was 
adopted even if the total cost was higher. The UK government has tried to add the 
PFI debt to its balance sheet and department budget, but this would not change the 
choice of using PFI. 
 
Value for money
49
 
Firstly, infrastructure and services traditionally constructed and delivered by the 
Public Sector may be more efficiently constructed and delivered by the Private 
Sector. Mr Philip Green has a view that the Public Sector may not be making 
efficient use of government finance. The prices in the market are not compared in 
advance and management in the Public Sector does not spend public money as 
                                                 
47
 In PFI model, the government need purchase the public service from Private Sector at the end 
though the government does not afford the cost of construction and operation at the beginning, 
which means the once payment becomes to the instalment. House of Common Treasury 
Committee, ‘Private Finance Initiative’ 17th Report of session 2010-12 (House of Commons, 
18
th
 July 2011), Chapter1 Introduction, para 2:  
‘The return on both equity and debt capital is sourced from the periodic "unitary charge", which is 
paid by the public authority from the point at which the contracted facility is available for use.’ 
48
 House of Common Treasury Committee, ‘Private Finance Initiative: Government, OBR and NAO 
Responses to the Seventeenth Report from the Committee’ 25th Report of session 2012-12 
(House of Commons, 19
th
 December 2011), Appendix 1: Government Response, P11   
49 
The UK National Audit Office (NAO) defines Value for Money as being ‘the optimal use of 
resources to achieve intended outcomes’. 
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wisely as it would its own.
50 
However, in PFIPs, the Public Sector only decides upon 
the facilities and services it needs and then seeks a private investor to complete the 
project. Since a competitive selection process, such as contract bidding, is offered by 
the Public Sector, private investors, competing for the contract bidding, try to find 
the “best” value for money (hereafter refer to VFM) solution that meets the 
requirements of the Public Sector.
51
 The cost of administrative monitoring by the 
Public Sector is high at the outset for certain developing countries without 
experience in using PFIPs, but this cost will decrease once the necessary procedures, 
systems and laws are established. 
 
It is noteworthy that a recent report made by critics of the Treasury Committee 
suggests that PFIs in the UK do not approach the best VFM. It points out that, as 
private finance costs are higher than public finance costs (since government has 
always been able to obtain cheaper funding than private providers of project finance), 
PFI will only provide VFM if this difference in cost is outweighed by the savings 
and efficiencies during the life of a PFI project.
52
 However, the data and cases show 
that the quantity, quality, price, inflexibility and the level of risk transfer of these 
projects are no better than those agreed upon by conventional procurement methods; 
or they may be worse.
53
 In PFIs, the Public Sector gives the Private Sector a 
payment which includes service costs and reasonable profits, so it seems the Public 
Sector pays more money in exchange for the same or less service offered by 
conventional procurement methods. The difference between direct government 
funding and the cost of this finance has increased significantly since the financial 
crisis.
54
 
 
As discussed before, PFI is only one type of PFIP. In the other types of PFIPs such 
as BOT, the Public Sector just covers the cost of project monitoring or management, 
or certain subsidies thereof. The Public Sector need not permit to purchase the 
                                                 
50
 Green Philip, ‘Efficiency review by Sir Philip Green: key findings and recommendations’, 11 
October 2010. P20 
51 
Vinter Graham D., ‘Project finance’ (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) p422 
52
 House of Common Treasury Committee, ‘Private Finance Initiative’ 17th Report of session 2010-
12 (House of Commons, 18
th
 July 2011), P56, para.8 
53
 Ibid, Chapter 3 Value for money 
54
 Ibid, P3, para.2 
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services produced by the infrastructure financed by Private Sector. Meanwhile, 
under the government administration, the Private Sector is not easy to over-charge 
for using the public service. Therefore, the only way the Private Sector can secure 
higher profits is to look for more efficient and quality outputs, which fits the theory 
of VFM.  
 
Although the UK government agrees that certain improvements could be made so 
that the VFM assessment process of PFI is more robust, the government considers 
the PFI projects in the UK to have already followed the VFM Principle. The 
government response is that VFM is a relative concept, which requires the 
comparison of the potential or actual outcomes of alternative delivery and financing 
options. Long-term forecasting requires assumptions to be made about the future. 
The outputs should not be considered in isolation as standalone cases for, or against, 
the use of private finance. A sensitivity analysis of the output should be considered 
alongside qualitative factors including the viability, achievability and desirability of 
using private finance. This analysis informs the final assessment of whether the 
project represents value for money.
55
 It is inappropriate that the critics only compare 
the financial costs and the outputs of the PFI projects. Moreover, the transfer of risk 
to the Private Sector has worked as anticipated. The Public Sector has been 
protected when projects have gone wrong, with losses being borne by the Private 
Sector.
56
 
 
New Technology and advanced management skill transferred 
As far as developing countries are concerned, in addition to attracting foreign 
private finance for developing their domestic infrastructure, using PFIPs has a fringe 
benefit—the import of new technology from other countries.57 The foreign private 
investors may use new technologies or advanced management techniques in the 
construction and operation of their PFIPs. Although these new technologies or 
                                                 
55
 House of Common Treasury Committee, ‘Private Finance Initiative: Government, OBR and NAO 
Responses to the Seventeenth Report from the Committee’ 25th Report of session 2012-12 
(House of Commons, 19
th
 December 2011), Appendix 1: Government Response, P9-10 
56
 Ibid, P11 
57
 Holloway Julian, ‘Infrastructure projects in mainland China’ (Const. L.J. 2004, 20(5), 278-279) 
P279 
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advanced management techniques may be acquired by normal bid or purchase, the 
real cost of the project may be higher in the latter case. 
 
Critics may argue that new technology and advanced management might not be 
applied in PFIPs. The concessioners in PFIPs are usually consortia, which often 
include a construction company and an operation company. Another construction 
company or operation company may have the better technologies or skills, but, 
unless these technologies and skills are part of the chosen consortium’s bid, they 
will not be used.
58
 
 
However, this criticism is not an argument against PFIPs. It simply raises the 
problem of market competition. Under efficient marketization, in order to win in the 
competition or obtain more profits, the private investor has the incentive to pursue 
better technologies and skills. 
 
Market competition increased 
By contrast with conventional procurement, when private finance is brought into the 
infrastructure market, it increases market competition.  
 
A potential criticism is that the long, complex and costly process may limit the 
number of participants to bid for projects. This would mean that only companies 
who can afford to lose millions of pounds in failed bids can be involved, which 
would result in an uncompetitive market. The competition is likely to be less intense, 
when compared to conventional procurements.
59
 However, this criticism conflates 
two different kinds of competition. The competition under conventional 
procurement is actually the competition for the public capital of infrastructure 
investments. No matter the result of the competition, the Public Sector covers the 
gain and loss of the infrastructure projects. By contrast, the competition under PFIPs 
creates real competition in infrastructure market because the private investor, rather 
                                                 
58
 House of Common Treasury Committee, ‘Private Finance Initiative’ 17th Report of session 2010-
12 (House of Commons, 18
th
 July 2011), P57, para.15 
59
 Ibid 
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than the public investor, covers the gain or loss of the project. In China, for example, 
if the government finances infrastructure projects, whether or not the concession is 
awarded through competitive bid, state-owned enterprises find it easier to win the 
project concession.
60
 
 
In summary, PFIPs can enlarge the source of capital to build infrastructure. The 
arguments against PFIPs for reasons of VFM assessment, transfer of risk, transfer of 
new technology, market competition and so on, can be solved through proper 
management, adequate systems and laws, to achieve a balance satisfactory to all 
participants in PFIPs.  
1.2.4 The worldwide legislation on PFIPs 
The number of PFIPs is gradually increasing in China, including infrastructure 
projects financed by foreign private investment, which play an important role in 
Chinese economic development. However, current Chinese regulations are hindering 
the development of PFIPs in China.
61
 Although in the past few years Chinese 
regulations on PFIPs have improved, they are not yet adequate for the full 
development of PFIPs. In order to make the legislation consistent with the 
development of PFIPs, it is necessary for China to reform its current regulations on 
PFIPs. The new legislation should aim to achieve a balance between the desire to 
facilitate and encourage of private participation in PFIPs, and the various public 
interests and concerns of the host country. 
 
As a matter of fact，PFIPs have been applied worldwide since in the early 1980s 
and have benefitted the host countries.
62  
Those countries have drafted various 
regulations or laws on PFIPs in order to protect and facilitate the development of 
PFIPs. Japan has passed a specific law on PFIPs to regulate their use. The law 
relating to the Promotion of the Realization of Public Facilities by Using Private 
                                                 
60
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173), P147 
61
 Ibid, P148-149 
62
 Smith A.J., ‘Privatized Infrastructure: the role of government’ (1999) Thomas Telford, P234-235 
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Funds was legislated in Japan in 1999.
63
 Britain does not have a specific law on 
PFIPs, but the regulations on PFIPs are presented in a number of relevant policies 
and guidelines. For example, the first policy on PFI presented by the British 
government was PFI: Meeting the Investment Challenge in 2003. PFI: 
Strengthening Long-term Partnerships, which confirms the importance of PFIs, was 
published in 2006. The Infrastructure Procurement: Delivering Long-term Value, 
which states the necessity of PFIs, was published in 2008. The Standardisation of 
PF2 Contracts (SoPC), which was issued in December 2012, is the latest version of 
the standard wording and guidance to be used by Public Sector bodies and their 
advisors when drafting PF2 contracts.
64
 This shows that countries are trying to 
improve their regulations on PFIPs in a variety of forms so that investments can be 
properly regulated under law. 
 
In this context, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)
65
 issued the Legislative Guide on PFIPs (2001)
66
 (the Legislative 
Guide) and its supplement Model Legislative Provisions on PFIPs (2003)
67
 (Model 
Provisions), to assist the establishment of legal frameworks favourable to PFIPs. 
Although the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions do not provide a single set of 
model solutions, a country can use them to evaluate different approaches and then 
choose the most suitable for its own national or local context. To some extent, the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions are beneficial to a worldwide 
                                                 
63
 Wang Tie Shan, ‘Comparative research on PFI project between Britain and Japan’ (2008) IEC, 
No1: 49 
64
 HM Treasure, ‘Standardisation of PF2 Contracts’(December 2012), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221556/infrastr
ucture_standardisation_of_contracts_051212.pdf> accessed on 26th July, 2013; Infrastructure 
UK, ‘PF2: A User Guide’(December 2012), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207382/pf2_use
rguide.pdf> accessed on 26th July, 2013;The National Archive, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/infrastructure_ppp_contractual.htm> accessed on 26th July, 2013 
65 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established by the 
General Assembly in 1966 (Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 December 1966). It is the core legal 
body of the United Nations system in the field of international trade law. UNCITRAL's business 
is the modernization and harmonization of rules on international business. 
66
 ‘Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Project’ (2001)UNCITRAL 
(A/CN.9/SER.B/4) (hereafter referred to as the Legislative Guide) 
67
 ‘Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects’ (2004) UNCITRAL 
(A/58/17), paras. 12-171 (hereafter referred to as the Model Provisions) 
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harmonization
68
 of the treatment and promotion of PFIPs for (foreign) private 
investment in public infrastructure.   
1.3 Research Questions 
This thesis intends to solve six research questions:  
1.3.1 Research Question 1  
With the development of PFIPs in China, has it become necessary to reform Chinese 
laws on PFIPs to match up with and facilitate the development of PFIPs?  
 What benefits has the PFIP model brought to China? Only if PFIPs have 
brought benefits to China would it be significant to improve the laws 
protecting and facilitating the PFIP model.  
 Do current Chinese laws on PFIPs match up with the development of PFIPs 
in China? If not, it is necessary to research how to improve the laws. 
 What are the shortcomings of the current Chinese laws on PFIPs and do 
these shortcomings result in adverse effects? Only by finding out the defects 
of the current Chinese laws on PFIPs can one know which points to improve 
and reform. 
 Whether or not conditions in China are amenable to accepting law reforms 
on PFIPs? 
 What is the aim of the reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs? This thesis will 
propose aims for law reform to achieve so that new laws on PFIPs facilitate 
the development of PFIPs, rather than hinder it.  
1.3.2 Research Question 2 
Why adopt the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
69
 made by UNCITRAL as 
guidelines for improving the Chinese laws on PFIPs? Why use other countries’ laws 
on PFIPs as supplementary references?  
                                                 
68
 Mistelis L., ‘Is Harmonisation a Necessary Evil? The Future of Harmonisation and New Sources 
of International Trade Law’ in I Fletcher, L Mistelis and M Cremona eds Foundations of 
International Trade Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001)  
69
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs; and the Model 
Provisions, Chap. I on General provisions. 
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 Why prefer the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL to other international agreements or treaties about PFIPs as the 
guidelines for improving the Chinese laws on PFIPs? What are the 
advantages of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions? What are the 
disadvantages of these other agreements and treaties? 
 Why consider other countries’ laws70 for supplementary references? Why 
can they not be the sole guideline for China? 
1.3.3 Research Question 3 
With reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
71
 
and to supplementary references from other countries
72
, how can the general 
legislative and institutional framework on PFIPs in China be improved?  
 What recommendations are given by the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions to establish general legislative and institutional framework in 
favour of developing PFIPs? What is the background of the 
recommendations and its meaning in detail?  
 With regard to the principle of transparency, how do the recommendations 
offered by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions compare with current 
Chinese laws on PFIPs and should any issues be addressed?  
 With regard to the principle of fairness, how do the recommendations offered 
by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions compare with current 
Chinese laws on PFIPs and should any issues be addressed?  
 With regard to the principle of long-term sustainability, how do the 
recommendations offered by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
compare with current Chinese laws on PFIPs and should any issues be 
addressed? Could any other country’s laws on PFIPs offer supplementary 
reference? 
 With regard to the principle of eliminating undesirable restrictions, how do 
the recommendations offered by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
                                                 
70
 Such as British law, EU law and so on. 
71
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 1-11, Chap. I on general legislative and institutional 
framework; the Model Provisions, Chap. I on General provisions, Model Provision 1-4 
72
 The British regulations about the regulatory institutions; The British special regulations about  the 
customer protection by Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) 
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compare with current Chinese laws on PFIPs and should any issues be 
addressed? 
1.3.4 Research Question 4 
With reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
73
 
and to supplementary references from other countries
74
, how may the selection 
procedures of the concessioner of PFIPs be improved to make the process more fair 
and transparent in China?  
 To ensure the process is fair and transparent in the Pre-selection stage, what 
recommendations are offered by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions? 
What are the current Chinese laws about this stage? Are there any issues 
should be addressed? 
 To ensure the process is fair and transparent during selection, should 
competitive selection procedures be used in PFIPs? Compared with the 
selection procedures in general bids and procurement, what are the special 
requirements of selection procedures for PFIPs? What recommendations are 
offered by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions? What are the current 
Chinese laws on selection? Are there any issues that should be addressed?  
 To ensure the process is fair and transparent in its post-selection stage, what 
recommendations are offered by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
if the unsuccessful bidders wish to question the result? What are the current 
Chinese laws on this stage? Are there any issues that should be addressed? 
 To ensure the process is fair and transparent to unsolicited proposals, what 
recommendations are offered by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions? 
Given that China has neither research nor practice in unsolicited proposals; 
would it be worthwhile to introduce this selection model in China? 
                                                 
73
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 14-39, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner; and the 
Model Provisions accompanied therein, Chap. II on Selection of the concessioner, Model 
Provision 5-27 
74
 EU regulations on market access are used as supplemental reference. 
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1.3.5 Research Question 5 
With reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
75
 
and to supplementary references from other countries, how should China reform the 
laws relating to the agreements involved in PFIPs?  
 What kinds of agreements may be included in PFIPs? What are the 
relationships between them? 
 To what extent should the law regulates Project Agreements but avoids 
jeopardising the necessary flexibility? In light of the recommendations from 
the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, what items could be involved in 
the project agreement? Considering China’s specific situation, what 
mandatory requirements may be added to these items? 
 In respect of the finance agreement, what recommendations are offered by 
the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions to the financial agreement? 
May these be used in Chinese law reform? 
 In respect of the subcontracting agreement, what recommendations are 
offered by the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions to the 
subcontracting agreement? May these be used in Chinese law reform? 
 In respect of the user agreement, what recommendations are offered by the 
Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions to the user agreement? May 
these be used in Chinese law reform? 
1.3.6 Research Question 6  
With reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
76
 
and to supplementary references from other countries
77
, how should the laws of 
dispute settlement in PFIPs be reformed in China?  
 In light of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, what channels could 
                                                 
75
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and Operation of infrastructure: Legislative 
framework and Project agreement, Chap. V on Duration, Extension and Termination of the 
Project Agreement; and the Model Provisions accompanied therein, Chap. III on Contents and 
Implementation of the Concession contract, Chap. IV on Duration, Extension and Termination 
of the Concession Contract.  
76
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of Disputes; and the Model Provisions 
accompanied therein, Chap. V on Settlement of Disputes. 
77
 The definition of public contract in Britain is broad. 
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be offered to settle disputes between the contracting authority and the 
concessioner? Could the concessioner of PFIPs in China use these channels? 
Are there any undesirable restrictions in current Chinese laws?  
 In light of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, could the disputes 
between the concessioner and its contractors, lenders and suppliers be solved 
through the freedom to choose litigation or arbitration? Are there any 
undesirable restrictions in current Chinese laws? 
 In light of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, what channels could 
be offered to settle the disputes involving customers or terminal users? How 
would this reform current Chinese legislation? 
1.4 The contribution of this research  
1.4.1 Research gap filled 
This thesis fills the research gap with respect to the legal aspects of Chinese PFIPs. 
 
The current literature on the legal aspects of Chinese PFIPs is limited. The reasons 
why previous research is insufficient are as follows:  
 
Firstly, the legal aspects of Chinese PFIPs have not been paid enough attention. 
Recently, however, the development of emerging PFIPs has achieved a certain level 
and the market of private investment has become mature.  
 
Secondly, there is little literature researching the legal aspects of Chinese PFIPs with 
most research focusing on the economic, financial or management aspects. 
 
Thirdly, even those research papers that study the legislative aspect of Chinese 
PFIPs are restricted by region or limited to specific types of PFIPs or sections of 
procedure. Therefore, this literatures presents research only on specific provinces, 
specific types of PFIPs such as BOT or specific sections of PFIP procedures such as 
concession bids. 
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It is noteworthy that this thesis systematically analyses and discusses Chinese PFIPs, 
with particular emphasis on legal aspects. Considering the development trend of the 
legislation pertaining to Chinese PFIPs, this thesis analyses the legal aspects of 
Chinese PFIPs across China. This thesis suggests a comprehensive legal framework 
which meets the international standards.  
 
Most importantly, this thesis makes the claim that the current Chinese laws on PFIPs 
need improvement and reform. Moreover, it offers reform recommendations and 
discusses their applicability to each specific phase of a PFIP. 
1.4.2 UNCITRAL guidance transferred 
This thesis makes some progress in looking into the applicability of the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions in China. 
 
Little work has considered the combination of Chinese regulations on PFIPs and the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provision on PFIPs. The literature usually analyses 
either the Chinese regulations or the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, rather 
than analysing both in combination them together. 
 
Thus far, the only article to combine the Chinese regulations on PFIPs and the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions by UNCITRAL is “Regulating 
Procurement of Privately Financed Infrastructure in China: a Review of the Recent 
Legislative Initiative and the Emerging Regulatory Framework” 78  by Professor 
Fuguo Cao. This thesis here expands upon Cao’s ideas and brings them into line 
with more contemporary findings. 
 
Firstly, Cao’s article, which was written in 2007, is outdated to some extent. In the 
five years after the State Council Opinions on Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding 
                                                 
78
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) 
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the Development of the Non-state Sector Economy, issued by the Chinese State 
Council in 2005, many provincial regulations on PFIPs were issued in various 
Chinese provinces. The State Council also issued Several Opinions of the State 
Council on Further Doing a Good Job in the Utilization of Foreign Investment in 
2010, which encourages foreign private investment through the use of PFIPs. 
 
Secondly, although Cao compares Chinese laws on PFIPs and the Legislative Guide 
and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL, he does not thoroughly discuss the 
applicability of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions for use in China. His 
article intends to review three current Chinese provincial laws on PFIPs and address 
their defects, but it does not discuss how the recommendations made by the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions could be applied to reform Chinese law on 
PFIPs. 
 
The contribution of this thesis is that it systematically analyses both current Chinese 
laws on PFIPs and the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL, and discusses the applicability of the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions for use in China to suggest reforms to the Chinese legislation on PFIPs, 
so that this might be promoted to an international standard, which would facilitate 
foreign private investment in China’s public infrastructure. Meanwhile, building on 
Cao’s arguments, this thesis updates information about laws on PFIPs in China.  
1.4.3 Global harmonization contributed 
This thesis is important for global legal harmonization because it looks at the extent 
to which UNCITRAL instruments can be transplanted into domestic laws.  
 
UNCITRAL, as a core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of 
international trade law that specializes in commercial law reform worldwide, was 
established to modernize and harmonize the rules on international business.
79
 Only 
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Official Records of the General Assembly, 21
st
 Session, Resolution 2205 (XXI), 
A/RES/2205(XXI), 17 December 1966, < 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html> accessed on 15
th
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when the countries accept and apply the legislative guides and model provisions 
formulated by UNCITRAL can the aims of modernization and harmonization be 
achieved. As a matter of fact, UNCITRAL has not only issued the Legislative Guide 
and Model Provisions on PFIPs, it has also issued many other instruments in other 
areas of international business. Whether global legal harmonization in these areas 
can be achieved depends on the extent to which countries accept and apply these 
instruments.
80
 
 
This thesis, taking the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions on PFIPs made by 
UNCITRAL as an example, analyses and discusses how the UNCITRAL 
instruments could be transplanted into Chinese laws. It therefore provides a good 
case example for China’s receptivity to future transplants of other guides and model 
provisions made by UNCITRAL. 
1.5 Methodology 
Three kinds of methodology are used during the research to complete this thesis. 
1.5.1 The doctrinal approach  
The doctrinal approach will involve an examination of the existing regulations, 
recommendations and statutes on PFIPs. The main focus will be the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions on PFIPs made by UNCITRAL and the current 
Chinese laws on PFIPs. At certain points, the thesis will also reference conventions 
made by other international organizations and the law in other countries. The 
purpose of this approach is to establish defects in current Chinese laws on PFIPs and 
consider whether the recommendations in the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions provide the best way to solve these defects. If certain aspects remain 
problematic, the thesis explores whether they could be supplemented by the laws of 
other countries, for example Britain. 
                                                 
80
 McCormack Gerard, ‘Secured credit and the harmonisation of law, the UNCITRAL Experience’ 
(Edward Elgar, USA 2011) P2-6,P15-20 
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1.5.2 The theoretical approach  
The theoretical approach will consider principles of international investment law 
such as harmonization, fairness, transparency and efficiency, etc.
81
 The use of this 
approach is to demonstrate what international standards the Chinese law reform on 
PFIPs should aim to achieve. 
1.5.3 The comparative approach  
The comparative approach is the primary methodology used in this thesis. It 
includes the comparison between the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made 
by UNCITRAL and other international agreements to indicate why the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions provide most appropriate guide to Chinese law reform 
on PFIPs; the comparison between the draft and final versions of the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions to explain the background and the meaning of the 
recommendations; the comparison between British laws and other countries’ laws on 
PFIPs to explain why British law is chosen as a supplement; the comparison 
between the recommendations in the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions and 
current Chinese laws on PFIPs to establish the defects in Chinese laws. This 
approach best establishes the most suitable provisions for the reform of Chinese 
legislation on PFIPs. 
 
The cases from both China and other countries are compared as well. The data and 
cases pertaining to Chinese PFIPs will be sourced from the database established by 
the China Construction Department, which is open to public. Some additional data 
will be taken from the websites of the companies acting as concessioners in PFIPs. 
The comparison of the successful cases and failed cases can establish the defects of 
Chinese laws on PFIPs. The data and cases pertaining to PFIPs in other countries 
                                                 
81
 Qureshi Asif H, and Ziegler Andreas R., ‘International Economic Law’ (2nd edn Thomson: sweet 
& maxwell 2007) P399-437; Subedi Surya P, ‘International Investment Law’ (2nd edition, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2012), P8-11, P189-192 
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will be sourced from the databases established by the World Bank
82
, which always 
plays a lender role in PFIPs or Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF)
83
 which has sponsored and assisted the organization of UNCITRAL 
Colloquia on PFIPs
84
. It will compare the impact of the various regulations in other 
countries by referencing particular cases. 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis considers how to reform current Chinese laws on PFIPs to facilitate their 
development in China, by transplanting the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
made by UNCITRAL into Chinese legislation. 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this Chapter 1 as an introduction, 
Chapter 2 demonstrates that current Chinese legislation is not consistent with the 
development of PFIPs in China and a reform is needed. Chapter 3 demonstrates that 
the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL is the best 
international regulation to guide the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs. Chapter 
4 discusses how to reform Chinese legislation on PFIPs in terms of general 
legislative and institutional framework. Chapter 5 discusses how to reform Chinese 
legislation on PFIPs in terms of concessioner selection. Chapter 6 discusses how to 
reform Chinese legislation on PFIPs in terms of the project agreements involve in 
PFIPs. Chapter 7 discusses how to reform Chinese legislation on PFIPs in terms of 
the settlement of disputes. Chapter 8 will conclude this thesis. 
                                                 
82
 The World Bank is a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries 
around the world. It provide low-interest loans, interest-free credits and grants to developing 
countries for a wide array of purposes that include investments in education, health, public 
administration, infrastructure, financial and Private Sector development, agriculture and 
environmental and natural resource management. 
83
 The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) was created in 1999 to act as a catalyst 
to increase Private Sector participation in emerging markets. It provides technical assistance to 
governments to support the creation of a sound enabling environment for private service 
provision. 
84
 UNCITRAL Colloquia on Privately Financed Infrastructure: Legal Framework and Technical 
Assistance, 2-4 July 2001, Vienna. 
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1.6.1 Chapter 1 outline 
Chapter 1 gives the aim and objectives of the thesis at the beginning. After 
illustrating the definition and analysing the feasibility of the PFIPs, the research 
questions which will be answered in the thesis are listed in this chapter and given 
detailed explanation. Contributions of the thesis are displayed to show the 
significance and importance of the research. This chapter also refers to the 
methodologies used and outlines how the thesis will proceed at the end.  
1.6.2 Chapter 2 outline 
Chapter 2 focuses on China. This chapter includes four issues:  
 It examines whether the PFIP model benefits the development of China.  
 It considers whether current Chinese laws on PFIPs are appropriate to protect 
PFIPs from standard risks. 
 It examines whether Chinese politics, judiciary and market are mature 
enough to accept law reforms on PFIPs. 
 It considers the aims of Chinese law reform on PFIPs are expected. 
1.6.3 Chapter 3 outline 
Chapter 3 focuses on UNCITRAL. This chapter includes three issues: 
 It analyses and discusses the international agreements made by other 
international organizations (WTO, OECD, World Bank) and the treaties 
between China and other countries, to point out why they could not provide 
the guidelines for Chinese law reform on PFIPs. 
 It gives the background of UNCITRAL and its Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions. Moreover, it explains why this thesis chooses the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions
85
 made by UNCITRAL to provide the 
guidelines for Chinese law reform on PFIPs. 
 It analyses and discusses the reasons why the other countries’ laws86 are used 
                                                 
85  
The Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, paras. 1-76; 
UNCITRAL Commission 34
th
 Session: 25 June -13 July 2001, Vienna, A/CN.9/488 -  Possible 
work on privately financed infrastructure projects: show the source and aim of Model 
Provisions 
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 Such as British laws, EU laws and so on. 
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as a supplementary reference, and the reasons why they are just used as a 
supplementary reference, rather than as the guidelines for Chinese law 
reform.  
1.6.4 Chapter 4 outline 
Chapter 4 discusses how the general legislative and institutional frameworks on 
PFIPs should be reformed in China, with reference to the Legislative Guide and 
Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL
87
 and supplemented by reference to laws in 
other countries
88
. This includes six recommended changes to current frameworks.   
 The flexibility principle and concise principle: there should be optional use 
of the recommendations in the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, 
rather than their wholesale adoption into Chinese law reform on PFIPs. 
 The structure of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions could also be 
applied to new Chinese legislation. 
 Transparency. On the one hand, it requires that laws and administrative 
procedures should offer clear and readily accessible laws and efficient 
procedures. On the other hand, it requires that laws and administrative 
procedures should force the Public Sector to publish information on 
decisions. The Beijing Regulations
89
 in China is used as an example to show 
the defects in transparency in current Chinese law. 
 Fairness. It requires a balance between public interest, private interest and 
customer interest. China has an unreasonable “public interest precedence 
principle” and has no concern for customer interest. 
 Long-term sustainability. On the one hand, it requires the legislation to 
ensure that the host country has the institutional capacity to undertake the 
various tasks entrusted to public authorities involved in infrastructure 
projects throughout their phases of implementation. On the other hand, it 
                                                 
87
 The Legislative Guide, recommendation 1-11 and chap. I, General Legislative and Institutional 
Framework; Model Provisions, chap. I on General Provisions, Model provision 1-4 on Preamble 
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 The British regulations about the regulatory institutions; The British special regulations about  the 
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requires the legislation to ensure marketization to achieve a correct balance 
between competitive and monopolistic provision of public services. The 
model provisions about regulatory institutions are not sufficient in the Model 
Provisions.
90
 Therefore, the Chinese reform on the regulatory institution 
should make reference to the model in Britain.
91
 
 Eliminating undesirable restriction. This requires the elimination of 
undesirable restrictions on Private Sector participation in infrastructure 
development and operation. The chapter therefore discusses three Chinese 
laws on PFIPs which make undesirable restrictions—the Constitution, the 
Land Law and the Foreign Exchange Law.  
1.6.5 Chapter 5 outline 
Chapter 5 discusses how the concessioner selection procedures of PFIPs should be 
reformed in China, with reference to the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
made by UNCITRAL
92
 and supplementary reference to other countries
93
.  
 The pre-selection stage should be fair and transparent. There are two matters 
at stake: One is whether an infrastructure project is needed. The other is 
whether a private investor should be allowed to access the infrastructure 
projects. The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions
94
 do not consider 
how the law authorizes private investors to access the host countries’ markets, 
so EU regulations are consulted here to discuss the best way to reform 
Chinese law. 
 The private concessioner selection procedure should be based on fair and 
transparent competition. PFIPs require not only fairness and transparency, 
but also economy and efficiency. Concomitantly, the laws should provide 
suitable regulations on its competitive selection procedure. There is no 
                                                 
90
 The Legislative Guide, recommendation 7-11 and chap. I, General Legislative and Institutional 
Framework, E on Authority to regulate infrastructure service paras.30-53. But the regulatory 
institution is not referred in the Model Provisions at all. 
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 Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the concessioner, Model provision 5-27; the Legislative 
Guide, recommendation 14-39 and chap. III on Selection of the concessioner 
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specific selection procedure for the concessioner of PFIPs in China, but the 
general selection procedures in bidding
95
 and procurement
96
 are used. 
However, in certain circumstances, concessions may be awarded without 
competitive procedure. The law should clarify these exceptional 
circumstances to ensure the fairness and transparency of the procedure. 
 After a concessioner is selected, disputes on the selection result or procedure 
should be settled properly. In order to safeguard proper adherence to the 
rules governing the selection procedure, bidders should have the right to seek 
a review of the actions by the contracting authority that are in violation of 
those rules, or of the rights of bidders. 
 As an exception from the general concessioner selection procedure, there is a 
special selection procedure, i.e. unsolicited proposal. In China, there is no 
procedure whereby unsolicited proposals may be acknowledged and 
accepted. It is worth considering the applicability of unsolicited proposal, 
and this thesis offers a hypothesis of the role of this for the future in Chinese 
Law.  
1.6.6 Chapter 6 outline 
Chapter 6 discusses how the relevant laws on the agreements involved in PFIPs 
should be reformed in China, with reference to the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions
97
.  
 The legal framework for PFIPs includes four kinds of agreements. The 
project agreement is the core agreement and may restrict the other three 
kinds of agreements—finance agreement, user agreement and subcontracting 
agreement. At the same time, the other three kinds of agreements may also 
affect each other.  
 The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions consider that the content of 
                                                 
95 
The Bidding Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Ninth National People’s Congress at the 11th Session on 30th August, 1999 and effective date at 
1
st
 January, 2000 
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 Government Procurement Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing 
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project agreement should be flexible enough to negotiate, but that there may 
be some mandatory orders to limit the flexibility in drafting the project 
agreement. Six issues in project agreement are discussed: Organization of the 
project company; Real estate (project assets, land, easements); Security 
interests; Performance guarantee; Protection of customers; Duration, 
extension and termination. 
 The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions suggest that the finance 
agreement should consider the step-in right of lenders to take over the 
concession when the previous concessioner cannot continue the project. This 
suggestion should be considered for Chinese law reform. 
 The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions suggest that the subcontracting 
agreement should consider a possible conflict of interest in the project 
company when its investor is also the subcontractor. This suggestion should 
be considered for Chinese law reform. 
 The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions suggest that the user agreement 
should consider extra protection for special customers using the public 
service. This suggestion should be considered for Chinese law reform. 
1.6.7 Chapter 7 outline 
Chapter 7 discusses how the regulations on the dispute settlement of PFIPs should 
be reformed in China, with reference to the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions
98
 and with supplementary reference to other countries
99
.  
 The disputes between the contracting authority and the concessioner.100 It is 
difficult to define whether the nature of the project agreement in PFIPs is 
“public” or “private”. The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
recommend a series of methods that range from conciliatory methods to 
antagonistic methods. However, in practice in China, the public authority 
                                                 
98
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of Disputes; and the Model Provisions 
accompanied therein, Chap. V on Settlement of Disputes. 
99
 The definition of public contract in Britain is broad. 
100
 Model Provisions, Chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 49; the Legislative Guide, 
recommendation 69 and Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, paras. 3-41 
    Administrative Reconsideration Law of The People's Republic of China, adopted at the Ninth 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on 29th April, 
1999; amended in accordance with the Decision Amendment Parts of Laws as adopted at the 
tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National Congress on August 27, 2009 
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often intervenes in this kind of agreement and a lot of disputes are solved by 
administrative act or Administrative Law. 
 The disputes between the concessioner and other participants in PFIPs.101 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend that the 
settlement of these disputes should be open to agreement by the parties. The 
current Chinese laws are consistent with the recommendations from the 
Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions. 
 The disputes involving customers or terminal users.102 The Legislative Guide 
and the Model Provisions recommend that, in addition to litigation and 
arbitration, the host countries should establish special mechanisms for 
handling claims brought by their customers. China already has the relevant 
mechanisms. 
 This thesis hypothesises that the parties in PFIPs could establish complete 
consistency in the arbitration provisions for the various contracts, but that 
this would be difficult to achieve. 
1.6.8 Chapter 8 outline 
Building upon the above analysis and discussion, the last chapter, Chapter 8, will 
conclude the main findings of the research as regards Chinese legislation on PFIPs. 
By reconnecting arguments from previous chapters, the conclusion will clearly 
indicate that: it is the time to reform Chinese legislation on PFIPs; the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL could guide this reform of 
Chinese legislation on PFIPs; the Chinese legislation reformed with reference to the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL could be improved to 
facilitate PFIPs in China. 
                                                 
101
 Model Provisions, Chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 51; the Legislative Guide, 
recommendation 70 and Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, paras. 42 
    Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Ninth National People’s Congress 
2
nd
 Session on 15
th
 March, 1999, executive at 1
st
 October, 1999: Chapter 7 on Liabilities for 
Breach of Contracts;  Chapter 8 on Other Provisions 
102
 Model Provisions, Chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 50; the Legislative Guide, 
recommendation 71 and Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, paras. 43-45 
    Consumer protection Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Standing Committee 
of the Eighth National People’s Congress at 4th Session on 31st Octobe, 1993 and executive at 1st 
January, 1994. 
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Chapter 2  
The necessity of reforming Chinese legislation on PFIPs 
Introduction  
PFIPs have brought many benefits since they began to be used in China in the 
1980s.
1
 During this development period, however, some of the challenges facing 
PFIPs have also become apparent. Many of these challenges could be avoided or 
remedied through the reformation or improvement of laws. Therefore, it is necessary 
to reform the Chinese laws on PFIPs. Chinese policies and the Chinese market have 
also developed and matured. Therefore, it is the proper time to reform and improve 
the Chinese laws on PFIPs to catch up with international developments in the use of 
PFIPs and facilitate their use in China.  
 
The aim of this Chapter is to prove that legislative reform on PFIPs in China is 
necessary and possible, and new laws would facilitate the development of PFIPs in 
China. 
 
This chapter has four objectives. The first objective is to prove that the private 
finance of public infrastructure is feasible in China and has brought many benefits to 
China through reviewing the history of development of PFIPs in China. The second 
objective is to demonstrate that China needs to reform its current laws on PFIPs by 
highlighting the shortcomings of the current Chinese laws on PFIPs, which are not 
strong enough to face the challenges to Chinese PFIPs. The third objective is to 
examine whether the financial conditions in China are mature enough to start this 
process of legislative reform. The final objective is to forecast what may be 
reasonably expected from the new laws. The guidelines to be followed will be 
analysed in Chapter 3 and the reform necessary to achieve the aims expected will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4 through Chapter 7. 
                                                 
1
 Shen Jiyong, Wang ShouQing, Qiang Maoshan, ‘The Political Risks in China's BOT/PPP Project: a 
case study’, Chinese Businessmen Investment and Finance, pp. 50-56, No. 1, 2005 
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This Chapter consists of four sections. Section 2.1 describes the developing history 
of PFIPs in China and the benefits brought to China by PFIPs. Section 2.2 states the 
risks facing PFIPs in China and the shortcomings of current laws on PFIPs, which 
cannot address these risks. Section 2.3 presents the current conditions in China 
(politics, judiciary, market), which show that the situation is mature enough to 
achieve legislative reform. Section 2.4 indicates the aims that the new laws should 
achieve through the reform, so that the new laws can cope with the development of 
PFIPs and facilitate them in China.  
 
This chapter answers the first research question—whether China needs to reform its 
laws on PFIPs to facilitate PFIPs in China. The chapter concludes that it does. 
2.1 The impact of PFIPs in China  
Ever since the planned economy in China has begun to transfer to a market economy, 
most markets in China have allowed private finance sector to enter. With the 
exception of national defence and some special industries related to the lifelines of 
the national economy, the infrastructure market has opened up to private finance. 
The PFIPs model has been developing in China for more than twenty years and been 
used in various projects.
2
 Most PFIPs have been a remarkable success and brought 
many benefits to China.
3
 
2.1.1 The developing history of PFIPs in China 
The following are five examples of typical PFIPs used for various different kinds of 
infrastructure in different periods. They show that, in China, PFIPs have begun to be 
used in more and more important large-scale projects and applied to a wider scope 
of projects. Meanwhile, the legal structures of PFIPs have become more complicated.  
                                                 
2
 Qi Xia, Ke Yongjiang,Wang ShouQing, ‘Analysis of Critical Risk Factors Causing the Failures of 
China’s PPP Projects’(2009), China soft science, pp.107-113, (5), 2009 
3
 Chan A.P.C., Chan D.W.M., Yeung J.F.Y., Xu Y.L, Wang S.Q. and Ke Y.J. ‘Critical Risk Factors 
Affecting the Success of PPP Projects in China: A Delphi Study’, Journal of Management in 
Engineering, ASCE, 2010, 136(5): 484-494 
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2.1.1.1 First PFIP in China: Shajiao B Power Plant 
 In China, the first infrastructure project to use private investment was the B Power 
Plant in Shajiao, Guangdong Province, in 1984.
4
 This project adopted a BOT 
structure in which Hong Kong Hopewell Holdings Ltd. financed and constructed the 
whole project in exchange for the concession to operate the Power Plant for ten 
years, after which it returned the Plant to the GuangDong Provincial Government in 
good condition. The legal structure (see Figure 2.1) in this first Chinese PFIP was 
based on simple contracts and there was no management or control by relevant 
regulations or laws on PFIPs. The Figure 2.1 illustrates that Hong Kong Hopewell 
Holdings Ltd. was at the core of the project. It made financial contracts with banks 
to obtain the loan to invest in the B Power Plant. It also made a concession contract 
with GuangDong Provincial Government to entitle it to design, maintain and operate 
the B Power Plan and make returns on the profits. Ownership of the B Power Plan 
passed to the GuangDong Provincial Government after the concession, as per 
agreement in the concession contract. 
Figure 2.1 PFIP Legal structure in B Power Plant 
                                                 
4
 Wang Ren Nong, ‘Practice and Legal perfection of BOT investment in China’ (2005) Journal of 
Jinling institute of technology (vol.19 No.4, 2005) 42. 
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2.1.1.2 PFIPs used in China’s Western Development 
PFIPs have been widely applied in China’s Western Development5 in the past ten 
years. At the beginning of this period, the density of rail and road per square 
kilometre in China’s Western Regions was only 1/3rd of the national average. In the 
Western Regions (See Figure 2.2), not only was the level of transport infrastructure 
lower than the national average, but other forms of infrastructure were also 
backward.
6
 Therefore, infrastructure had to be greatly improved before the Western 
Regions could be further developed.
7
 As a part of China’s Western Development, 
both domestic private investment and foreign private investment have financed 
public infrastructure such as roads, rail and hydraulic projects in the Western 
Regions.
8
 It is notable that PFIPs have been successful even in least developed rural 
areas of the Western Regions, although they were only applied in some small 
projects.
9
 For example, PFIPs were applied in all small-scale irrigation construction 
in the least developed city—Yan’an. The total investments of approximately 3 
million US dollars only involved 1 million US dollars of government finance; the 
rest came from private finance. The assets belonged to Public Sector in the end, 
                                                 
5
 In January 2000, a Leadership Group for China’s Western Development was created by the State 
Council, which marked the start of deploying Chinese western region. The Chinese economy is 
unbalanced seriously between eastern and western regions. China's western regions includes 6 
provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), 5 autonomous regions 
(Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang), and 1 municipality (Chongqing). 
These regions occupy 71.4% of mainland China's area, which own 82.5% of the nation's total 
water resource, 36% of the nation's coal reserves, 53% of its natural gas reserves. However, the 
western regions only have 28.8% of national population in 2002, and only produce 16.8% of 
national GDP in 2003. GDP per capita in Chinese western regions is only about 2/3 of the 
national average, even less than 40% of the average of eastern regions. The aim of China’s 
Western Development is to facilitate the development of western economy so that the gap 
between rich eastern and poor western could be narrowed. Therefore, in this case, enormous 
infrastructure is demanded in Chinese western region. ‘Western development strategy’, China 
daily Newspaper (22
nd
 December, 2009) < 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/westdevelopment/2009-12/22/content_9215054.htm> 
accessed on 22
nd
 July, 2013; ‘Economy improving in China’s west region’, China daily 
Newspaper (22
nd
 July, 2013) <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8335126.html> accessed 
on 23
rd
 July, 2013 
6
 Xia Aiping, Li Jianzhong, ‘Innovation in infrastructure financing in western area: a PPP 
pattern’(2004), Journal of ChongQing Technology and Business University(West Economic 
Forum), Feb.2004 pp.75-78 
7 
Wang Zhou Xi & Zhang Yong, ‘Feasibility Analysis of PPP Financing Pattern on Infrastructure 
Construction in the West Part of China’ (2003) Journal of Northwest Sci-Tech University of 
Agriculture and Forestry (Social Science Edition)  
8
 ibid 
9
 Guo Rui Ping & Guo Juan-Juan, ‘The application and perfection of the PPP Mode in China’s 
western rural infrastructure supply’(2009), Research on Western Development, May, 2009, 
pp.19-23 
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while the concessioners took the right to charge the users and the responsibility to 
manage, operate and maintain the facilities.
10
  
 
 
Figure 2.2 The provinces involved in China’s Western Development11 
2.1.1.3 PFIP used in Beijing Olympic Stadium 
The most famous PFIP in China is the Olympic stadium, constructed in 2006.
12
 It 
was co-owned by the Beijing State-Owned Assets Management Co. Ltd (BSAM), 
which represented the Beijing local government and owned 58% of the total 
assets, and the China International Trust and Investment (CITIC) Consortium, which 
held the rest of the assets. Composed of BSAM and CITIC, the Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV)
13
 in this instance was called the National Stadium Co Ltd. and was 
responsible for financing, construction, operation and management of the project. 
                                                 
10
 Guo Rui Ping & Guo Juan-Juan, ‘PPP model for the supply of China’s western rural 
infrastructure’ (2009), Journal of Chang’an University (Social Science Edition) (Vol 11 No.3, 
Sept 2009) 
11
 The website of China Western Development,  
<http://www.chinawest.gov.cn/web/Column1.asp?ColumnId=6> accessed on 9
th
 March 2011  
12
 Beijing National Stadium, <http://www.chinauniquetour.com/arts.asp?place=4&id=5223> 
accessed on 23
rd
 February, 2011 
13
 SPV (special purpose vehicle): a special purpose entity is a legal entity (usually a limited company 
of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or 
temporary objectives. The Project Company as an SPV cannot carry out any other business that 
is not part of the project. E. R. Yescombe, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and 
Finance’(ELSEVIER 2007) P109 
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CITIC had a post-games concession to operate the stadium for 30 years. It is notable 
that this PFIP involved a foreign element—the Golden State Holding Group 
Corporation, which owned 2.1% of the shares in CITIC.
14
 The legal structure (see 
Figure 2.3) of this PFIP is much more complicated than that of the Shajiao B Power 
Plant. Firstly, with regard to financial source, the Beijing Olympic Stadium project 
financed by more than one private investor and they put in their own money as well 
as bank loans. In this case, the Beijing Olympic Stadium project had various 
investors involved. Figure 2.3 illustrates how the National Stadium Co Ltd. was the 
core in the project. It was financed by BSAM which represented the Beijing local 
government and CITIC which included many finance sources, such as the CITIC 
Group itself, the Beijing Urban Construction Group and the American Golden State 
Holding Group. 42% of the investment was derived from private investors. Secondly, 
with regard to profit disposition, a number of shareholders were entitled to share 
profits in Beijing Olympic Stadium project. The National Stadium Co Ltd. obtained 
concession from the Beijing local government and took the responsibility to 
construct, maintain and operate the Olympic stadium. Its profits from this project 
would be shared with its investors in CITIC. The BSAM, which represented the 
Beijing local government, gave up its share in the profits because the Olympic 
stadium property would be owned by the Beijing local government after a 30 year 
concession. Thirdly, with regard to project performance, the National Stadium Co 
Ltd. did not take all the responsibilities of design, maintenance and operation nor did 
it assign the responsibilities to other companies. The National Stadium Co Ltd. made 
a subcontract with CITIC, in which CITIC took responsibility for the operation and 
got a corresponding payment from the National Stadium Co Ltd. The fact that 
CITIC obtained the payment from National Stadium Co Ltd. may result in a conflict 
of interest because CITIC is also one of the investors in National Stadium Co Ltd. 
This kind of subcontract makes the legal relationships more complicated in this PFIP 
project and a proper legal framework needs to be in operation to monitor the 
relationships involved. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The website of Golden State Holding Group Corporation,  
<http://www.goldenstate.com.cn/index2.html>  accessed on 23
rd
 February, 2011 
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Figure 2.3 PFIP Legal structure in Olympic stadium 
2.1.1.4 PFIPs used in Low-rent housing 
PFIPs are also used in the emerging Low-rent Housing Plan
15
 in China. Private 
investment finances low-rent housing in various forms. For example, some private 
investors cover all costs in house construction, own the property and then operate 
them as low-rent housing (BOO);
16
 some private investors pay all costs for the 
house construction and operation, but the low-rent housing is returned to the 
government at the end of the concession (BOT);
17
 some private investors only pay 
                                                 
15 
Chinese government offers the minimum living standard houses with very little Charge or without 
charge to its citizens who are too poor to afford normal rent. It is alike the social housing in 
Britain, which were built and operated by local councils to supply uncrowded, well-built homes 
on secure tenancies at reasonable rents to people who cannot afford buying a house. Paul 
Reeves, ‘An Introduction to Social Housing’ (2nd ed, Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann 2005), 
P1-3,P245-248 
16
 BOO is similar as the BOT, but the Private Sector owns the facility permanently and is not under 
an obligation to transfer it back to the contracting authority. 
17
 BOT is the fundamental and typical selection. The government grants a Private Sector a concession 
to build an infrastructure, and operate it during the concession period to cover the cost and 
reasonable profit, and then to transfer the infrastructure back at the end of the concession period 
without charge. 
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for the operation and maintenance costs of existing state-owned low-rent housing 
(O&M);
18
 other private investors are initiatives to finance and offer services under 
relevant regulations and laws (PFI).
19
 Although private investors in Low-rent 
Housing PFIPs may not have large profits, they garner other social benefits such as a 
reputation for enterprise and the public trust. Figure 2.4 illustrates the various 
private investment contributions to building public infrastructure in Low-rent 
Housing Projects by model. Private investors can invest in existing houses, build 
new houses or re-build or renovate existing houses through various models, such as 
Service, O&M, BOT, BOO or PFI. Since there is a variable legal structure in Low-
rent Housing PFIPs, the Public-Private relationships are different in the 
infrastructure projects. The Service model, in which the private investor just offers a 
direct service, involves the lowest level of private investment into public 
infrastructure buildings. In ascending levels of private investment are the O&M, 
BOT and BOO models.  The PFI model involves the highest level of private finance. 
Figure 2.4 PFIPs Legal structure in Low-rent housing
20
 
 
                                                 
18
 O&M (or M&O Maintain and Operation) means the Private Sector finances on the maintenance of 
the existing infrastructure and then operates the facility to return its cost and reasonable profits 
during the allowed period. 
19
 PFI, a Public Sector body contracts with a Private Sector provider to purchase services it requires 
on a long-term basis. Typically this will involve the provider in the design, construction, 
financing and operation of a new capital asset (e.g. a road). On completion of the project, the 
Public Sector buys the services, but not the capital asset itself. 
20
 Wang Qian Kun & Wang Shu Qiang, ‘Application of PPP pattern in low-rent housing’(2007), 
Construction Economy(Vol10, No 300, 2007) P27 
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2.1.1.5 PFIPs used in Railway Network Plan 
According to the requirements in the "Long-term Railway Network Plan"
21
, China's 
railway infrastructure is scheduled to rise from 73,000 km of track at the end of 
2003 to 10 million km by 2020. Most of the railway projects have been, and will 
continue to be, implemented as PFIPs.  
 
To sum up, despite a slowdown after 2008 economic crisis, the PFIP model is 
continues to be widely applied in China, as illustrated in the following bar chart 
(Figure 2.5). As the following pie chart (Figure 2.6) illustrates, the PFIP model is 
broadly applied in various infrastructure sectors. 
 
Figure 2.5 Private Investments in the Chinese Infrastructure Development
22
 
                                                 
21 
January 2004, the State Council Standing Committee discussed and adopted the "long-term railway 
network plan”, which is the first industry plan approved by the State Council and is also the 
railway construction blueprint until 2020. 
22
 World Bank (2009), ‘Country Snapshots: China. Private Participation in Infrastructure Database’, 
<http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/ppi_exploreCountry.aspx?countryID=50.> accessed on 6
th
 
March 2011. The data are shown in a table in the website of World Bank and I reform them into 
a bar chart which is clearer. 
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Figure 2.6 Private Investments in the Chinese various infrastructure sectors ($ 
million)
23
 
 
2.1.2 The benefits brought to China by PFIPs 
With the development of PFIPs in China, the benefits brought to China by PFIPs 
have risen gradually.   
 
Firstly, PFIPs solve the shortage of government funding for public infrastructure. 
Private finance played an important role in China’s Western Development. Between 
2003 and 2008, the investment capital for infrastructure in Western China was 1.2 
trillion Yuan (approximately £120 billion), which included capital 61.6% from 
national finance, 4.6% from foreign investors and 7% from domestic private 
investors.
24
 According to the budget drawn up by the People’s Bank of China, the 
capital demands for China’s Western Development between 2006 and 2015 are 20.9 
                                                 
23
 Ibid. The data are shown in a table in the website of World Bank and I reform them into a pie chart 
which is clearer. 
24
 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘Basic industries and infrastructure building have brilliant 
achievements ’ ， published on 15th September, 2009  
<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/qzxzgcl60zn/t20090915_402587081.htm> accessed on 24
th
 
July, 2013  
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trillion Yuan (about £2.09 trillion), including 2.01 trillion Yuan (about £201 billion) 
for the building of infrastructure. However, the national finance (including loans 
from central bank) can only supply 70% of this figure.
25
 Therefore, PFIPs which 
could adopt (foreign) private investment into public infrastructure were, and 
continue to be, used to fill the funding gap. The same situation is evident in low-rent 
housing construction. The investigation report on the implementation of affordable 
housing construction issued by NPC
26
 shows that the completion rate was only 
23.6% before the end of August 2009 because of the funding shortage. Therefore, 
other construction projects have had to consider relying on PFIPs. The “Long-term 
Railway Network Plan” referred to above requires China's railway miles to rise from 
73,000 km of track at the end of 2003 to 10 million km in 2020. Completing this 
project will cost more than 2 trillion RMB (about US$250 billion) in total, or 
US$1,000 billion per year.
27
 Government would find it impossible to fund this huge 
investment fully. Therefore, PFIPs which can raise private investment are an 
appropriate way to solve the twin dilemmas of the railway development and funding 
shortages.   
 
Secondly, PFIPs promote the initiative of private investors in assisting the further 
development of Chinese public service. Generally, the PFIPs involve a long-term 
agreement, which allows the private investors to return their costs and get profits 
through operating the infrastructure built or developed. Only if the infrastructure 
operates properly, do the private investors acquire profits smoothly and efficiently. 
On the one hand, the private investors need to attract more users, so they have to try 
to offer better public service. This leads to the Private Sector bringing skills and 
expertise to a project that the Public Sector lacks. On the other hand, the operation 
of infrastructure is closely related to the local environment, so the private investors 
generally support and encourage local development. The Public or Private Sector, 
working together, can achieve results that the Chinese public authorities cannot on 
their own. In China’s Western Development, the private investors who financed 
                                                 
25
 The People’s bank of China, ‘China’s Western Development finance reform survey’ (19th 
December, 2005), <http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1037/3952777.html> accessed on 24
th
 
July, 2013 
26
 NPC stand for Standing committee of the national people's congress 
27
 January 2004, the State Council Standing Committee discussed and adopted the "long-term railway 
network plan”, which is the first industry plan approved by the State Council and is also the 
railway construction blueprint until 2020.  
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early public infrastructure may pay more attention to, encourage and adhere to the 
plans for Western Development because their profits are intertwined with the whole 
development. Once the Chinese West is prosperous, this infrastructure could be 
frequently used. This would reduce the time taken to recover costs, which would 
increase the profits. Therefore, the private investors who finance the infrastructure in 
Western China pay attention to, and support, the whole Western Development 
project.   
 
Thirdly, PFIPs encourage the establishment of market competition mechanisms in 
China. The public infrastructure market is traditionally monopolised by the state or 
SOEs.
28
 In PFIPs, there is competition between private investors to win the 
concession, and public infrastructure projects are implemented by the concessioner 
who is considered to be the most suitable.
29
 
 
Fourthly, PFIPs promote efficiency and reduce costs. The B Power Plant in Shajiao, 
Guangdong Province provides a convincing example.目 This project was completed 
a year ahead of schedule—in only 22 months—because the private investor, who 
wanted to be repaid as soon as possible, was efficient in constructing the plant.
30
 
More importantly, the operation cost of the project was lower than that of the 
Guangdong State-owned Electricity Grid. There are doubts as to whether the returns 
for the private investor were too large, but, after an investigation, the Guangdong 
Provincial Economic Commission concluded that the rate of return was 
reasonable.
31
 First, the private investor used excellent management and operational 
skills to promote efficiency and reduce costs. Secondly, the risks the concessioner 
took were equal to the rate of return, since a one year extension of the project would 
have reduced the rate of return.
32
 Examples such as these have led to the recognition 
                                                 
28
 SOEs stand for State-owned Enterprises which is a legal entity created by a government to 
undertake commercial activities on behalf of an owner government. 
29
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) 
30
 The website of Project Management Union, 
<http://www.mypm.net/articles/show_article_content.asp?articleID=12238> accessed on 23
rd
 
February, 2011 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ke Y.J., Wang S.Q. and Chan A.P.C.. ‘Risk Allocation in Public-Private Partnership 
Infrastructure Projects: Comparative Study’, Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 16(4): 343-351. 
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of PFIPs by all levels of government.
33
 
 
Finally, PFIPs can assist in fighting corruption on major infrastructure projects, 
especially in China. In traditional government procurement, the Chinese government 
itself finances the projects. Even if the concession of designs, constructions and 
operations may be awarded to private companies or SOE, it is hard to say whether 
all funds are used on the project. The statistics of the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China show that, from September 2009 to 
March 2011, the amount of money related to corruption in infrastructure projects is 
2.99billion Yuan (about £299 million).
34
 However, in the case of PFIPs the Chinese 
government only monitors and regulates the project construction and operation of 
private investors, rather than controlling the funding of the infrastructure project. 
Though the PFIPs model may not prevent bribes or other actions lacking in integrity 
during the concessioner selection processes or the administration of the contract, at 
the very least government officials cannot misappropriate public funds which were 
distributed for these projects. Therefore, the PFIPs model prevents a degree of 
governmental corruption in infrastructure projects. Additionally, even if the private 
investor bribes the government officials or the private investors suffer from the 
extortion of bribes during the selection processes or the administration of the 
contract, it may be easier for the Anti-Corruption Department to cooperate with the 
private investors in PFIPs, who wish to protect their capital and their long-term 
interests, than the SOE,
35
 who may be inclined to conspire with government 
officers.
36
 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Report on 20 typical 
corruption cases on infrastructure projects’(18th May, 2011), 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-05/17/c_121426712.htm>accessed on 25
th
 July, 2013 
35
 In China, the government senior officers are usually appointed to the senior executives in State-
owned Enterprises to ensure the SOE under control of government. Therefore, the government 
and the SOEs have interest binding more or less. 
36
 Avina Jeffrey, ‘Public-Private Partnerships in the fight against crime: an emerging frontier in 
corporate social responsibility’ (Journal of Financial Crime 2011)P282 
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2.2 The shortcomings of China’s current laws on PFIPs  
In China, not all PFIPs have achieved the successes of the cases detailed in section 
2.1. As PFIPs have developed and become longer, larger and more complicated, 
some PFIPs have failed because of the various risks facing them, causing losses to 
both the Public and Private Sector. However, some of these risks are caused by the 
shortcomings of the current Chinese laws on PFIPs. Some of these risks could be 
reduced or avoided by improving the laws, and others could be remedied afterwards 
by enhancing provisions in existing laws. In other words, the current Chinese laws 
are insufficient to protect PFIPs from these risks, so it is necessary to reform 
Chinese laws on PFIPs. 
2.2.1 Chinese laws on PFIPs 
Although China’s current laws on PFIPs are not perfect, the relevant regulations and 
laws have been improving.  
 
The first Chinese PFIP—B Power Plant in Shajiao, Guangdong Province in 1984—
was based on simple contracts. The modern Contract Law of the People’s Republic 
of China had not been issued at that point. Therefore, it seems that the contracts in 
the first Chinese PFIP were regulated under the People’s Republic of China on 
Economic Contract Involving Foreign Interest and the Economic Contract Law of 
the People‘s Republic of China.37 However, neither statute could properly regulate 
the contracts in the project. The former one only regulates economic enterprises 
rather than Public Sector.
38
 The latter only regulates contracts without foreign 
elements. As a matter of fact, there was no law or regulation to monitor or manage 
the first PFIP. 
 
                                                 
37
 Both of them were repealed in 1999 and replaced by Contract Law of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
38
 The People’s Republic of China on Economic Contract Involving Foreign Interest 1985, expired in 
1999:  
         Article 2: This Law shall apply to economic contracts concluded between enterprises or other 
economic organizations of the People's Republic of China and foreign enterprises, other 
economic organizations or individuals…… 
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A number of laws and regulations relevant PFIP were issued in the decade following 
that of the first PFIP case. Relevant laws included:  
Guarantee Law issued on 30th June 1995
39
 
Contract Law issued on 15th March 1999
40
 
Bidding Law issued on 30th August 1999
41
 
Relevant legal documents included
42
:  
Circular Concerning the Issues of Absorbing Foreign Investment 
through BOT issued in 1995
43
 
Circular Concerning the Issues of the Approval and Administration of 
Experimental Foreign-invested Concession Projects issued in 1995. 
Temporary Provisions of the Ministry of Construction on Utilizing 
Foreign Capital in Municipality Public Utilities issued in 2000. 
Over this period, PFIPs could be regulated by general laws but there were still no 
specific provisions for PFIPs. Although the first legal document on PFIPs—Circular 
Concerning the Issues of Absorbing Foreign Investment through BOT—was issued 
                                                 
39
 The Guarantee Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 14th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on June 
30, 1995, and shall enter into force as of October 1
st
, 1995:   
    Article 2: This Law is enacted with a view to promoting the accommodation of funds and the 
circulation of commodities, ensuring the enforcement of creditor's rights and developing the 
socialist market economy. 
40
 The Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted and Promulgated by the Second 
Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on March 15th, 1999: 
    Article 3 Contract parties enjoy equal legal standing and neither party may impose its will on the 
other party. 
    Article 8 A lawfully formed contract is legally binding on the parties. The parties shall perform 
their respective obligations in accordance with the contract，and neither party may arbitrarily 
amend or terminate the contract. A lawfully formed contract is protected by law. 
41
 The Bidding Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Ninth National People's Congress at the 11th Session on August 30, 1999, and shall enter into 
force as of January 1st, 2000: 
    Article 3 Bidding shall be carried out for the following construction projects, including the survey, 
design, construction, supervision of the project, and the procurement of the important 
equipment, materials relevant to the construction of the project: (1) large projects of 
infrastructure facility or public utility that have a bearing on the social public interest and the 
safety of the general public…… 
42
 Ke Yongjian, Wang Shouqing & Chan Albert PC, ‘Public-private partnerships in China’s 
infrastructure development: lessons learnt’ < 
http://www.changingroles09.nl/uploads/File/Final.Ke-Wang-Chan.pdf> accessed on 25
th
 July, 
2013 
43 
It is the first Chinese legal document specific on PFIPs. 
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in 1995, it was only a principle to attract foreign investment and had no specific 
legal provisions. 
 
When the Chinese Western Development started in 2000, more legal documents 
facilitating PFIPs were issued, adding to the above laws and legal documents, and 
some of them even focused on the Western Development. 
Relevant legal documents included
44
:  
2001 Several Opinions of the State Development Planning Commission 
concerning the Promotion and Guidance of Private Investment 
2002 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the Relevant 
Issues concerning the Appropriate Handling of the Existing Projects 
Guaranteeing the Fixed Return from Investments by Foreign Parties 
2002 Opinions of the Ministry of Construction on Accelerating the 
Marketization of Urban Utilities 
2004 Administrative Measures on the Concession of Municipal Public 
Utilities 
2004 Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System 
Some legal documents on PFIPs focused on Western Development: 
2008 The notice on the technology policy and technical guidelines on 
the environmental infrastructure  in small towns in Western China
45
 
2010 Central and western regions of infrastructure project loan interest 
subsidy management
46
 
In this period, Chinese legislation started to confirm the position of private 
investment in infrastructure projects. However, even if some legal documents were 
issued for PFIPs in China’s Western Development, PFIPs in general have not 
received any specific legislation yet. 
                                                 
44
 (n 42) 
45
 The notice on the technology policy and technical guidelines on the environmental infrastructure  
in small town of Chinese western, issued by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development of the People’s Republic of China (MOHURD) on 13th November, 2008 
46
 Central and western regions of infrastructure project loan interest subsidy management, issued by 
the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China on 15th March, 2010 
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When the Olympic stadium was built in 2006, the PFIPs were supported by further 
legal documents and many provincial regulations on PFIPs were passed. 
Relevant legal documents included
47
:  
2005 Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging, Supporting 
and Guiding the Development of Individual and Private Economy and 
Other Non-Public Sector of the Economy 
Provincial regulation on PFIPs
48
: 
2005 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal 
public utilities in Hu’nan, Shanxi, Hefei, Wuhan, Shenzhen, Beijing49, 
etc. 
During this period, provincial regulations on PFIPs were passed in some provinces. 
However, there was no national legislation on PFIPs. 
 
The Chinese laws and regulations on PFIPs have kept improving. 
2008 Research Reports of PPP Legislation in Infrastructure 
Development 
2010 Several Opinions of the State Council on Further Doing a Good 
Job in the Utilization of Foreign Investment
50
 
2010  The opinions
 
on encouraging and guiding the healthy 
development of private investment
51
 
2012 The opinion on encouraging and guiding private capital investment 
into railways
52
 
                                                 
47
 (n 42) 
48
 (n 42) 
49
 Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005 
50
 Several Opinions of the State Council on Further Doing a Good Job in the Utilization of Foreign 
Investment, issued by the State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China on 7
th
 May, 2010 
51
 The opinions on encourage and guide the healthy development of private investment, issued by 
State Council on 7
th
 May, 2010 
52
 The opinion on encourage and guide private capital investment in railway, issued by the Ministry 
of Railways on 16
th
 May, 2012 
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2012 The notice on encouraging and guiding the healthy development of 
private investment management issues relating to foreign exchange
53
 
2012 The notice on encouraging private capital to participate in the 
construction of low-rent housing projects
54
 
In this period, Chinese legislation made further efforts to encourage private 
investment into public infrastructure but there was still no national legislation on 
PFIPs. 
2.2.2 The shortcomings 
In China, there is still no national or sectoral legislation governing the awarding of 
concessions or the supervision of the operation in PFIPs.
55
 In certain provinces, 
there may be provincial regulations on PFIPs, but they are only valid in 
corresponding provinces, i.e. the regulation is only applied and valid to the PFIPs in 
the province where the local government made it.
56
 Some negative consequences 
have arisen due to there being only provincial regulations to regulate the behaviour 
of PFIPs in China. 
2.2.2.1 Instability 
The current Chinese laws on PFIPs are unstable. 
 
Provincial regulation is much easier to change than national legislation. In China, 
national legislation must be approved by more than half of the members of the 
                                                 
53
 The notice of encourage and guide the healthy development of private investment management 
issues relating to foreign exchange, issued by State Administration of Foreign Exchange on 11th 
June, 2012 
54
 The notice of encourage private capital to participate in the construction of low-rent housing 
projects, issued by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People’s Republic 
of China (MOHURD) on 20
th
 June, 2012 
55
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) 
56
 e.g. Urban Public Utilities Concession Regulation, issued by the province Shenzhen of China in 
2004; Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation, issued by the province Beijing of China in 
2005; Public Utilities Concession Regulation, issued by the province Xinjiang of China in 2005 
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National People's Congress (NPC)
57
, whereas provincial regulation is issued and 
altered by the provincial government. Sometimes provincial regulations are changed, 
following a decision by central government or a change in national law.
58
 This 
means the regulations issued by provincial governments may be unreliable, and the 
subsequent change in regulations may result in the failure of PFIPs. Long-term 
PFIPs are particularly prone to risk from changes in the laws. The adoption, issuance 
and modification of laws may happen after the signature date of the project 
agreement, which may suspend or terminate the projects. For example, since “Notice 
of the General Office of the State Council on the Relevant Issues concerning the 
Appropriate Handling of the Existing Projects Guaranteeing the Fixed Return from 
Investments by Foreign Parties” was issued in September 2002, those existing 
projects with a promised fixed rate of return from local government were forced into 
“modification”, “purchase”, “transfer” or “cancellation” on the basis of the 
particulars of the concerned project.
59
 
2.2.2.2 Contradiction 
The current Chinese laws on PFIPs are contradictory at times.  
 
Different provincial regulations on PFIPs may result in different laws being applied 
to the same project in different provinces. Infrastructure such as road and rail is 
often constructed a part of cross-provincial projects, which means they may be 
under the jurisdictions of different provinces. The cross-provincial PFIPs may fail 
because of the divergence between local regulations.
60
 For example, the opening of 
toll gates that interlink provinces should be decided by negotiation between the 
                                                 
57 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on March 14, 2004 
Article 64: …Statutes and resolutions are adopted by a majority vote of more than one half of all the 
deputies to the National People s Congress… 
58
 If the provincial government amend the provincial regulations, it should be approved by a majority 
vote of more than on half of all the deputies to the Provincial people’s Congress. However, the 
provincial regulation have to be repealed immediately once it contradict with national 
legislation.  
59
 Wang S.Q. (2006), “Lessons learnt from the PPP practices in China (keynote speech)”, Asian 
Infrastructure Congress 2006, organized by Terrapinn and sponsored by IAPF, Hong Kong, 29-
30
th
 Nov, 2006 
60
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) 
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related provincial governments. However, the negotiations may fail. Although the 
Transportation Department under the State Council could mediate between the 
provinces and make a final decision, this would still delay the project.
61
 It is difficult 
and unnecessary to judge which provincial regulation is right and it is unreasonable 
to use different regulations in different parts of the same project. This means the 
private company who is the concessioner has to follow different regulations and pay 
higher costs. 
2.2.2.3 Ambiguity 
The provincial regulations on PFIPs in China are not comprehensive and not specific 
about all aspects of PFIPs. 
 
The procedure on PFIPs is not clear, and the rights and responsibilities of the parties 
in PFIPs are not clear either. To take the Urban Infrastructure Concession 
Regulation (Beijing) of 2005 as an example
62
 (hereafter referred to as “Beijing 
Regulation”), the provincial regulations are often general and ignore many matters 
pertaining to PFIPs. 
 
Firstly, although some provisions refer to the selection procedure of the 
concessioner, the selection procedure is vague and requires the consultation of other 
laws. Article 11 of the Beijing Regulation provides that concessioner shall be 
selected by such competitive procedures as bidding.
63
 This indicates that a bidding 
procedure may be preferred, in which case the Chinese Bidding Law will 
automatically apply. However, “other” procedures may also be employed, provided 
they are “competitive”, such as Government Procurement Law. 64  The Beijing 
                                                 
61
 Highway Law of the People's Republic of China 1998, Article 64. 
62
 Beijing Regulation is the most typical provincial regulation on PFIPs in China. At the moment, 
most provincial regulations on PFIPs in China are established following its framework. 
Therefore, it is chosen as the template in this thesis. The Urban Infrastructure Concession 
Regulation of Beijing Municipality, passed on Dec.1, 2005 by the People's Congress of Beijing 
Municipality, effective on March 1, 2006. 
63
 Art.11 of the Beijing Regulation. 
64  
The Bidding Law of China does not provide for procedures other than the formal bidding 
procedures, and while in contrast the Chinese Government Procurement Law does provide more 
procurement procedures such as competitive negotiation, among others, it only governs project 
procurement which is financed by state budget. 
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Regulation does not provide further details for the “other” competitive procedures, 
so the procedure may be competitive negotiation.
 
Since the Beijing Regulation 
simply says nothing on this point, it leaves too much scope for the details to be 
ascertained. The long selection procedure may result in the failure of PFIPs.
65
 Even 
if the relevant laws could be ascertained, the general competitive procedures may 
not be appropriate rules of selection, given the features of specific PFIP 
concessioners. 
 
Secondly, although the regulations have provided mandatory provisions on the 
obligations and rights of the Public and Private Sector, they are a very general legal 
framework and some specific aspects on PFIPs have not been considered or 
considered in detail. The Beijing Regulation has no provision regulating 
subcontracting, which is common in PFIPs. Additionally, government is required to 
compensate for the losses suffered by the concessioner if the interest of legitimate 
expectation of the concessioner is prejudiced due to a change in government policy
66
, 
but this method of compensation has not been regulated. 
2.2.2.4 Poor protection on private investors 
The private investors in PFIPs do not have adequate legal protection in China. 
 
The private investors may lose their reasonable interests because of political risks: 
These risks may include poor political decision-making processes, public/political 
opposition, government unreliability and corruption.
67
 For example, in the Qingdao 
VEOLIA Wastewater project, the negotiation took a long time because Qingdao 
local government frequently changed their minds. The government agreed at first to 
quite a high off-take price
68
 but later wished to re-negotiate this with Veolia.
69
 
                                                 
65
 Cao Fuguo, ‘The emerging legal framework for private finance in infrastructure in China: a 
preliminary review of the Beijing Concession Regulation’ (2006), (P.P.L.R. 62) 
66
 Article 30 of the Beijing Regulation. 
67
 Ke Yong Jian, Wang Shouqing & Chan Albert PC, ‘Public-Private Partnership in China’s 
Infrastructure Development: Lessons Learnt’, in H. Wamelink, M. Prins & R Geraedlts (eds), 
Proc. of Int’l Conf. on Changing Roles: New Roles and New Challenges (TU Delft, Faculty of 
AREH, The Netherlands, Oct 5-9, 2009, pp. 177-188) 
68
 The price promised to pay for the service produced by the infrastructure. 
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Another example is the Beijing No.10 Water Plan Project. The reasonable proposal 
of raising Beijing water prices was rejected by local government because of social 
stability and public interest considerations. British Anglian Water Corporation, one 
of the private investors in this project, had to withdraw their investment from this 
project.
70
 
 
Current Chinese law is weak in relation to protecting private investors from political 
risks. Current Chinese Contract Law only covers normal civil rights
71
. When the 
government acts as a negotiating party in PFIPs, Contract Law cannot be applied 
properly to control the government’s behaviour. Once the government delays 
negotiation on the basis of the public interest, the private investor will be faced with 
high costs. In order to enhance the investor’s confidence, there should be laws to 
restrict unnecessary delays by the government, or to provide appropriate 
compensation for the investor’s loss.  China has no relevant laws or regulations at all 
in this regard. The Administrative Reconsideration Law
72
 and Administrative 
                                                                                                                                         
69
 Asian Development Bank, ‘Some important issues and recommendations on marketization (PPP) 
of  China urban water industry’, under Policy Reform Support project-4095, 
<http://www.adb.org/projects/30436-012/details>accessed on 25
th
 July, 2013; translate into 
Chinese on <http://doc.mbalib.com/view/4dfef56bab2c24464666a13add686f50.html> accessed 
on 25
th
 July, 2013 
70
 Ibid; Ke yong-jian, Wang Shou-qing, etc, ‘Changes of Political Risks in China’s PPP 
Projects’(The 6th National Civil Engineering Forum for Graduate Students, Tsinghua 
University2008),< 
http://myweb.polyu.edu.hk/~bsachan/NSFC/private/documents/publications/2008-
PoliticalRisks.pdf> accessed on 25
th
 July, 2013 
71
 The Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted and Promulgated by the Second 
Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on March 15th, 1999: 
    Article 2 Definition of Contract； Exclusions 
  For purposes of this Law， a contract is an agreement between natural persons， legal persons 
or other organizations with equal standing， for the purpose of establishing， altering， or 
discharging a relationship of civil rights and obligations. 
72
 The Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China 2009; 
    Article 2 This Law is applicable to a citizen, legal person or any other organization who considers 
that his or its lawful rights and interests have been infringed upon by a specific administrative 
act, and applies for administrative reconsideration to an administrative organ which accepts the 
application for administrative reconsideration, and makes a decision of administrative 
reconsideration. 
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Procedure Law
73
 provide that private investors may require administrative 
reconsideration of a specific administrative act, but this process causes delay to the 
project. The loss caused by delay in these cases cannot be calculated or compensated 
according to current State Compensation Law in China.      
 
Private investors may also lose their profits through economic factors. The risks 
involve financing risks, insufficient income, competition and market demand. For 
example, the Beijing Jingtong Expressway could not derive sufficient profits at the 
start of the project because of adjacent toll-free roads competing and this resulted in 
an insufficient vehicle flow rate.   
 
Although there is Anti-Unfair Competition Law, its scope does not cover the above 
situation in relation to PFIPs.
74
 To some extent, this state of affairs arises due to 
government awarding extra concessions to other road operators. However, there are 
currently no the relevant laws to control the government’s behaviour in China.  
 
The private investors may also lose their reasonable interests because of force 
majeure. Force Majeure is a circumstance beyond the control of the project 
developer or government, such as a natural disaster or an accident. For example, the 
contract negotiation in the Jiangsu Sewage Treatment Plant was forced to be 
                                                 
73
 The Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China. adopted at the Second 
Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 4, 1989, promulgated by Order No. 
16 of the President of the People's Republic of China on April 4, 1989, and effective as of 
October 1, 1990 
    Article 2 If a citizen, a legal person or any other organization considers that his or its lawful rights 
and interests have been infringed upon by a specific administrative act of an administrative 
organ or its personnel, he or it shall have the right to bring a suit before a people's court in 
accordance with this Law. 
74
 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted by the Third 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress On September 
2nd, 1993 
    Article 2 ……… 
      "Unfair competition", in this Law, means activities made by managers who damage the others' 
legal rights and interests, disturb the order of social economy and violate the provisions of this 
Law 
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suspended because of the SARS Epidemic in 2003.
75
  
 
The State Compensation Law in China does not mention any compensation 
provisions under force majeure. However, making provision for compensation could 
enhance the private investor’s confidence if China expects to attract more private 
investment for infrastructure building. 
 
These risks are especially true for foreign private investments, where there are extra 
restrictions such as foreign exchange control.
76
  
 
Facilitation foreign exchange is essential in encouraging foreign private investors to 
enter into PFIPs. Foreign exchange control may hinder private investment from 
other countries. China has many restrictions with foreign exchange and has not 
allowed for any exemptions in the case of PFIPs. 
2.2.2.5 Poor protection on public interest 
The public interests in PFIPs are not protected enough by laws in China. 
 
Sometimes the risks to PFIPs are not from the host country, where the infrastructure 
is to be implemented, but from the concessioners. The PFIPs may fail because of the 
concessioner in two situations: the first is a serious breach by the concessioner, such 
as unsatisfactory quality, which leads the public authority to refuse to continue the 
concession. The second is the bankruptcy of the concessioners. There is the famous 
                                                 
75
 Ke Yong Jian, Wang Shouqing & Chan Albert PC, ‘Public-Private Partnership in China’s 
Infrastructure Development: Lessons Learnt’, in H. Wamelink, M. Prins & R Geraedlts (eds), 
Proc. of Int’l Conf. on Changing Roles: New Roles and New Challenges (TU Delft, Faculty of 
AREH, The Netherlands, Oct 5-9, 2009, pp. 177-188) 
76 
The Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration (2008 
Revision):  
    Article 8: Foreign currency is prohibited for circulation and shall not be quoted for pricing or 
settlement in the territory of the People's Republic of China… 
    Article 14: Purchase of foreign exchange for current account transactions shall be conducted with 
the designated foreign exchange banks, in accordance with the regulations issued by the State 
Council on the purchase of foreign exchange and making payments in foreign exchange, upon 
the presentation of valid documents and commercial bills. 
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case HuangQiao Pacific Electricity Power Co. LTD in 2000.
77
 HuangQiao Pacific 
Electricity Power Co. LTD, a project company, financed by Chinese HuangQiao 
Electricity Power Co. Ltd (US$7.6 million) and Australia Asia-Pacific Electricity 
Power Co. Ltd (US$8.5 million), was established in 1995 in Tai Xing City, Jiangsu 
Province, to construct electricity plants to power HuangQiao District. However, 
before the PFIP was completed, the Australian party withdrew their investment 
because of conflicts with Chinese partner, which resulted in the breakup of the 
project company. The projects had to be postponed until a new concession was 
awarded to a new concessioner.
78
 
2.3 The possibility of legislative reform 
Given that the current Chinese laws are insufficient to protect PFIPs from the above 
risks, it is necessary to reform the Chinese laws on PFIPs. As a matter of fact, some 
essential objective conditions to enable the reform of current laws on PFIPs have 
been satisfied already, so it is possible to reform the laws. 
 
First of all, Chinese politics is ready to have a law reform on PFIPs. Although China 
is a communist country, it has gradually allowed private investment to occur and has 
permitted private capital protection. A law reform on PFIPs would mean the Chinese 
government would further admit the legal status of private capital in the Chinese 
infrastructure market. As a matter of fact, the private financing of public 
infrastructure is greatly encouraged by the Chinese Public Sector. The development 
of private investment in China has gained support recently, following a series of 
encouraging political and policy initiatives issued at a central level over the past few 
years.
79
 Although they are not formal legislation documents, they show the intent to 
remove political barriers, and that private investment is backed by certain legal 
                                                 
77
 Southern Weekly Newspaper, ‘BOT failure: HuangQiao Case’ South weekly  (GuangDong 
Province, China, 29
th
 January 2003) Page B13  
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) 
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measures.
80
 These changes and improvements are also indicated in ‘Doing Business 
2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size for Enterprises’, a report to 
the World Bank. Although China is in 91
st
 place in the ease of doing business index 
(a high ranking on the index means the regulatory environment is more conducive to 
the starting and operation of a local firm), it is the 12
th
 place in the most-improved 
economies list.
81
 China has been adjusting its policies to catch up with the 
international developments in PFIPs in order to facilitate them. 
 
Secondly, the Chinese judiciary is ready to have a law reform on PFIPs. China 
already has laws on PFIPs in some provinces. Although there are only provincial 
regulations
82
 which are only valid in their corresponding provinces and have 
features which just fit their local requirements, the regulations under review as a 
whole could contribute to the reform of the legislative framework on Chinese 
PFIPs.
83
 Moreover, the Chinese laws on franchises
84
 have apparently gone beyond 
the phase of case-by-case regulation to a more comprehensive stage of regulation, 
which could offer useful reference in establishing legislation on PFIPs. 
 
Finally, the Chinese market is ready to have a law reform on PFIPs. Once specific 
legislation on PFIPs is established, more PFIPs may come into the Chinese 
                                                 
80
 e.g. the Notice on Publishing the Opinions on Promoting and Guiding Private Investment, issued 
by the then National Planning Commission on December 11, 2001. Some Opinions On Some 
Policy Measure To Increase The Development Of Service Sectors In The 15th Five Year Period, 
issued by the then National Planning Commission in January 2002; Opinion On Promoting The 
Marketization Of Urban Public Utilities, issued by the Ministry of Construction on December 
27, 2003; Measures On Urban Public Utilities Concession, issued by MOC in 2004; the 
Opinions On Encouraging, Supporting And Guiding The Development Of Non-State Sector 
Economies, issued by the State Council in 2005. 
81
 World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size for 
Enterprises’ (1st June, 2012), < 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB13-full-report.pdf > accessed on 17
th
 September, 2013 
82
 e.g. Urban Public Utilities Concession Regulation, issued by the province Shenzhen of China in 
2004; Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation, issued by the province Beijing of China in 
2005; Public Utilities Concession Regulation, issued by the province Xinjiang of China in 2005 
83
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) 
84
 e.g. Regulation on the Administration of Commercial Franchises, issued by the State Council in 
2007; Measures for the Administration on the Franchise of Municipal Public Utilities, issued by 
Ministry of Construction in 2004; Administrative Measures for the Information Disclosure of 
Commercial Franchise, issued by Ministry of Commerce in 2007. Moreover, almost provincial 
regulations on PFIPs focus on concession rather than all aspects of PFIPs. 
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infrastructure market. China’s infrastructure market is mature enough to accept an 
increased number of PFIPs, which would be brought by the legislative reform of 
PFIPs. With the development of the Chinese economy from a planned economy to a 
market economy, the Chinese infrastructure market has been occupied by private 
investors, rather than SOEs
85
.
86
 The market has been opened to private investors, 
with the exception of some special sectors such as the defence industry. 
2.4 The aims of the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs  
Now that the existing provincial regulations on PFIPs have been assessed and 
deemed to be defective, and the objective conditions to reform the legislation on 
PFIPs have been considered, this section will consider what the new legislation 
should aim to achieve if the legislation on PFIPs is to be reformed. 
2.4.1 Facilitate PFIPs 
The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should facilitate PFIPs in China. It is obvious 
that legislation plays an important role in promoting private investment in public 
infrastructure projects. As the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide also points out:  
“The law typically embodies a political commitment, 
provides specific legal rights and may represent an important 
guarantee of stability of the legal and regulatory regime”.87  
In light of their own specific national circumstances, various countries have drawn 
up appropriate legislative measures under which PFIPs are awarded and executed. 
The legislation on PFIPs should ensure that the public infrastructure may be 
financed by private investors, even foreign private investors. This basic provision is 
particularly important in China where public services used to be governmental 
monopolies. Therefore, the first aim of the new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should 
                                                 
85
 SOEs stand for State-owned Enterprises which is a legal entity created by a government to 
undertake commercial activities on behalf of an owner government. 
86
 The state-own enterprises monopolizing the infrastructure market has a lot of problems. E.g. the 
Beijing 5th Ring Road was provided by a SOE controlled by the Municipal Government based 
on bank loans. However audit found that the cost for the construction of the road was 
excessively high and later investigation disclosed a number of corruption cases. 
87
 ‘Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Project’ (2001) UNCITRAL 
(A/CN.9/SER.B/4) (hereafter referred to as the Legislative Guide) p25 Chap. I, General 
Legislative and Institutional Framework, paras.10 
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be to facilitate PFIPs. 
2.4.2 Establish a national comprehensive legislation 
The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should be a nationally comprehensive 
legislation.  This means three things, outlined below:   
2.4.2.1 It should be a national legislation  
It should be national legislation rather than provincial regulation. Though some 
experts consider that “local regulation is more flexible in certain areas”88, it is a 
trend in thinking about the development of PFIPs that the features of PFIPs are 
better decided upon by a unified national legislation on PFIPs than provincial 
regulations.  
 
Firstly, national legislation is more stable than provincial regulations. National 
legislation is not easy to change or repeal. PFIPs are mostly long-term projects in 
which a stable legislative environment is very important. The participants, in 
particular foreign private investors operating on a certain preferential policy basis, 
would be affected if the regulations on PFIPs were changed in the middle of the 
project. 
 
Secondly, national legislation could resolve conflicts between different provincial 
regulations. Infrastructure such as road and rail is generally constructed through 
cross-provincial projects. If the regulations on a single PFIP are different in different 
provinces, they can cause significant difficulties to concessioners trying to 
accommodate conflicting provincial regulations. Therefore, a unified national 
legislation could coordinate between different provinces using the same PFIP.  
 
Thirdly, national legislation could offer better administrative coordination. The 
Legislative Guide says: “Privately financed infrastructure projects may require the 
                                                 
88
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involvement of several public authorities, at various levels of government.”89 Most 
PFIPs are large-scale projects which need coordination by various levels or bureaus 
of government, such as the Land and Resources Bureau, the Auditing Bureau, the 
Quality Control Bureau and so on. Therefore, a unified national legislation 
clarifying the authority and duties of each Bureau would lead to greater clarity in 
regulating PFIPs.  
2.4.2.2 It should be a comprehensive legislation on PFIPs 
PFIP legislation should be separated from other laws, so that it might focus on all 
aspects of PFIPs. A comprehensive legislation on PFIPs could offer a clear and 
competitive selection procedure and clarify the rights and responsibilities of the 
parties in PFIPs. 
 
Firstly, the comprehensive legislation on PFIPs could offer a competitive selection 
procedure, which is appropriate for the special features of PFIPs rather than 
ascertained from the provisions in the Procurement Law or the Bidding Law. The 
Legislative Guide also says that the domestic laws on competitive selection 
procedures for the procurement of goods, construction or services may not be 
entirely suitable for PFIPs. International experience in the award of PFIPs has in fact 
revealed some limitations of traditional forms of competitive selection procedures.
90
 
 
Secondly, comprehensive legislation on PFIPs, which clarifies the rights and 
responsibilities among the parties in PFIPs, could ensure the projects run smoothly. 
For example: 
(1) To set out the roles of the different branches of government: the large-scale 
PFIPs need the co-operation of different government departments and a 
specific law could clarify the responsibilities and rights of each government 
branch. 
(2) To set out the basis on which a Public Authority may provide support for 
various project risks, e.g. revenue guarantees; and limit the interference from 
                                                 
89
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government. 
(3) To provide clarity on investors’ rights if the PFIPs contract is terminated 
early, whether because of default by the Project Company or because the 
Public Authority wants to take the Facility back under the control by the 
Public Sector. In the latter case, a method of compensation should be offered 
to the Project Company to defray costs. 
(4) To give lenders security in the PFIPs contract.91 
(5) To confirm specific channels for resolving disputes that may arise. 
2.4.2.3 A contract version on project agreement could be attached 
A contract version on project agreement could be attached to the national 
comprehensive legislation on PFIPs. This contract version would not be mandatory, 
but parties would be free to adopt it in full or in part with modifications in specific 
circumstances. This contract version could help to avoid misunderstandings over 
vague contract terms made by the parties themselves, and offer a generic form to 
parties to prevent items being omitted through negligence. In this respect, the United 
Kingdom’s approach provides an interesting example. A series of versions of PFIP 
contracts were published by HM Treasury during 1999 to 2007.
92
 The 
Standardisation of PFI Contracts Version 1 was published in July 1999;
93
 the second 
and third editions were published in September 2002, and April 2004, together with 
an Addendum in December 2005;
94
 and the Standardisation of PFI Contracts 
Version 4, was published in March 2007.
95
 The Standardisation of PF2 Contracts 
(SoPC), which was issued in December 2012, is the latest version of the standard 
wording and guidance to be used by Public Sector bodies and their advisors when 
drafting PF2 contracts. It reflects the new model of contracting for projects for the 
                                                 
91
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92
 HM Treasure, ‘Standardisation of PFI Contracts Version 4’(March 2007) P1, 
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delivery of infrastructure and services using public private partnerships and replaces 
Standardisation of PFI Contracts Version 4.
96
  
2.4.3 Balance the interests of private and public  
The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should balance the interests of the Private and 
Public Sector. The Legislative Guide says:  
“The advice provided in the Guide aims at achieving a 
balance between the desire to facilitate and encourage 
private participation in infrastructure projects, on the one 
hand, and various public interest concerns of the host 
country, on the other.”97 
The legislator has been greatly concerned that the government may on some 
occasions be vulnerable to exploitation by private operators seeking excessive 
profits. In particular, when the host government lacks finance to satisfy public 
requirements for infrastructures, they may accept unfair agreements, which may 
harm the public interest, to obtain investment from private investors.
98
 This is 
particularly true when a judicial system is not in place: the regulations are poor, the 
project implementation process can be easily manipulated and a supervisory system 
is not yet established. These situations are likely in the Chinese context. Therefore, 
while it must consider the protection of private interest, the new legislation should 
also safeguard public interests.  
 
However, although sovereignty and autonomy are important, Chinese legislation on 
PFIPs should also have the intention of protecting the private investor. 
 
                                                 
96
 HM Treasure, ‘Standardisation of PF2 Contracts’(December 2012), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221556/infrastr
ucture_standardisation_of_contracts_051212.pdf> accessed on 26th July, 2013; Infrastructure 
UK, ‘PF2: A User Guide’(December 2012), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207382/pf2_use
rguide.pdf> accessed on 26th July, 2013;The National Archive, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
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 Ke Y.J., Wang S.Q. and Chan A.P.C.. ‘Risk Allocation in Public-Private Partnership 
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Firstly, the nature of PFIPs means that the private investor is the most important 
performer. The private investor has to deal with various problems in the design, 
construction and operation of the project. Moreover, the foreign private investor has 
to face more complex problems in China, such as material import custom duties and 
foreign exchange control
99
. Therefore, the legislation should offer more protection to 
private investors. It should deal with these specific problems for foreign private 
investor.  
 
Secondly, the private investor needs more legislative protection because it is more 
vulnerable than the Chinese government. The public authority, which makes 
regulations and has administrative power, is the most powerful party in Chinese 
PFIPs. The private investor who commences PFIPs needs the concessions of the 
public authority and will be monitored even after it wins the concession.  
 
Foreign private investors may be more vulnerable than local private investors. 
Although all private investors have similar concerns regarding public authorities, 
local private investors have more ways of protecting themselves than  foreign 
private investors. The local private investors usually interact with the public 
authority in other areas of business, and they can even sometimes affect the 
decisions of the public authority through their personal impact. By contrast, foreign 
private investors may encounter discrimination in comparison with the local private 
investors. Even if foreign private investors try to obtain help from their home 
countries, it is impossible for these countries to intervene directly. They may only 
provide diplomatic support. 
 
Compared with other parties in PFIPs, the private investor is lacks protection. The 
lender, who gives financial support to the investor, has insurance or a mortgage in 
                                                 
99
 Regulations on the Foreign Exchange System of The People’s Republic of China, adopted on 1st 
August, 2008:  
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the case of failure. The final customer, who represents “public interest”, is backed 
by the host country. The private investor may only rely on the protection of 
legislation.  
 
Thirdly, China is looking for more investment to meet its requirements for 
infrastructure. Legislation which offers more protection to foreign private investors 
on PFIPs could attract more foreign investment.   
 
Finally, legislation which pays more attention to protecting foreign private investors 
will not affect Chinese sovereignty and autonomy. The profits of the foreign private 
investors are closely tied to the success of the PFIPS. Moreover, the final goal of the 
foreign private investor is not the ownership of the project but the profits from it. 
 
It is worthy to note whether Chinese legislation on PFIPs should regulate the foreign 
public authorities and State-owned enterprises which finance Chinese public 
infrastructures.  
 
The principle of sovereign immunity promotes the functioning of all governments 
by protecting states from the burden of defending themselves in litigation abroad.
100
      
 
In China, there are no specific regulations on how to deal with sovereign immunity. 
The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China only gives a general 
principle that the solution to issues of sovereign immunity should be consistent with 
the relevant Chinese laws and the international treaties concluded or acceded to by 
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China.
101
 The Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities only refers to the privileges and immunities of the 
diplomatic missions in China and their members rather than their sovereign 
immunity.
102
 Thus far, no any case about sovereign immunity has been claimed in 
Chinese courts, so there is no juridical precedence in China. However, according to 
the international agreements
103
 acceded to by China and the cases
104
 in which China 
has claimed in other countries, China’s stance in dealing with sovereign immunity is 
as follows:  
 
China recognizes and supports the principle of sovereign immunity but the state-
owned enterprises should be treated separately. Whether or not the state-owned 
enterprises have sovereign immunity is decided by their status. When the foreign 
public authorities or State-owned companies enter into the Chinese infrastructure 
market, if the foreign public authorities or State-owned companies finance the 
Chinese infrastructure as a general commercial investment, they should be regulated 
under legislation relating to PFIPs. Conversely, if they represent an effort by the 
public authority to finance Chinese infrastructure with political or diplomatic aims 
                                                 
101
 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, amended for the second time in 
accordance with the Decision on Amending the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic 
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and without commercial profits, their behaviour should be regulated through 
diplomatic negotiation.      
 
As the matter of fact, China and the UK share their views on sovereign immunity. 
After considering the scope of section 20(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978
105
 and 
article 31 of Schedule 1 to the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
106
, the UK High 
Court confirmed sovereign immunity does not extend to commercial activities in 
Apex Global Management Ltd v Fi Call Ltd and others [2013] EWHC 587 (Ch)
107
, 
and the Court of Appeal re-confirmed the decision in the succedent appeal Al Saud 
and another v Apex Global Management Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 642
108
. Therefore, 
in the UK, sovereign immunity does not extend to cover any action relating to an 
individual's professional or commercial activity outside his official functions.
109
   
2.4.4 Embody Marketisation  
The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should embody marketisation, i.e., 
competition in the market. The Legislative Guide points out:  
“For monopolistic situations resulting from legal 
prohibitions rather than economic and technological 
fundamentals, the main legislative action needed to 
introduce competition is the removal of the existing legal 
barriers.”110  
In China, one limitation that should be removed from concession is the rule granting 
government the option not to choose to employ the means of concession for 
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infrastructure, but may appoint the SOEs directly without any reasonable reasons. 
The other limitation that should be removed is the privileges of SOEs that some 
infrastructure projects, which are not in forbidden areas such as national defence, 
only award concession to SOEs.
111
 
2.4.5 Approach international standard 
The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should harmonise with international standards. 
A current report on the ‘Quality of Concession Legislation in Early Transition 
Countries’ may present a general scenario and comment:  
“In response to this situation, the UNECE, with the support 
of key international partners, has established an International 
PPP Centre of Excellence. We are confident that the Centre 
will take countries to the next stage in PPP development, 
drawing on materials produced to a consistent and high 
standard by specialist Centres located all over the world that 
reflect the excellence in PPPs which countries should aspire 
to.”112 
Only if the Chinese legislation on PFIPs corresponds with international standards, 
can it protect foreign investors and attract more foreign investment into Chinese 
public infrastructure. 
Conclusion  
This chapter answers the 1
st
 research question, namely whether China needs to 
reform its legislation on PFIPs.  
 
First of all, this chapter describes some of the successful PFIPs in China. These 
cases cover various infrastructures built by PFIPs, since the first project in 1984. 
The benefits brought to China by PFIPs are summarised by analysing these cases. 
These benefits demonstrate that the legislation on PFIPs is worth improving because 
                                                 
111
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it has brought and will bring benefits to China. 
 
Then, the current Chinese laws and regulations and legal documents on PFIPs are 
summarised. The existing Chinese regulations are found to be insufficient in 
reducing or avoiding the risks to PFIPs. Therefore, it is necessary to reform the 
Chinese legislation on PFIPs; otherwise the PFIPs in China may fail. 
 
Thirdly, the objective conditions for reforming the Chinese legislation on PFIPs are 
analysed. It is found that the existing politics, judiciary and market are mature 
enough to reform Chinese legislation on PFIPs. Therefore, it is possible to reform 
Chinese legislation on PFIPs. 
 
Finally, this chapter considers the aims of reforming Chinese legislation on PFIPs. It 
looks forward to the future benefits that may be brought by new legislation.   
 
To summarise, China needs to reform its laws on PFIPs. The laws on PFIPs in China 
are worthy of reform because the PFIP model could bring benefits to China; it is 
necessary to reform these laws because their current shortcomings are hindering the 
development of PFIPs; the Chinese conditions would support the reform of 
legislation and the new legislation on PFIPs will facilitate the development of PFIPs 
in China and bring more benefits to both the Public Sector and (foreign) private 
investors. 
 
Chapter 3 will compare some international agreements and treaties. It will be found 
that the aims of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL 
match the aims of the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs. That is one of the 
reasons why the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions should be used as 
guidelines when reforming the Chinese laws on PFIPs. The next chapter will also 
discuss the reason why other countries’ laws are given as a supplementary reference 
to Chinese law reform on PFIPs. 
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Chapter 3  
The guidance made by UNCITRAL as international standards 
Introduction  
In Chapter 2, PFIPs were shown to benefit the development of China, but that 
current laws on PFIPs in China are hindering their use. Moreover, as the objective 
conditions in China were also shown to be mature enough, Chapter 2 concluded that 
it was time to reform Chinese laws on PFIPs. The next question is what guidelines 
or experiences should be taken from international organizations or other countries so 
that this law reform can achieve the aims of the law makers, since China has no 
experience in establishing comprehensive legislation on PFIPs? The aim of this 
Chapter is to consider the guidelines of the international organizations and the 
experiences of other countries, which could become references for Chinese law 
reform on PFIPs. 
 
There are two objectives in this chapter. The first objective is to prove that the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions on PFIPs made by UNCITRAL are the best 
guidelines for the law reform in China by comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the international agreements on PFIPs made by certain 
international organisations, and treaties on PFIPs subscribed to by China and other 
countries,. The second objective is to confirm whether other countries’ laws on 
PFIPs may be used as supplementary references for the law reform in China. 
 
This chapter consists of three sections. Section 3.1 states the international 
agreements relating to PFIPs made by various international organisations (WTO, 
OECD, World Bank), the bilateral or multilateral treaties relating to PFIPs 
subscribed to by China, and analyses their disadvantages and limitations. Section 3.2 
presents the background of the international organisation, UNCITRAL, and its 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. It then analyses and discusses why the 
Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL are better placed 
to guide Chinese legislative reform on PFIPs. Section 3.3 states the reasons why the 
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other countries’ laws on PFIPs are used in this thesis as a supplementary reference 
for Chinese law reform and analyses why these are just used as supplementary 
references rather than as the principal guidelines.  
 
This chapter answers the second research question, namely why the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL are chosen to be the standard to 
improve the Chinese legislation on PFIPs; and why the other countries’ laws on 
PFIPs are used as a supplementary reference.   
3.1 The international agreements and treaties related PFIPs 
With the synchronisation of global processes in politics and economics, and in order 
to improve co-operation and development, the harmonisation of laws has gradually 
been accepted and applied worldwide.
1
 The harmonisation movement is most 
readily identified with the adoption of the United Nations on Convention on 
Contracts for the international Sale of Goods (CISG) in 1980.
2
 Harmonisation is also 
required in investment laws, as expressed by Keba Mbaye during the mission led by 
the former president of the CCJA
3
 in 1992: “We do not want investment because we 
do not know which law will govern our assets.”4 In the harmonisation of aspects of 
International Investment Law, some international agreements have been drafted by 
international institutions, some regional treaties have been made by certain regions, 
and some bilateral treaties have been subscribed to by two countries. For example, 
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Laryea Emmanuel, ‘Why Ghana should implement certain international legal instruments relating 
to international sale of goods transactions’ (A.J.I.C.L. 2011, 19(1), 1-37) P4 
2
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2009, 75(1), 65-70) P68  
3
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the integration method of issuing binding uniform acts that automatically supercede all prior and 
future inconsistent national laws.—The official website of African International Court and 
Tribunals (AICT) <http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/ohada/ohada_home.html>Accessed 
on 9
th
 March 2011 
4
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François Katendi and Jean-Baptiste Placca, L'autre Afrique, 
<http://www.afrology.com/eco/kebam> accessed on 9
th
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China has concluded 117 treaties between 1982 and 2006.
5
 These agreements and 
treaties are intended to establish a harmonised standard so that the investment laws 
in different countries can approach harmonious accord. However, although these 
agreements and treaties have contributed to the harmonisation of International 
Investment Law, they cannot be used to guide the reform of Chinese legislation on 
PFIPs because of their specificity and limitations. The Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions made by the UNCITRAL are different from other international 
agreements or treaties. They regulate all aspects of behaviour in PFIPs and give 
detail guidelines to improve legislation on PFIPs.  
3.1.1 WTO  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organisation 
that deals with the rules of trade between nations. The goal of this organisation is to 
help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their 
business.
6
  Due to its status and its positive impact on international trade, the WTO, 
it was hoped, would break down investment barriers between nations. However, the 
WTO has made very few contributions to the harmonisation of International 
Investment Law. 
 
The WTO established a working group on Trade and Investment during the 1996 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore. However, this working group was short-lived 
and achieved little by way of multilateral agreement. During the Cancun meeting in 
October 2004, which was intended to be the mid-term review of the Doha Round
7
, 
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 Dolzer Rudolf and Schreuer Christoph, ‘Principles of international investment law’ (Oxford 
University Press,2008)P21 
6
 World Trade Organization Website, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm>accessed on 30
th
 May 2011 
7 
The Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations among the WTO membership. The Round 
was officially launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2001. Its aim is to achieve major reform of the international trading system through 
the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules. The work programme covers 
about 20 areas of trade. WTO website, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm>accessed on 28
th
 July, 2013. However, 
Doha Round negotiations took in excess of ten years but it was not completed or concluded with 
a consensus so far (as it failed). Parties to the Round arrived at a "stalemate" and could not 
agree or consent to each other's terms. The Round highlights the fact that not all negotiations are 
successful (that is, resulting in a concluded treaty), and neither is it necessarily a speedy 
process. Westlaw insight, ‘analysis key areas of complexity or uncertainty’  
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the WTO Members took the dramatic decision to stop negotiation on trade and 
investment. As a result, the WTO Members abandoned the working group on trade 
and investment.
8 
 
 
The only multilateral agreement on investment issued by WTO is the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures (hereafter referred to as “TRIM”). 
This agreement recognizes that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade. 
It provides that no contracting party shall apply any TRIM inconsistent with Articles 
III (national treatment
9
) and XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions
10
) of the 
GATT
11
. To this end, a list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these articles is 
appended to the agreement. The list includes measures which require particular 
levels of local procurement by an enterprise (“local content requirements”12) or 
which restrict the volume or value of imports such an enterprise can purchase or use 
to an amount related to the level of products it exports (“trade balancing 
requirements”13).14 In light of the content of the TRIMs, it is obvious that TRIMs 
only apply to investments related to trade in goods. 
 
The above analysis of the WTO and the content of TRIMs shows that the 
agreements on investment issued by WTO are not applied to all kinds of 
international investment but only to those investments related to trade. There is no 
reference to PFIPs. Therefore, it is impossible to use these agreements to guide the 
reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs. However, the principles of TRIMs about 
fairness, anti-discrimination and removal of barriers to investment are exemplary for 
                                                 
8
 Matsushita M., Schoenbaum T.J. &  Mavroidis P.C., ‘The World Trade Organization: Law, 
Practice, and Policy’ (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2006) P836 
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11
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the discussions on PFIPs. 
3.1.2 OECD  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is another 
important international institution. It has 34 members and 25 non-members, who 
participate as regular observers or participants in OECD Committees. About 70 non-
members are engaged in OECD working parties, schemes or programmes.
15
 The 
mission of the OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and 
social well-being of people around the world.
16
 Though the OECD has contributed 
more to the harmonisation of international investment than the WTO, and has 
established some measures relating to PFIPs, these are only scattered and do not 
provide specific and systematic guidance on PFIPs.   
 
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), proposed by the OECD in 1995, 
was meant to provide a general protection of “fair and equitable treatment and full 
and constant security. In no case shall a Contracting Party accord treatment less 
favourable than that required by international law.”17 The MAI was seen by the 
OECD as a harmonisation exercise, and an attempt to address the fragmented nature 
of investment protection through BITs.
18
 However, it provoked intense opposition 
from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) on the grounds that it would 
weaken the regulatory capacity of host States, in favour of investor protection.
19
 
Efforts to conclude it collapsed in 1998. 
                                                 
15
 China is not the member of OECD, but it is the Enhanced engagement country of OECD. In May 
2007, OECD countries agreed to invite Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia and Slovenia to open 
discussions for membership of the organisation and offered enhanced engagement to Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia and South Africa. 
16
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Website, 
<http://www.oecd.org/home/0,3675,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> accessed on 31th 
May 2011  
17
 OECD, ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment draft consolidated 
text’(DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, 22nd April 1998), 
<http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf> accessed on 29th September 2013; 
OECD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law’(2004) in 
‘OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/03’, 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435> accessed on 29th September 2013 
18 
McLachlan Campbell, ‘Investment treaties and general international law’ (I.C.L.Q. 2008, 57(2), 
361-401) P368-369 
19
 Salzman JE, ‘Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’ (2005) 68 Law & Contemporary Problems 189, 196-200 
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The MAI does not directly refer to PFIPs, but its references to Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)
20
 may be overlap with the functions of PFIPs in some cases. When 
the foreign private investor is one of the investors in a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV)
21
, which undertakes the responsibility of conducting and operating public 
infrastructure and is allowed to charge the public or public authorities for use, this 
investor is participating in a PFIP. This is also a FDI. The foreign private investor 
sets up an enterprise in the form of a joint venture or using foreign capital. While 
this company obtains profits through financing and operating a public infrastructure, 
the foreign private investor acquires profits through the operation of the company 
rather than through a secondary market (such as the stock market). This form of 
investment is not only a FDI but also a PFIP. Therefore, although the MIA does not 
specify practice for PFIPs and it has failed in practice, the concepts it puts forward 
on investment liberalisation, investment protection and dispute settlement
22
 are 
worth considering in the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs. 
 
In 1976, the OECD adopted the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises, which was rewritten and annexed by the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 2000.
23
 The guidelines constitute 
voluntary recommendations to multinational enterprises in areas such employment, 
human rights, environment, fighting bribery, science and technology, competition, 
taxation, information disclosure and consumer interests.
24
 
 
                                                 
20
 FDI stand for Foreign Direct Investment, which refers to an investment made to acquire lasting 
interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor. 
21
 SPV (special purpose vehicle): a special purpose entity is a legal entity (usually a limited company 
of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or 
temporary objectives. The Project Company as an SPV cannot carry out any other business that 
is not part of the project. E. R. Yescombe, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy 
and Finance’(ELSEVIER 2007) P109 
22
 Matsushita M., Schoenbaum T.J. &  Mavroidis P.C., ‘The World Trade Organization: Law, 
Practice, and Policy’ (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2006) P834 
23
 The Guidelines are reprinted in 40 ILM (2001) P143. S Tully, ‘The 2000 Review of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise’ (2001), 50 I.C.L.Q, P394. 
24
 Dolzer Rudolf and Schreuer Christoph, ‘Principles of international investment law’ (Oxford 
University Press,2008) P24 
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PFIPs are implemented through SPVs
25
, which have to face problems relating to 
environments, labour rights and so on. Although these guidelines are not specific to 
SPVs in PFIPs, this content could also be considered in the reform of Chinese 
legislation on PFIPs.  
 
The OECD Istanbul Centre, i.e. the Centre for Private Sector Development in 
Istanbul, has been the place where knowledge and experience is exchanged between 
OECD member countries and other partner countries in Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia and the Caucasus since 1994. The Private Sector continues to play a key role in 
the transformation to market-based economies. Therefore, creating a framework 
which is conducive for Private Sector development is a priority for many Transition 
Economies and the OECD is committed to supporting these efforts. The mission of 
this centre is to promote sustainable economic development and poverty alleviation 
through Private Sector development in OECD partner countries with particular focus 
on economic and social policy areas, making use of policy dialogue, peer review 
backed by high quality analytical work, and the willingness of policy makers to 
exchange good practices.
26
 
 
It is worth noting that the Basic Elements of a Law on Concession Agreement
27
, 
published by The OECD Istanbul Centre use the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide as 
the starting point for its report. The OECD convened an expert group that would 
formulate basic elements in light of international experience, so as to insure that 
project financing becomes a more viable option for much needed infrastructure 
financing in the region. This document sets out in legislative language the guiding 
principles of a modern law on concession agreements and comments on these 
principles in light of best international practice. This study contributes to the 
facilitation of Private Sector investment in the infrastructure of countries in 
                                                 
25
 SPV (special purpose vehicle): a special purpose entity is a legal entity (usually a limited company 
of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or 
temporary objectives. The Project Company as an SPV cannot carry out any other business that 
is not part of the project. E. R. Yescombe, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy 
and Finance’(ELSEVIER 2007) P109 
26
 OECD Istanbul Center: Centre for Private Sector Development Istanbul Brochure 
27
 OECD, Multilateral Centre for Private Sector Development Istanbul, ‘Basic Elements of a Law on 
Concession Agreement’ (19/09/2002) 
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economic transition.
28
 
 
It could easily be concluded that the OECD has a specific remit to research PFIPs 
and has published relevant legal documents. To some extent, these legal documents 
represent the opinion of the OECD members and contribute to the harmonisation of 
the laws on PFIPs. They are worthy of reference in the reform of Chinese legislation 
on PFIPs. 
 
In 2010, the OECD offered a new concept—dedicated public-private partnership 
units.
29
 Dedicated public-private partnership units include any organisation set up 
with the full or partial aid of the government to ensure that necessary competencies 
to manage third-party provision of goods and services are made available and 
clustered together within government. The establishment of dedicated units serves to 
enhance the capacity of government to manage the risks associated with a growing 
number and value of public-private partnerships successfully. Although a relatively 
recent phenomenon, in 2009 over half of all OECD member countries reported the 
existence of a dedicated unit of some kind.
30
 
 
Dedicated public-private partnership units have not been established in China yet. 
However, it could be considered for addition into Chinese legislation on PFIPs when 
the provisions on monitoring government administration are drafted.  
 
The above analysis of the OECD and its relevant measures shows that the OECD 
has contributed much more than the WTO to the harmonisation of International 
Investment Law. The OECD’s MIA considers all aspects of investment. Particularly, 
the OECD has specific measures that focus on PFIPs. Despite the OECD’s efforts 
and useful ideas, it is not systematic enough to guide the reform of Chinese 
legislation on PFIPs, especially with regard to substantive provisions. 
                                                 
28
 Ibid: Preface 
29
 OECD, ‘Dedicated Public-Private Partnership Units: A Survey of Institutional and Governance 
Structures’ (2010) 
30
 Ibid, P3 
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3.1.3 World Bank  
The World Bank is a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing 
countries around the world. Its mission is to fight poverty with lasting results and to 
help people help themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing 
knowledge, building capacity and forging partnerships in the Public and Private 
Sector.
31
 In comparison with the OECD, the World Bank only focuses on the 
procedures of dispute settlement in PFIPs rather than on substantive agreements on 
the regulation of PFIPs.  
 
In the World Bank, it was the then General Counsel, Aron Broches, who initiated 
and drove the debates on the possible scope of international consensus. Broches 
concluded that  
“…the best contribution of the Bank was to provide for 
effective procedures for impartial settlement of disputes, 
without attempting to seek agreement on substantive 
standards”.  
It sounds that this approach seemed to break the logic that any system of dispute 
settlement would have to be based on a set of substantive rules that could be applied. 
Broches argued that, from a pragmatic point of view, such a substantive agreement 
on international investment law was neither necessary nor productive.
32
 
 
At first sight, the Broches concept (‘procedure before substance’) seemed to be a 
limited and modest one. However, he began the design of what was to become, in 
1965, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment  Dispute between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) establishing the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The five features of ICSID make it 
to be the boldest innovative step in the modern history of international cooperation 
concerning the role and protection of foreign investment: (a) foreign companies and 
                                                 
31
 World Bank Website,  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK
:36602~theSitePK:29708,00.html> accessed on 3th July 2011 
32
 Dolzer Rudolf and Schreuer Christoph, ‘Principles of international investment law’ (Oxford 
University Press,2008) p20 
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individuals can directly bring a suit against their host state; (b) state immunity
33
 is 
severely restricted; (c) international law can be applied to the relationship between 
the host state and the investor; (d) the local remedies
34
 rule is excluded in principle; 
and (e) ICSID award are directly enforceable within the territories of all states 
parties to ICSID.
35
 
 
The above analysis of the World Bank shows that the World Bank pays more 
attention to dispute settlement than to substantive provisions. Although the ICSID 
was proved successful when in subsequent decades more and more investment 
treaties, bilateral and multilateral, referred to the ICSID as a forum for dispute 
settlement, this concept (‘procedure before substance’) cannot be used to guide the 
reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs because it does not prevent the disputes (it 
only resolves them). A completed legislation should be applied both to prevent 
disputes from arising and settle disputes if they do arise. 
3.1.4 Bilateral treaties between China and other countries  
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are agreements between two countries for the 
reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's 
territories by companies based in either country.  
 
The number of BITs has grown worldwide. In 2010 alone, 54 new BITs were signed. 
By the end of 2010, there were 2,807 BITs in total.
36
 According to the statistics of 
                                                 
33
 The doctrine and rules of state immunity concern the protection which a state is given from being 
sued in the courts of other states. Hazel Fox, ‘The Law of State Immunity’, (2008 Oxford 
University Press)    
34
 The local remedies rule is that a State should be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong 
within the framework of its own domestic legal system before its international responsibility can 
be called into question at international level. A. A. Cancado Trindade, ‘The application of the 
rule of exhaustion of local remedies in international law 1’ (1983). 
http://www.asil.org/ajil/Udombana.pdf 
35
 Shihata I, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and 
MIGA’ in The Wold Bank in a Changing World (1991) P309 
36
 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2011: non-equity modes of international production and 
development’,P100(with Figure III.2) 
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UNCTAD
37
, China has signed 127 BITs on 1st June 2011, since its first BIT was 
signed with Norway on 21st November 1984.
38
 China has signed BITs with almost 
all economies and only follows Germany in total BITs signed (with 136 BITs). 
 
Generally, BITs have a similar basic structure that covers the following areas. Firstly, 
the treaty begins with a prefatory statement as to the aims of the treaty, which are 
usually the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment flows between 
the two states. Secondly, it is followed by identification of the types of property 
which are protected and the nature of the link of nationality to one of the parties 
which entitles the foreign investor to the protection of the treaty. Thirdly, the 
standard of treatment to be accorded to the foreign investor is established, such as 
national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, and fair and equitable treatment. 
Fourthly, the right to the repatriation of profits is asserted. Fifthly, there are 
statements on the compensation in the event of expropriation or damage to the 
investment during wars and civil riots. The standard of compensation in the event of 
a takeover of the foreign investor’s property is identified. Finally, the mechanisms 
for dispute settlement (both state-state and investor-state) arising from the 
investment are stated. The above items are the standard contents in most BITs. In 
light of the specific conditions of the treaty, there are variations in the statements of 
rules that are to be applied between the parties in each of these areas.
39
 
 
The above analysis of BITs shows that the contents of BITs may be flexible in light 
of the specific situation shared by the bilateral parties, but they are too flexible and 
numerous to be used as a guideline for law reform in China. What Chinese law 
reform needs is a systematic set of guidelines to guide all aspects of the law reform 
                                                 
37
 UNCTAD stands for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which was 
established under United Nations’ system in Geneva in 1964. UNCTAD promotes the 
development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy. UNCTAD 
has progressively evolved into an authoritative knowledge-based institution whose work aims to 
help shape current policy debates and thinking on development, with a particular focus on 
ensuring that domestic policies and international action are mutually supportive in bringing 
about sustainable development. 
38
 UNCTAD, ‘Total number of Bilateral Investment Treaties concluded, 1 June 2011’, 
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1> accessed on 1
st
 
September 2011 
39
 Sornarajah M., ‘The international law on foreign investment’ (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
2010) P187-188 
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on PFIPs, rather than the resolution of one specific issue. According to the World 
Investment Report 2011 by UNCTAD, BITs have a vital weakness:  
“It has come close to a point it is too big and complex to 
handle for governments and investors alike, yet remains 
inadequate to cover all possible bilateral investment 
relationships which would require a further 14,100 bilateral 
treaties.” 40 
However, when the Chinese laws on PFIPs are reformed, these BITs should be 
considered, in case there is conflict between the PFIP law and some of China’s 
existing BITs. 
 
To sum up, the above international agreements (made by WTO, OECD and World 
Bank) and BITs (signed by China) can be referred to in the Chinese legislation on 
PFIPs, but they cannot guide the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs because of 
their limitations. By contrast, the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL can guide the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs, as will be 
analysed and discussed in the following section. 
3.2 UNCITRAL and its Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
When compared with the above international investment agreements made by the 
various international organisations and the bilateral investment treaties made 
between China and other countries, the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
made by UNCITRAL proves itself to be the most suitable guideline in supporting 
the reform of Chinese law on PFIPs. 
3.2.1 Background of UNCITRAL 
UNCITRAL itself is highly prestigious. UNCITRAL was established in 1966 by the 
United Nations General Assembly through Resolution 2205 (XXI). The mandate of 
this organisation is to work towards the progressive harmonisation and unification of 
                                                 
40
 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2011: non-equity modes of international production and 
development’, Px 
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international economic laws, so the guidelines offered by UNCITRAL would permit 
reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs to approach international standards.  
 
In an increasingly economically interdependent world, the importance of an 
improved legal framework for the facilitation of international trade and investment 
is widely acknowledged. UNCITRAL plays an important role in developing that 
framework in pursuit of its mandate to further the progressive harmonisation and 
modernisation of International Trade Law by preparing and promoting the use and 
adoption of legislative and non-legislative instruments in a number of key areas of 
commercial law.
41
 
 
The areas covered by UNCITRAL include dispute resolution, international contract 
practices, transport, insolvency, electronic commerce, international payments, 
secured transactions, procurement and the sale of goods.
42
 The legislative guidelines 
offered by UNCITRAL in these areas favour the progressive harmonisation and 
unification of international economic laws. 
3.2.2 Reasons for choosing UNCITRAL 
3.2.2.1 The framework of UNCITRAL organisation is suited to harmonisation 
UNCITRAL’s framework is suited to making its guidelines achieve the maximum 
harmonisation of legislative instruments.   
 
UNCITRAL is composed of members selected from among States Members of the 
United Nations (UN) and ensures that the various geographic regions and the 
principal economic and legal systems of the world are represented. The 60 member 
States include 14 African States, 14 Asian States, 8 Eastern European States, 10 
Latin American and Caribbean States and 14 Western European and other States. 
                                                 
41
 UNCITRAL, ‘The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts about the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law’ (United Nations Vienna, 2007) P1 
42
 Ibid. 
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The General Assembly elects members for terms of six years; every three years the 
terms of half of the members expire.
43
 
 
China, a member of UN, was also selected to be a member of UNCITRAL. China 
joined UNCITRAL in 1983 and this membership will expire in 2013.
44
 As a result, 
there is interaction between China and UNCITRAL. Chinese delegations, through 
regional legislative instruments, specific consultation and language, support 
UNCITRAL in drafting legislative instruments, so as to add Chinese elements to the 
UNCITRAL legislative instrument. This could be reciprocated if UNCITRAL 
legislative instruments, which involve harmonisation considerations, were to offer 
guidelines to the development of Chinese laws.  
3.2.2.2 The work methods of UNCITRAL for harmonization 
The work methods of UNCITRAL may also provide guidelines to achieving the 
maximum harmonisation of legislative instruments.   
 
UNCITRAL cooperate with other international organisations active in the field of 
International Economic Law. Those international organisations, both within and 
outside the United Nations system, include the World Trade Organization (WTO); 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the World 
Bank; UNCTAD and so on. As was previously discussed in Section 3.1, these 
international organisations have their own advantages, which might be used in the 
reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs. UNCITRAL has close links with these 
international organisations, could facilitate the exchange of ideas and information, 
                                                 
43
 Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, members of the 
Commission are elected by the General Assembly for a term of six years, the term of half of the 
members expiring every three years. By its resolution 3108 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, the 
Assembly increased the membership of the Commission from 29 to 36 States. By its resolution 
57/20 of 19 November 2002, the Assembly further increased the membership of the 
Commission from 36 States to 60 States. In order to maintain the system of electing half of the 
membership every three years, of those 24 additional members, 13 have a three-year term 
expiring on the day preceding the opening of the fortieth regular annual session, in 2007, and 11 
have a six-year term expiring on the day preceding the opening of the forty-third regular annual 
session, in 2010, with the result that of the 60 members of the Commission, the membership of 
30 States expires in 2007 and the remaining 30 States expires in 2010. 
44
 UNCITRAL website, <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_history.html> accessed on 
05 September 2011 
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avoiding a duplication of effort and promoting efficiency, consistency and 
coherence in the modernisation and harmonisation of International Trade Law.
45
 In 
this case, UNCITRAL could offer the best guidelines for the reform of Chinese laws. 
 
UNCITRAL considers suggestions from a wide variety of parties when it drafts its 
legislative instruments. These instruments are negotiated through an international 
process involving a variety of participants, including the member States of 
UNCITRAL, which bring different legal traditions and levels of economic 
development; non-member States; Intergovernmental Organisations; and Non-
Governmental Organisations. Thus, these texts offer solutions appropriate to 
different legal traditions and to countries at different stages of economic 
development.
46
 In this case, UNCITRAL could offer guidelines which involve high 
harmonisation but may also be acceptable to China. 
 
UNCITRAL offers technical assistance to law reform, which is not only helpful for 
the countries requiring assistance but also involves harmonisation to a certain extent. 
UNCITRAL undertakes a range of technical assistance activities to promote its work 
and the use and adoption of the legislative and non-legislative texts it has developed 
to further the progressive harmonisation and unification of International Trade Law. 
One such activity is to undertake a law reform assessment to assist Governments to 
review existing legislation and assess their need for law reform in the commercial 
field.
47
 In this case, should China start to reform its laws on PFIPs, UNCITRAL 
could offer China essential and efficient technical assistance to achieve an 
international standard. 
 
It is noteworthy that, as Processor McCormack has argued, the UNCITRAL Secured 
Transactions Guide and the UNCITRAL Insolvency Guide are very similar to US 
law because of the US influence on their drafting through organisations such as 
                                                 
45
 UNCITRAL, ‘The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts about the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law’ (United Nations Vienna, 2007) P10 
46
 ibid P1 
47
 ibid P22 
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CFA.
48
 The UK influence is similarly observable, as influenced through the London-
based INSOL
49
.
50
 Although some academics complain that UNCITRAL may be too 
US or West-dominated, which may hurt the interests of developing countries, this 
does not negatively affect the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions on PFIPs in 
this case. Firstly, China also has had some influence in the drafting of the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions on PFIPs. The UNCITRAL Secretariat 
invited Chinese experts to the two drafting sessions
51
, and even the recent 
UNCITRAL International Colloquium on PPPs
52
 invited Professor Cao as a keynote 
speaker. Secondly, although the US and the UK and their related organisations 
participated in the drafting of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions on PFIPs, 
the relatively unprejudiced international organisations such as the World Bank and 
the OECD had more influence
53
. Finally, neither the Legislative Guide nor the 
Model Provisions on PFIPs are mandatory prescriptions. They provide a point of 
reference, so China could choose those recommendations it needs and abandon 
others. 
                                                 
48
 The Commercial Finance Association (CFA) founded in 1944, is the international trade association 
dedicated to the asset-based lending and factoring industries. The CFA has nearly 300 member 
companies and 16 chapters located throughout the United States, Mexico and Canada. 
49
 International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals (INSOL), is a 
world-wide federation of national associations for accountants and lawyers who specialise in 
turnaround and insolvency.  
50
 Gerard McCormack, ‘Secured credit and the harmonisation of law, the UNCITRAL Experience’ 
(Edward Elgar, USA 2011) P182-186 
51
 UNCITRAL, 33
rd
 session, A/CN.9/471—Privately financed infrastructure projects: draft chapters 
of a legislative guide on privately financed infrastructure projects, P1 para.1-4: The 
Commission requested the Secretariat to seek the assistance of outside experts, as required, in 
the preparation of future chapters and invited Governments to identify experts who could be of 
assistance to the Secretariat in that task……; The Commission requested the Secretariat to 
continue the preparation of future chapters, with the assistance of outside experts……; 
UNCITRAL, 34
th
 session, A/CN.9/488—Possible work on privately financed infrastructure 
projects, P2 para.5-6: there were more than 70 registered participants at the Colloquium, 
including Government officials, bankers and Private Sector lawyers from more than 20 
States……The participants represented a broad range of practical experience and the 
perspectives of different legal systems. 
52
 UNCITRAL International Colloquium on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) took place on 2-3 
May 2013, Vienna: to produce a recommendation to United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on possible future works in the area of PPPs. 
53
 UNCITRAL, ‘Concept Note Prepared for French Business Association (MEDEF) And World Bank 
group meeting March 2013’ <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/public-private-
partnerships-2013/Frilet_Concept-note.pdf>  accessed on 30th July, 2013 
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3.2.3 Background of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL 
UNCITRAL believed that guidelines on the legislation of PFIPs could help 
countries improve their laws on PFIPs to facilitate the development of PFIPs. This 
led to drafting the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions. The content of the 
Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions were drawn up over seven years’ 
discussion, between the 29
th
 Commission Session and the 36
th
 Commission Session. 
3.2.3.1 Why did UNCITRAL get involved in PFIPS? 
After recommendations by many States and the consideration of a report 
(A/CN.9/424)
54
 prepared by the Secretary-General, the UNCITRAL decided to 
prepare a legislative guide on PFIPs
55
 at its 29
th
 session in 1996.         
3.2.3.1.1 The attraction of joining Private Investors and Public Infrastructure 
The UNCITRAL noted that the interest in various forms of private participation in 
public infrastructure projects had risen in many States, particularly in developing 
countries.  
 
Firstly, the PFIP model could save public funding. Since the private investor 
finances the project, the successful implementation of such projects would enable 
States to achieve significant savings in public expenditure. In this case, the resources 
that would have been invested in infrastructure could be reallocated to meet more 
pressing social needs.
56
 
 
                                                 
54
 UNCITRAL, 29
th
 session, A/CN.9/424-Possible Future Work: Build-Operate-Transfer projects 
55
 The exactly words here should be “build-operate-transfer (BOT) and related types of projects” 
which was used before 30
th
 session. However, in order to maintain consistency in this thesis, the 
advanced word “PFIPs” which was created and confirmed in 30th session is used here.  
56
 UNCITRAL, 29
th
 session, A/CN.9/424-Possible Future Work: Build-Operate-Transfer projects, 
P3, para.4-5; UNCITRAL, 29
th
 session, A/51/17-Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on its twenty-ninth session, P53, para.228; UNCITRAL, 30
th
 session, 
A/52/17-Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on its thirty 
session, P46, para.228 
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Secondly, the host government could benefit from the Private Sector’s expertise in 
operating and managing such projects. The private investor undertakes to complete a 
construction and to operate the facility for a certain period of time with a view to 
reclaiming its costs with reasonable profits. Thus, the private investor has a clear 
interest in the feasibility and design of the facility. At the same time, the host 
government also expects in particular to achieve efficient gains and high standards 
of service, which may not be provided by State monopolies.
57
 
3.2.3.1.2 The advantages of a favourable legal framework on PFIPs 
The UNCITRAL noted that a favourable legal framework for PFIPs is necessary and 
important when PFIPs are implemented.  
 
Firstly, a favourable legal framework fosters the confidence of national or foreign 
potential investors, and attracts more private investment into public infrastructure. 
PFIPs require substantial investment from private sources which is generally 
obtained by borrowing from commercial banks and other financial institutions. 
However, the repayment of borrowed funds and the return on the investment takes 
place over an extended period. Thus, the lenders and the investors look for clear 
guarantees by the host government that it will encourage long-term private 
investments and that such investments will be protected from expropriation or 
nationalisation without fair compensation. The way that the host government gives 
such guarantees is by providing a favourable legal framework that encourages 
private investment and protects the return on the investment.
58
 
 
Secondly, a favourable legal framework protects public interests.
59
 The final 
customers of the infrastructures are the people. A favourable legal framework 
ensures that the private investor provides a proper service. 
                                                 
57
 UNCITRAL, 29
th
 session, A/CN.9/424-Possible Future Work: Build-Operate-Transfer projects, 
P3-4, para.5-6; UNCITRAL, 30
th
 session, A/52/17-Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on its thirty session, P46, para.228 
58
 UNCITRAL, 29
th
 session, A/CN.9/424-Possible Future Work: Build-Operate-Transfer projects, 
P8, para.22-23 
59
 UNCITRAL, 30
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 session, A/52/17-Report of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law on its thirty session, P46, para.229 
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Thirdly, a favourable legal framework makes it easier to negotiate specific PFIPs. In 
the absence of such legislation, the contract documents have to cover various issues 
and guarantees that should be covered by legislation. It adds complexity to the 
negotiations.
60
 
3.2.3.1.3 The necessity of legislative guidance 
The UNCITRAL noted that it would be useful to provide legislative guidance to 
States preparing or modernising legislation relevant to PFIPs, and it has the 
capability to do this.  
 
Firstly, many countries require legislative guidance in improving their legislation to 
tackle the problems found in PFIPs. PFIPs usually involve contractual arrangements 
of considerable complexity and may require lengthy negotiations. Work by the 
UNCITRAL in this area would help such States in tackling identifiable problems. In 
particular, it would be useful to provide legislative guidance to States preparing or 
modernising their legislation on PFIPs.
61
  
 
Secondly, UNCITRAL has done a lot of preliminary work in preparing legislative 
guidance on PFIPs. The Secretariat examined other international organisations’ 
work on PFIPs, such as that of UNIDO, the EC and the World Bank
62
 and examined 
the legislative and regulatory texts on PFIPs from twenty-four countries.
63
 
 
Thirdly, UNCITRAL has been considered to be the best international organisation to 
provide the legislative guidance on PFIPs to various countries. It was noted that 
organisations that had done work in the area of PFIPs were not working to provide 
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comprehensive guidance to national legislators regarding PFIPs. Given 
UNCITRAL’s universal representation and its record in preparing trade law texts, 
there was a general agreement that UNCITRAL was the appropriate body to 
undertake such work, but that it needed to avoid a possible overlap with work being 
done by other international organisations.
64
 
 
To sum up, UNCITRAL founded a PFIP model that could benefit the development 
of a country, and a favourable legislative framework that could ensure these benefits 
and avoid some risks carried by PFIPs. Therefore, UNCITRAL decided to provide 
comprehensive legislative guidance to assist States who are preparing or 
modernising their legislation on PFIPs.  
3.2.3.2 Why were two legal documents on PFIPs with the same effect drafted by 
UNCITRAL—the Legislative Guide on PFIPs and the Model Provisions 
on PFIPs?   
The structure of the Legislative Guide is a set of legislative recommendations, 
followed by an explanatory discussion of the pertinent issues and the possible 
options available. The present Model Legislative Provisions were prepared by 
UNCITRAL as an addition to the Legislative Guide on PFIPs. The texts of the 
Legislative Guide and the Model Legislative Provisions were combined into one 
single publication to retain the legislative recommendations contained in the 
Legislative Guide as a basis of the development of the Model Legislative 
Provisions.
65
 
 
The 30
th
 Commission session in Vienna in 1997 had before it the first document 
comprising a table of contents setting out the topics proposed to be covered by the 
legislative guide, followed by annotations in some detail concerning the issues to be 
discussed therein
66
. After this, the Commission commenced work towards the 
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preparation of a Legislative Guide on PFIPs.
67 
The structure and content of the 
Legislative Guide were discussed repeatedly in the 30
th
 session, the 31
st
 session, and 
the 32
nd
 session. The Legislative Guide on PFIPs was finally confirmed and adopted 
by UNCITRAL on 29
th
 June 2000 in its 33
rd
 session.  
 
At the early stages of the preparation of the Legislative Guide, the Commission was 
expected to formulate more concrete guidance in the form of model legislative 
provisions or even in the form of a model law dealing with specific issues. The 
reason why the UNCITRAL preferred a Legislative Guide is mainly attributable to a 
lack of consensus as to which of the various issues dealt with in the Legislative 
Guide might be suitable subjects for Model Legislative Provisions.
68
 When arguing 
whether the Model Legislative Provisions should be drafted instead of the 
Legislative Guide, the opposing view was that PFIPs involved a number of Public 
Law and policy issues and that it would therefore be difficult to attempt to formulate 
model provisions that have to consider the differences between legal systems and the 
variety of policy options. Moreover, these opponents considered that it more 
important to offer sufficient flexibility to legislators in countries wishing to promote 
private investment in infrastructure. For that purpose, UNCITRAL decided that a 
clear set of legislative recommendations followed by explanations and the possible 
options, as in the Legislative Guide, might be more useful than a set of model 
provisions that legislators might find difficult to apply to domestic conditions.
69
  
 
The proposal to make Model Legislative Provisions on PFIPs had been reiterated in 
33
rd
 session, after the Legislative Guide had been adopted and published. The draft 
of Model Legislative Provisions was discussed and reviewed during the 34
th
 session, 
the 35
st
 session, and the 36
nd
 session. The Legislative Model Provisions were finally 
confirmed and adopted by UNCITRAL in 2003 in its 36
th
 session. 
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The reason why the Model Legislative Provisions on PFIPs was drafted soon after 
the Legislative Guide was adopted is that the UNCITRAL considered the requisite 
conditions to formulate more concrete guidance to be in place. The immediate 
decision to prepare a model law or model legislative provisions should not be 
interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction by the Commission with the work on 
Legislative Guide that had just been accomplished.
70
   
 
Firstly, over the course of the 3 years’ work in drafting the Legislative Guide on 
PFIPs, a clearer understanding had developed within UNCITRAL with regard to the 
issues involved and the options available. As a matter of fact, the Legislative Guide 
adopted by the Commission reflected their common understanding and represented a 
good starting point for future work aimed at providing more concrete guidance, e.g. 
the Model Legislative Provisions. More concrete guidance would meet a pressing 
need, in particular in countries with economies in transition and in developing 
countries.
71
 
 
Secondly, UNCITRAL had done enormous work in answering questions of the 
desirability and feasibility of preparing a model law or model legislative provisions 
on selected issues covered by the Legislative Guide,
72
 and this affirmed the work to 
draft the Model Legislative Provisions was necessary.
73
  
 
During the second week of the 34
th
 session of the UNCITRAL Commission in 
Vienna from 2 to 4 July 2001, a Colloquium on Privately Financed Infrastructure: 
Legal Frameworks and Technical Assistance was organised by the Secretariat of 
UNCITRAL with the co-sponsorship and organisational assistance of the Public-
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Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)
74
. This Colloquium had two aims. 
Firstly, it presented the best legislative and regulatory practices, as well as assessing 
the needs of recipient countries for assistance in establishing a legislative and 
regulatory framework for public-private partnerships. Secondly, the participant 
countries were invited to make recommendations on the desirability and, especially, 
the feasibility of a model law or model legislative provisions on PFIPs.
75
 
 
In the Colloquium, the debate on whether a model law or model legislative 
provisions on PFIPs was desirable or feasible was very intense. The countervailing 
view was that the preparation of a model law was neither feasible nor desirable. As 
to feasibility, it was recalled that some projects had failed because of the significant 
disparity of approach in different legal systems. As to desirability, the draft of the 
Model Legislative Provisions might conflict with the Legislative Guide, which was 
already adopted, and would therefore negatively affect the considerable work behind 
the widely disseminated Legislative Guide.
76
 However, several participants, who 
supported preparing the Model Legislative Guide, stated that there was significant 
demand for such a model law. It was noted that the Legislative Guide represented a 
good starting point, but that more concrete guidance, in the form of model 
legislative provisions, was desirable, especially for those countries with little or no 
experience in the field of PFIPs.
77
 It was also noted that the prompt undertaking of 
such work would take advantage of the experience gathered throughout the process 
that led to the adoption of the Legislative Guide. This would allow the work to be 
achieved easily and effectively within a reasonable amount of time. There was no 
conflict between preparing the Model Legislative Provisions and the efforts 
undertaken to disseminate the Legislative Guide.
78
 Although the views on how to 
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deal with the Model Legislative Provisions varied, its feasibility was agreed upon by 
the propositions group.
79
  
 
Although it was difficult to achieve an agreement between the two parties, the 
consequence was that the UNCITRAL Commission decided to continue its work on 
preparing the Model Legislative Provisions.
80
 
 
Thirdly, the UNCITRAL Working Group I
81
 was entrusted in 34
th
 Session with the 
specific task of drafting core model legislative provisions in the field of PFIPs.
82
 At 
the beginning of this task, the Working Group I was invited to formulate a specific 
part of the Model Legislative Provisions, namely the selection of the concessioner. 
83
 
However, the Working Group I was of the view that Model Legislative Provisions 
on other parts might be desirable as well.
84
 Therefore, the Model Legislative 
Provisions covered most of the subject matter addressed in the legislative 
recommendations of the Legislative Guide. The Model Legislative Provisions had 
been drafted during the 4
th
 and 5
th
 session of Working Group I and adopted by 
UNCITRAL in 2003 in its 36
th
 session. 
 
It is worth noting that the Model Legislative Provisions, which provides more 
concrete guidance, has not replaced the Legislative Guide in its entirety, nor have 
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the model provisions been thoroughly combined with the recommendations 
contained in Legislative Guide. The Model Legislative Provisions is a supplement to 
the Legislative Guide. It cannot supplant the Guide.
85
 
 
Firstly, the Model Provisions need the notes from the Legislative Guide in order to 
be explained and understood. According the discussions in the 4
th
 and 5
th
 sessions of 
Working Group I, the draft model provisions were not a departure from, but rather a 
development of, the policies and principles upon which the Legislative Guide was 
based. Thus, the draft model provisions did not replace the Legislative Guide in its 
entirety, and were to be understood and applied in light of and with the assistance of 
the explanatory notes contained in the Guide.
86
   
 
Secondly, although the draft model provisions covered most of the subject matter 
addressed in the legislative recommendations, there were matters dealt with in some 
legislative recommendations that were not addressed in any of the draft model 
provisions, such as recommendations 3 and 5-13. That circumstance alone excluded 
the possibility of replacing the legislative recommendations with the draft model 
provisions.
87
 Therefore, even in the Model Provisions, the full text of the legislative 
recommendations 1-13 as originally adopted by the Commission in 2000 remains in 
Part 1 of the Model Provisions. 
 
Thirdly, some issues neither arise in the recommendations of the Legislative Guide 
nor the provisions in the Model Provisions. These issues are only explained and 
discussed in the notes of the Legislative Guide, such as that on sovereign 
immunity.
88
 The countries who expect to establish or reform their laws on PFIPs in 
light of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions should consider all of these 
documents.  
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Therefore, the preamble of the Model Legislative Provisions clearly spells out that 
the legislators in recipient countries need to consider the whole of the contents of the 
Legislative Guide, whether or not expressly dealt with in the Model Legislative 
Provisions.
89
 
 
To sum up, so far UNCITRAL has drafted two relevant guidelines: the Legislative 
Guide (2000) and the Model Legislative Provisions (2003). Both of them have the 
same effect.  
3.2.4 The reasons to choose the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
drafted by UNCITRAL 
Both the Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects and Model 
Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects were issued by UNCITRAL. 
In addition to representatives of member States of the Commission, representatives 
of many other States and of a number of international organisations, both 
intergovernmental and non-governmental, actively participated in the preparatory 
work. When the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions are considered as guides to 
the reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs, it will be found that they not only satisfy the 
aims of the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs, referred to in 2.4, but they also 
could overcome the shortcomings of Chinese laws on PFIPs, referred to in 2.2.2. 
3.2.4.1 Facilitate PFIPs 
The final aim of the reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs is to facilitate PFIPs, which is 
the original aim for drafting the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. As is 
written in the Foreword to the Legislative Guide:  
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“For host countries wishing to promote PFIPs it is 
recommended that the following principles be implemented 
by the law.”90 
 
Law could be considered to be a political commitment to provide legal rights and 
guarantee policy stability. Therefore, an efficient legislative framework could attract 
private investment and facilitate PFIPs. 
 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provision could help China establish a legislative 
framework to protect private investment. The Legislative Guide contains a set of 
recommended legislative principles entitled “Legislative Recommendations”. The 
Model Provisions issued afterwards was also written on the basis of these 
recommendations. The legislative recommendations are intended to assist in the 
establishment of a legislative framework favourable to PFIPs.
91
 
 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions could help China review its laws to 
attract private investment. The Legislative Guide is intended to be used as a 
reference by legislators when they prepare new laws or review existing laws and 
regulations. For that purpose, the Guide helps identify areas of law that are typically 
most relevant to private capital investment in public infrastructure projects and 
discusses the content of those laws which would be conducive to attracting private 
capital, national and foreign.
92
 
3.2.4.2  Unified legislation 
The aim of reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs and the principles in the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions emphasize long-term sustainability.  
 
One of the reasons why the Chinese legislation on PFIPs needs to be reformed is 
current Chinese provincial laws on PFIPs cannot ensure consistency between the 
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public authorities, since they sometimes contradict each other. Meanwhile, the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions consider it important to ensure that the host 
country has the institutional capacity to undertake the various tasks entrusted to 
public authorities involved in infrastructure projects through their phases of 
implementation.
93
   
 
It is noteworthy that, although the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions do not 
mention the “establishment of national legislation” directly, all four legislative 
frameworks analysed in them imply a unified legislation at a national rather than 
provincial level. Firstly, it adopts specific legislation in respect of individual 
projects.
94
 In other words, even if the infrastructure project crosses difference 
provinces in the host country, only one legislative body manages the project. 
Secondly, it awards concessions to the Private Sector for the provision of public 
services. The Government is authorized by general legislation to award the Private 
Sector a concession in which a public service, which has economic value and is 
originally offered by the Public Sector, is allowed to be exploited by private 
entities.
95
 In other words, the standard by which concessions are  awarded is fixed 
by general legislation and cannot be changed in different regions without permission. 
Thirdly, it adopts sector-specific legislation, taking into account the market structure 
in each sector.
96 
In other words, in the specific sector the legislation should have 
coherence in the host country rather than depending upon provincial regulation in 
different regions. Fourthly, it enacts regulations, setting forth more detailed rules to 
implement the general provisions of domestic laws on PFIPs.
97
 In other words, a 
unified general provision should be made first. 
3.2.4.3 Comprehensive legislation on PFIPs 
China need to establish a comprehensive legislation on PFIPs, and the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions offer a pattern and choices for this legislation.  
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The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs needs be separated from other laws in order to 
focus on PFIPs. The legislative recommendations in the Legislative Guide and 
Model Provisions deal with matters that need to be addressed in legislation 
specifically concerned with PFIPs, but they do not deal with other areas of law 
which also have an impact on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects. Moreover, 
the successful implementation of PFIPs typically requires various measures beyond 
the establishment of an appropriate legislative framework, such as adequate 
administrative structures and practices, organisational capability, technical expertise, 
appropriate human and financial resources and economic stability. Although some 
of these matters are covered to some extent, they are not fully addressed in the 
legislative recommendations.
98
 
 
The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should cover all aspects of PFIPs. The 
Legislative Guide contains seventy one recommendations covering all aspects of 
PFIPs. The Model Provisions, which was drafted afterwards, consist of five parts on 
the basis of these recommendations: I. General Provisions; II. Selection of the 
concessioner; III. Contents and implementation of the concession contract; IV. 
Duration, extension and termination of the concession contract; V. Settlement of 
disputes. Therefore, the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions offer a clear 
and competitive selection procedure and clarify the rights and responsibilities of the 
parties in PFIPs. 
 
During the reform of Chinese legislation on PFIPs, the contents of the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions could be applied in light of different requirements. The 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions do not provide a single set of model 
solutions to address these concerns, but it helps the country to evaluate different 
approaches available and to choose the one most suitable to the national or local 
context. 
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3.2.4.4 Balancing the interests between private and public 
The new Chinese legislation on PFIPs should balance the interests between the 
Private and Public Sector. The advice provided in the Legislative Guide also aims at 
achieving a balance between the desire to facilitate and encourage private 
participation in infrastructure projects, on the one hand, and the various public 
interest concerns of the host country, on the other. The Legislative Guide lists and 
discusses a number of concerns of fundamental public interest and private interest 
which should be considered in the new Chinese legislation. 
 
Points of public concern include matters such as the continuity of the provision of 
public services; adherence to environmental protection, health, safety and quality 
standards set by the host country; fairness of prices charged to the public; non-
discriminatory treatment of customers or users, full disclosure of information 
pertaining to the operation of infrastructure facilities and the flexibility needed to 
meet changing conditions, including the expansion of the service to meet additional 
demand.
99
 
 
Fundamental concerns of the Private Sector, in turn, usually include issues such as 
the stability of the legal and economic environment in the host country; the 
transparency of laws and regulations, and predictability and impartiality in their 
application; enforceability of property rights against violations by third parties; 
assurances that private property is respected by the host country and not interfered 
with other than for reasons of public interest and only then if compensation is paid; 
and freedom of the parties to agree on commercial terms that ensure a reasonable 
return on invested capital commensurate with the risks taken by private investors.
100
 
3.2.4.5 Embody Marketisation 
The Chinese legislation reform on PFIPs aims to break monopoly and enhance 
competition in this market. Market competition is also advocated in the Legislative 
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Guide and Model Provisions. The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions consider 
essential elements of national policies to include the level of competition sought for 
each infrastructure sector, the way in which the sector is structured and the 
mechanisms used to ensure adequate functioning of infrastructure markets.
101
 
 
In China, competition between concessioners has no clear protection and there is 
still unfair competition between the common Private Sector and SOEs
102  
which 
monopolize Chinese infrastructure projects. The government may prefer the SOEs to 
profit rather than the Private Sector. Then the SOEs may find it easier to get the 
concession because the concession is awarded by the government. Although this 
prejudice may not be shown directly, there is no doubt that the SOEs would at least 
get more information and support from the government, which could help them to 
get the concession. 
 
Therefore, when referring to the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, Chinese 
legislation to promote private investment in infrastructure should be accompanied by 
measures destined to introduce competition between public service providers or to 
prevent monopolistic conditions where competition is not feasible. 
3.2.4.6 International standards 
Chinese legislation reform on PFIPs aims for Chinese legislation on PFIPs to 
achieve an international standard to attract more foreign private investment. The 
mission of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions is to promote the 
transparency of laws on PFIPs so that private investment can clarify their investment 
options and have reasonable expectations about their profits. The transparency of 
laws and administrative procedures is of particular importance when foreign 
investment is sought, since foreign companies may be unfamiliar with the country’s 
practices for the award of infrastructure projects.
103
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3.3 Other countries’ laws on PFIPs 
In this thesis, some countries’ laws about PFIPs are referenced. When compared 
with the various countries’ domestic laws which reflect the specific demands of 
these countries, the guidelines made by UNCITRAL represent the commonly 
accepted international standard. Therefore, in Chinese law reform, the other 
countries’ laws are considered as a reference only when the Legislative Guide and 
the Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL have gaps in their guidelines or their 
recommendations do not fit China’s specific situation. In other words, the other 
countries’ laws on PFIPs are not used as the primary guidelines to the Chinese law 
reform but as a supplement for situations when the guideline has gaps or is 
unavailable. 
3.3.1 Extraordinary opinions 
The countries which have extensive experience of PFIPs may have some 
extraordinary opinions on making laws on PFIPs. 
  
Some countries have extensive experience in PFIPs. There were a number of 
countries using the PPP model as early as the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries.
104
 With the development and improvement of PPPs, Britain even invented 
PFIs in 1992.
105 
There are a lot of successful examples on PFIPs in these countries. 
For example, the M6 toll road in Britain which connects Birmingham and the Black 
Country was constructed and is operated by the private company—Midland 
Expressway Limited.
106
 The Channel Tunnel which connects Britain and France is 
financed by a joint-owned British and French private company—Eurotunnel General 
Limited.
107
 Since these countries have been using the PFIP model, these cases offer 
practical examples used in establishing the laws on PFIPs in these countries, and 
therefore these countries have made a number of laws and regulations on PFIPs. In 
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the UK for example, a series of PFIPs contract versions were published by HM 
Treasury during 1999 to 2012.
108
 The Standardisation of PF2 Contracts (SoPC), 
which was issued in December 2012, is the latest version of the standard wording 
and guidance used by Public Sector bodies and their advisors when drafting PF2 
contracts. It reflects the new model of contracting for projects for the delivery of 
infrastructure and services using public private partnerships.
109
 There is no 
standardisation contract version offered by UNCITRAL. If China expects to offer 
standardisation contracts to private investors in PFIPs, the standardisation contracts 
used in the UK could be referenced. 
3.3.2 Supplemental reference rather than primary guideline 
Other countries’ laws cannot be used as the primary guidelines in Chinese law 
reform but they may be used as a supplementary reference. 
 
The countries’ domestic laws on PFIPs focus on the specific situations in these 
countries, which may be not be appropriate to the specific circumstances in China. 
The UK, for instance, does not have a specific law on PFIPs, but regulations on 
PFIPs are scattered in some relevant policies and guidelines. Although China could 
reference the UK’s model in the Standardisation of Contracts on PFIs, China, which 
needs a nationally comprehensive legislation on PFIPs, would find it impossible to 
use British laws as a guideline. Japanese law provides a further example. It issued 
the Law Relating the Promotion of Realization of Public Facilities by Using Private 
Funds of 1999 as a comprehensive law on PFIPs to regulate their relevant 
behaviours systematically.
110
 However, neither the Japanese law nor other countries’ 
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ucture_standardisation_of_contracts_051212.pdf> accessed on 26th July, 2013; Infrastructure 
UK, ‘PF2: A User Guide’(December 2012), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207382/pf2_use
rguide.pdf> accessed on 26th July, 2013;The National Archive, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/infrastructure_ppp_contractual.htm> accessed on 26th July, 2013 
110
 Wang Tie Shan, ‘Comparative research on PFI project between Britain and Japan’ (2008) IEC, 
No1: 49 
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laws deal with China-specific problems such as the state-owned land.  They only 
offer alternative suggestions. By contrast, the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions made by UNCITRAL represent commonly accepted international 
standards. They consider all aspects of PFIPs and various solutions to possible 
problems that might arise. It does not provide a single set of model solutions to 
address these concerns, but helps countries which need reform their laws on PFIPs 
to evaluate the different approaches available and to choose the one most suitable to 
its specific national context.
111
 Therefore, the other countries’ laws on PFIPs should 
not become the primary guide to Chinese law reform, but remain a supplementary 
reference. 
Conclusion 
This chapter answers the 2
nd
 research question, namely why choose the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL as the guidelines to improve the 
Chinese legislation reform on PFIPs, and why use other countries’ laws on PFIPs as 
a supplementary reference. 
 
Firstly, this chapter states that, in addition to the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions made by UNCITRAL, there are other international agreements relating to 
Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs) made by international 
organisations, such as the WTO, the OECD and the World Bank. Moreover, some 
bilateral or multilateral treaties relating to PFIPs are subscribed to by China and 
other countries. These international agreements and treaties have contributed to the 
harmonisation of laws on PFIPs, so that the countries are in agreement on the issues 
relating to PFIPs. However, these international agreements and treaties cannot be 
used to guide the reform and improvement of the host countries’ laws on PFIPs 
because of various limitations and disadvantages. 
 
Secondly, the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL are 
considered for their appropriateness in guiding the Chinese legislation reform on 
                                                 
111 ‘Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Project’ (2001)UNCITRAL 
(A/CN.9/SER.B/4), Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, paras.4 
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PFIPs. On the one hand, the organisation UNCITRAL, which works towards the 
progressive harmonisation and unification of international economic laws, is reliable. 
On the other hand, the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, which have 
recommendations for the treatment of all aspects of PFIPs, address all the aims of 
Chinese legislation reform. Therefore, they are considered to be the best guideline to 
inform Chinese legislation on PFIPs.  
 
Thirdly, some countries’ laws on PFIPs may be useful as a supplementary reference 
because these countries have extensive experience in PFIP practice and related laws.  
These countries’ laws on PFIPs could not guide Chinese law reform, since they 
focus on their own situations. However, they could be used to remedy the gaps in 
the guidelines in the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. 
 
To sum up, after comparing the advantages and disadvantages among these 
international agreements and treaties, the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
made by UNCITRAL serves as the best guide to Chinese legislation reform on 
PFIPs. Meanwhile, some countries’ laws on PFIPs may be used as a supplementary 
reference. 
 
The next chapters of this thesis will discuss in detail how the Legislative Guide and 
Model Provisions will guide the Chinese legislation reform on PFIPs.  Following the 
structure of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, the rest of the thesis will be 
divided into four parts: legislative framework, concessioner selection, project 
agreement and dispute settlement. Chapter 4 will discuss, referring the guidelines of 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, how to reform the general legislative and 
institutional framework on PFIPs in China. 
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Chapter 4  
General legislative and institutional framework 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss Chinese law reforms on PFIPs in terms of the general 
legislative and institutional framework required, according to the guidelines of the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL and supplementary 
references to other countries’ laws. 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to review the current Chinese legislative and institutional 
framework on PFIPs, and to propose a more appropriate legislative and institutional 
framework to facilitate the development of PFIPs in China. 
 
There are two objectives for this Chapter. The first objective is to prove that the best 
way to use the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions is to use its structure to 
discuss Chinese law reform on PFIPs while making the use of their content optional. 
The second objective is to point out the defects in current Chinese legislative and 
institutional frameworks and improve them by considering the principles in terms of 
the legislative and institutional framework on PFIPs offered by Legislative Guide 
and Model Provisions. 
 
This chapter consists of two sections. Section 4.1 presents the history behind the 
structure of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions and suggests new 
Chinese legislation on PFIPs may benefit from using this structure. This section also 
points out that using the content of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
is optional. Section 4.2 lists the four principles necessary to establishing the general 
legislative and institutional framework offered by Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions—transparency, fairness, long-term sustainability and eliminating 
undesirable restrictions. This section reviews whether the current Chinese 
framework satisfies these four principles. The British regulations about regulatory 
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institutions and customer interest are also used as supplementary reference. 
 
This chapter answers the third research question, with reference to the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions and with supplementary reference to the laws of other 
countries; namely, how should the general legislative and institutional framework on 
PFIPs in China be improved?  
4.1 How to use the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions to 
guide Chinese law reform on the general legislative and 
institutional framework of PFIPs 
4.1.1 Flexibility principle and concise principles 
The Legislative Guide includes a clear set of legislative recommendations followed 
by an explanatory discussion of the pertinent issues and the possible options 
available.
1
 The Model Legislative Provisions also gives a set of model provisions 
corresponding to the recommendations in the Legislative Guide and each provision 
references its corresponding recommendation and paragraphs of explanations in the 
Legislative Guide.
2
 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions are made up of recommendation, 
provisions and explanatory discussion, based on two principles fixed by 
UNCITRAL on how to draft legal documents on PFIPs:  
 
Firstly, the Legislative Guide was drafted with the flexibility principle in mind. The 
subject matter dealt with in the Guide touched upon a number of public law and 
policy issues and that it would therefore be difficult to attempt to formulate model 
provisions that adequately took into account the differences between legal systems 
                                                 
1
 UNCITRAL, 31
st
 session, A/53/17- Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its thirty-first session, P20 
para203  
2
 UNCITRAL, 34
th
 session, A/CN.9/488-Possible work on privately financed infrastructure projects, 
P4 para19; UNCITRAL, 35
th
 session, A/CN.9/505-Report of the Working Group on Privately 
Financed Infrastructure Projects at its fourth session, P3-24 para18-174; UNCITRAL, 35
st
 
session,  A/57/17- Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its thirty-fifth session, para231-232  
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and the variety of policy options. Thus the Guide stressed the importance of 
affording sufficient flexibility to legislators in countries wishing to promote private 
investment in infrastructure.
3
 
 
Secondly, the Legislative Guide was drafted with the principle of concision in mind. 
After considering the different views expressed, the Commission requested the 
Secretariat to draft the legislative recommendations in the form of concise 
legislative principles, thereby reducing the number of recommendations.
4
 
 
Therefore, when China uses the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions as 
guidelines in its law reform, it is not mandatory that China copies all 
recommendations and provisions into its new legislation. It may choose any 
recommendations and provisions which it needs in the law reform. 
4.1.2 The structure of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
The structure of both of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions are similar. 
The first part includes general items on general legislative and institutional 
frameworks, followed by chapters on the details of selection of the concessioner, 
concession contract (plus the duration, extension and termination of the project 
agreement) and settlement of dispute.   
 
The structure of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions was discussed 
many times in the UNCITRAL meetings and the current structure is considered to 
be the most suitable. One of the documents submitted to the 30
th
 Commission 
Session of UNCITRAL included annex I, which contains a table of contents setting 
out the topics to be covered by the legislative guide.
5
 This content was divided into 
eleven chapters in the 31
st
 Commission Session
6
. The Commission, in its 32
nd
 
                                                 
3
 UNCITRAL, 31
st
 session, A/53/17- Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its thirty-first session, P20 
para203 
4
 Ibid. para204 
5
 UNCITRAL, 30
th
 Session, A/CN.9/438-Privately-Financed Infrastructure Projects: Draft Chapters 
of a legislative guide on privately-financed infrastructure projects, P4 
6
 UNCITRAL, 31
st
 Session, A/CN.9/444-Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects - Draft chapters 
of a legislative guide on privately financed infrastructure projects, P3-7 para6-30 
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Session, was informed that the overall structure of the legislative guide should be 
changed by combining some of its chapters. The result was eight chapters (I, 
“General legislative considerations”, II, “Project risks and government support”, III, 
“Selection of the concessioner”, IV, “The project agreement”, V, “Infrastructure 
development and operation”, VI, “End of project term, extension and termination”, 
VII, “Governing law”, VIII, “Settlement of disputes”).7 The final structure of seven 
chapters was confirmed in the 33
rd
 Commission Session of UNCITRAL (I, “General 
legislative and institutional framework”, II, “Project risks and government support”, 
III, “Selection of the concessioner”, IV, “Construction and operation of 
infrastructure”, V, “Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement”, 
VI, “Settlement of disputes”, VII, “Other Relevant Areas of Law”). It can be seen 
that though the structure of the Legislative Guide changed during the discussions, it 
still maintained a connection between the general legislative framework and various 
issues in detail. 
 
Considering China has never established a comprehensive legislation on PFIPs, the 
new Chinese legislation on PFIPs could follow the structure of the Legislative Guide 
and Model Provisions: first to discuss the general legislative framework (in this 
chapter), and then separately discuss the details pertaining to concessioner selection, 
project agreements and dispute settlement. 
4.2 How to use the general principles of the Legislative Guide and 
the Model Provisions to guide Chinese law reform on the 
general legislative and institutional framework of PFIPs 
The general guiding principles are expressed in Recommendation 1 of the 
Legislative Guide: 
“The constitutional, legislative and institutional framework 
for the implementation of privately financed infrastructure 
projects should ensure transparency, fairness, and the long-
term sustainability of projects. Undesirable restrictions on 
private sector participation in infrastructure development and 
operation should be eliminated.” 
                                                 
7 
UNCITRAL, 32
nd
 Session, A/54/17-‘Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its thirty-second session’, 
P3 para.15 
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It is clear that the Legislative Guide considers the four issues of transparency, 
fairness, long-term sustainability and eliminating undesirable restrictions to be the 
general guiding principles to the establishment of a legal framework for PFIPs.  
 
The original draft
8
 from the Secretary-General did not express such clear general 
guiding principles but it did indicate that it is necessary to eliminate undesirable 
restrictions in constitutional provisions so as to give power to contracting authorities 
to award concessions.   
 
However, in the Report by UNCITRAL on the work of its 32
nd
 Session
9
, a proposal 
was made that the draft should outline the general principles that should inspire a 
domestic legislative framework for privately financed infrastructure projects, in 
particular the principles of transparency, fairness, openness and competition. 
Therefore, the general guiding principles were refined and clearly expressed in 
Recommendation 1 of the Legislative Guide and formally adopted in succeeding 
documents. When the Model Provisions was developed as an addendum to the 
Legislative Guide in the 35
th
 session of UNCITRAL, these general guiding 
principles were emphasised in Model Provision 1
10
. 
 
The following discussion assesses whether these general principles are also 
embodied in current Chinese laws on PFIPs. If so, it will examine whether they are 
applied appropriately; if not, it will address how these principles should be applied 
and how they might reform current Chinese laws on PFIPs: 
                                                 
8
 UNCITRAL, 32nd session, A/CN.9/458/add.2—Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects: Draft 
Chapters of a legislative guide on privately financed infrastructure projects - Chapter I. 
General Legislative Considerations, p3: (1) The law should provide the contracting authorities 
in the host country with the necessary power to award concessions for infrastructure 
development and operation. It is advisable to review existing constitutional provisions so as to 
eliminate undesirable restrictions to Private Sector participation in infrastructure development 
and operation, or unnecessary limitations to the use of public property by private entities and 
obstacles to private ownership of infrastructure.  
9
 UNCITRAL, 32
nd
 session, A/54/17-‘Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its thirty-second session’, 
p6 para.44 
10 UNCITRAL, Model Provisions, Model provision 1. Preamble: …considers it desirable to establish 
a favourable legislative framework to promote and facilitate the implementation of privately 
financed infrastructure projects by enhancing transparency, fairness and long-term sustainability 
and removing undesirable restrictions on Private Sector participation in infrastructure 
development and operation. 
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4.2.1 Transparency 
According to the Legislative Guide, transparency in a legal framework for PFIPs 
means clear and readily accessible laws with efficient procedures that can be easily 
applied.
11
 It involves two aspects: firstly, transparent laws and administrative 
procedures offer clear and readily accessible laws and efficient procedures, so that 
the potential private investors can predict and estimate the costs and risks of their 
investment and thus offer the most advantageous terms. Secondly, transparent laws 
and administrative procedures foster openness through provisions requiring the 
publication of administrative decisions, in order to prevent corruption or improper 
actions and decisions in the contracting authority or its officials.  
 
In order for the private investor better to estimate the risks, , the Legislative Guide 
emphasises rules relating to project risk and government support, in addition to the 
rules on the behaviour within PFIPs. The Legislative Guide does not advise statutory 
provisions that limit the negotiators’ ability to achieve a balanced allocation of 
project risks, as appropriate to the needs of individual projects.
12  
However, the 
Legislative Guide does advise that legislation has  explicit legislative authorisation 
to provide certain government support.
13
 This is very important when foreign 
investment is sought, since foreign companies may be unfamiliar with the country’s 
laws on PFIPs. By clarifying the risks and supports, foreign private investors will 
have more confidence to join a project. 
 
Both the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions point out the importance of 
information disclosure, but they do not offer this resolution in detail. In the follow 
chapters, however, information disclosure is implicitly dealt with in suggestions on 
the processes of concessioner selection, and project construction and operation. 
 
In current Chinese laws on PFIPs, , the transparency principle is implicit in 
provincial regulations to some extent but it is not framed clearly enough. In China, 
                                                 
11
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, P23-24 para.4 
12
 The legislative Guide, Chap. II on Project risks and government support, P42 para.21 
13
 The legislative Guide, Chap. II on Project risks and government support, P47 para.36 
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there are only provincial regulations on PFIPs, and no comprehensive national 
legislation (as was discussed in Chapter 2). These deficiencies are evident if  the 
most typical provincial regulation is taken for example: Urban Infrastructure 
Concession Regulation (Beijing) 2005 (hereafter referred to as “Beijing 
Regulation”). . 
 
Firstly, the transparency principle is not directly expressed in the general provisions 
of the Beijing Regulation. Article 5 of the Beijing Regulation
14
 states that fairness, 
honest and priority of public interest are the general guiding principles for PFIPs, 
but it does not mention transparency. Although some provisions in the Beijing 
Regulation imply transparency, the transparency principle is explicit. 
 
Secondly, the Beijing Regulation only provides for a very general legal framework 
to govern private finance in infrastructure, so it does not offer clear and readily 
accessible laws and efficient procedures for certain aspects. On the one hand, some 
vague words are used in this Regulation, which means that more work is needed to 
do to fix their significance. For example, Article 3 lists the specific sectors where 
concession may be taken as a means to provide infrastructure services, but a vague 
item at the end of Article 3 says the Municipal Government may also designate other 
sectors where concessions may be arranged. How the Municipal Government is to 
designate these sectors is not addressed. On the other hand, the procedure governing 
concessioner selection is not clear either. For example, a reference to “other 
competitive procedures” in concessioner selection15 means that both the Bidding 
Law and also the Procurement Law may be applied (as analysed in 2.2.2.3)Another 
example in the Beijing Regulation is the failure to explain the pre-award process for 
deciding a concession project. It only says that the concession project should satisfy 
the requirements of city development
16
 (The pre-award process and the concessioner 
selection process will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5). Therefore, much work is 
left over in relation to the explanation and implementation of the Regulation, the 
                                                 
14
Beijing Regulation 2005, Chapter 1 General Provisions, Article 5: the implement of urban 
infrastructure concession should follow the principles of fair, honest and priority to public 
interest.  
15
 Beijing Regulation 2005, Chapter 2 Award procedures, Article 11 
16
 Beijing Regulation 2005, Chapter 2 Award procedures, Article 8 
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careful preparation of the PIP
17
 and the negotiation of the concession agreement.
18
 
 
Thirdly, the disclosure of administrative information is hardly referred to in the 
Beijing Regulation. Although the Regulation requires the relevant department of the 
administration to supervise the concession project, it does not require the 
administrative department to disclose their decision or the results of this supervision 
to public. By contrast,  it stresses the concessioner’s obligation to disclose 
information to both administration and the public in Article 39. Publishing the 
concessioner’s information is important, but the administrative information 
disclosure is also important to both the concessioner and the public. 
 
Transparency of laws and administrative procedures is of particular importance to 
foreign investment, since foreign companies may be unfamiliar with the country’s 
practices in awarding infrastructure projects.
19
 Therefore, the legal framework 
governing future PFIPs in China should be explicit in reference to the transparency 
principle, and offer clear and readily accessible laws and efficient procedures. 
4.2.2 Fairness 
In the Legislative Guide, the fairness of a legal framework for PFIPs means it should 
take into account the various (and sometimes possibly conflicting) interests of the 
Public Sector, the Private Sector and the customers, and seeks to achieve an 
equitable balance between them.
20
 The interest of Public Sector is to ensure public 
interest, including continuous provision of essential services and promoting the 
development of national infrastructure. The interest of the private investors is their 
business profits. The interest of the customers is access to adequate services with a 
high quality and an affordable price. 
 
                                                 
17
 Implementation Plan for the Project (PIP): After a concession project is determined, the contracting 
authority shall prepare a project implementation plan, which lays out the basis for the award 
process and provides for the substance of the concession agreement. 
18
 Cao Fuguo, ‘The emerging legal framework for private finance in infrastructure in China: a 
preliminary review of the Beijing Concession Regulation’ (2006), (P.P.L.R. 62) 
19
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, P23-24 para.4 
20
 Ibid. P24 para.5 
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In current Chinese laws on PFIPs, the fairness principle is accepted and applied in 
provincial regulations. The current Chinese regulations are intended to protect both 
public interest and private interest. However, the regulations only emphasise the 
balance between public interests and private interests, whereas the interests of the 
customer is not reflected upon at all. For example, the beginning of the Beijing 
Regulation states that the Regulation aims at protecting social and public interests, 
ensuring safety and the quality provision of public goods and services, and 
protecting the legitimate interests of concessioners.
21
 
4.2.2.1 Protection of public interests 
The Legislative Guide lists those public interests that should be considered by the 
legislators when drafting legislation on PFIPs. These include continuity in the 
provision of public services; adherence to environmental protection, health, safety 
and quality standards set by the host country; fairness of the prices charged to the 
public; non-discriminatory treatment of customers or users; full disclosure of 
information pertaining to the operation of infrastructure facilities; and flexibility to 
meet changing conditions, including the expansion of the service to meet additional 
demand.
22
  
 
In China, there are measures in provincial regulations designed to protect public 
interest, including the regulation of the project quality and safety;
23
 the withdrawal 
of concession in emergency situation;
24
 control of the service fee and the 
concessioner charge.
25
 
 
It seems that the current Chinese regulations on protecting the public interest are 
consistent with the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions.  
 
                                                 
21 
Beijing Regulation 2005, Chapter 1 General Provisions, Article 1 
22
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and background information on PFIPs, P2 para.4 
23  
Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005 Art.19; Xinjiang Regulation, Art.5; 
Shenzhen Regulation, Art.4. 
24 
Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005 Art.21; Shenzhen Regulation, Art.36. 
25 
Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005 Art.20; Xinjiang Regulation, Art.22; 
Shenzhen Regulation, Art.20. 
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However, one exceptional situation should be noted: all current Chinese Provincial 
Regulations establish the “principle of public interest precedence”, which means 
when conflicts arise between public interest and private interest, public interests is 
given priority for protection.
26
 When the Chinese laws on PFIPs were not 
sufficiently advanced to regulate PFIPs, the government was, on occasion, 
vulnerable to exploitation by the private operator investors seeking excessive 
profits.
27
 Therefore, the “principle of public interest precedence” was useful for 
protecting Chinese public interest. However, this principle is inconsistent with the 
spirit of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL. 
Although the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions require the protection of the 
public interest
28
 and allow for the termination of projects for reasons of public 
interest
29 , they still emphasise the spirit of “equitable balance between the 
interests”30 rather than the priority of certain interests over others. China’s efforts to 
attract more private finance to satisfy the infrastructure demand mean it should 
abandon the “principle of public interest precedence”, and instead, to maintain 
consistency with the spirit of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. This will 
emphasise the “equitable balance between the interests”, and give exceptions to the 
contracting authority’s termination rights and relative compensation rules.31 
4.2.2.2 Protection of  private interests 
The Legislative Guide also lists those private investor’s interests that should be 
considered by the legislator when drafting legislation on PFIPs: stability of the legal 
and economic environment in the host country; transparency of laws and regulations, 
and predictability and impartiality in their application; enforceability of property 
                                                 
26 
Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005 
   Article 5: The principles of fairness, honesty and priority of public interests shall be followed for 
implementing concession of urban infrastructure. 
   Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) P152 
27
 Shen Jiyong, Wang ShouQing, Qiang Maoshan, ‘The Political Risks in China's BOT/PPP Project: 
a case study’, Chinese Businessmen Investment and Finance, pp. 50-56, No. 1, 2005 
28
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and background information on PFIPs, P2 para.4 
29
 The legislative Guide, Chap. V on Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement, 
Section D on Termination, paras.26 
30
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, P23-24 para.5 
31
 The legislative Guide, Chap. V on Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement, 
Section D on Termination, paras.14-27 
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rights against violations by third parties; assurances that private property is 
respected by the host country and not interfered with other than for reasons of public 
interest and only then if compensation is paid; and freedom of the parties to agree on 
commercial terms that ensure a reasonable return on invested capital commensurate 
with the risks taken by private investors.
32
 
 
In China, there are also measures in the provincial regulations designed to protect 
the interests of private investors, including the transparency of laws and regulations 
on the award process, and predictability and impartiality in their application. In 
respect of concession contracts by the Government, there are regulations on 
strengthening the co-ordination between governments; on government support and 
commitment; on protection of commercial secret; and on compensation payable in 
the case of policy change.
33
 
 
In practice, the balance of public interests and private interest is a consequence of 
negotiation; thus the achievement of the balance of interest objectives depends very 
much on the selection and negotiations process and the resulting contract between 
the contracting parties.
34
 
4.2.2.3 Protection of customer interests 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions particularly refer to the customers’ 
right to adequate services with proper quality and price. 
 
The current Chinese Provincial Regulations do not consider the customer interests to 
be a primary objective, although, in Beijing Regulation Article 20
35
, the customer 
                                                 
32
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and background information on PFIPs, P2 para.4 
33
 Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005 Art., 6, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18,19, 29, 30, 32 
34
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) P153 
35
 Beijing Regulation 2005, Chapter 3 Rights and obligations, Article 20: The concessionaire must 
provide a universal and non-discriminatory service to the consumers within the area defined in 
the concession agreement.  When new users request connection to the infrastructure facilities 
supplying water, gas or heating, or infrastructure facilities established for sewage disposal, the 
concessionaire operating the facilities may not charge a connection fee to such new users. 
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rights are more or less protected. Customer interest is so related to the development 
of a consumer society that it is no surprise that efforts to declare consumer 
protection failed in the Chinese Provincial Regulations, where a consumer society is 
not a primary consideration. Although it is difficult to separate customer interest 
from government interest because the government represents a public interest that 
includes the customer interest, customers have to safeguard their interests in cases 
where the government and the private investor conspire to harm customer interests.
36
 
As a matter of fact, consumers can play an important role in supervising the 
operation of public services. However, the Legislative Guide does not offer the 
details how to protect the customers’ interest, even though the protection of 
customer interest is considered to be one of its objectives. In this case, it is welcome 
that some advances have been achieved. Some countries’ regulations require the 
establishment of a utilities committee, such as a consumer mechanism in the British 
counterpart. In the United Kingdom, several consumer voice mechanisms have been 
established in light of relevant Utilities Regulations as in, for example, the 
Consumer Council for Water (hereafter refers to CCWater) in the water industry.
37
 
The organisation of CCWater makes sure that the water consumers’ collective voice 
is heard in national water debates and that consumers are important in the water 
industry.
38
 
 
To sum up, the fairness of legal framework for PFIPs is both the means by which 
Governments regulate and ensure the provision of public services to their citizens 
and the means by which public service providers and their customers may protect 
their rights. Therefore, the legal framework for the further PFIPs in China should do 
more to balance public and private interests. Additionally, the protection of 
customer interests is necessary in further Chinese legislation on PFIPs. 
                                                 
36
 Peng Tao, ‘PPP’ practice in China and Composition of PPP’ Legal Framework’, Zheng Fa Lun 
Cong(No.6, Dec. 10, 2006) P83 
37
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) P152 
38
 The Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) represents water and sewerage consumers in England 
and Wales. It is to make sure that the consumers’ collective voice is heard in national water 
debate and that consumers remain at the heart of the water industry. It also takes up consumers’ 
complaints if they have tried and failed to resolve issues with their water companies. (It took 
over the original organization “Water Voice” on 1 October 2005.)                                                                                    
< http://www.ccwater.org.uk/server.php?show=nav.1300 > accessed at 26/11/2011 
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4.2.3 Long-term sustainability 
In the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, long-term sustainability of legal 
frameworks governing PFIPs means that domestic legislation on infrastructure 
development should ensure the long-term provision of public services, with 
increasing attention paid to environmental sustainability.
39
 From a legislative 
perspective, it involves two aspects: Firstly, the legislation can ensure that the host 
country has the institutional capacity to undertake the various tasks entrusted to 
public authorities involved in infrastructure projects through the phases of 
implementation.
40
 Secondly, the legislation can ensure a marketization to achieve a 
correct balance between competitive and monopolistic provision of public 
services.
41
 
4.2.3.1 Institutional capacity 
In order to ensure the host country has the institutional capacity to undertake tasks 
through the phases of implementation, the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions 
indicate that three aspects should be considered when the host country makes 
domestic legislation on PFIPs: 
4.2.3.1.1 Authority sector 
The legislation should identify the sectors of the host country that are empowered to 
award concessions and enter into agreements for the implementation of PFIPs.
42
 In 
some countries, such as China, the Government’s responsibility for providing public 
services cannot be delegated without prior legislative authorisation.
43
 In this case, 
when the legislation allows Private Sector to offer public services, the first thing is 
to identify clearly the sectors authorised to award infrastructure projects and to act 
                                                 
39
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, P24 para.6 
40
 ibid 
41
 ibid 
42
 The Legislative Guide, recommendation 2. 
43
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on March 14, 2004 
    Article 99: Local people's congresses at various levels ensure the observance and implementation 
of the Constitution and the law and the administrative rules and regulations in their respective 
administrative areas. Within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law, they adopt and 
issue resolutions and examine and decide on plans for local economic and cultural development 
and for the development of public services……. 
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as contracting authorities. Once the concession is award by the authorised sector, it 
means the PFIP has been acknowledged by the host country and is protected by the 
laws, and it cannot be withdrawn arbitrarily. The Model Legislative Provisions 
further specifies this recommendation. It indicates that the host country should list 
all sectors empowered to award concessions and enter into agreements for the 
implementation of PFIPs.
44
 It even gives suggestions as to how to list the authorised 
sectors. One alternative may be to provide a list of authorised sectors empowered to 
enter into concession contracts, either in Model Provisions or in a schedule to be 
attached thereto. Another alternative might be to indicate the levels of government 
that have the power to enter into those contracts, without naming relevant public 
authorities.
45
 In a big country, such as China, which has 35 provinces, it would be 
impossible to list all the names of the authorised sectors. A more reasonable 
approach may be to list the levels of government that have the power to enter into 
those contracts.  
 
The scope of authorised sectors to award concessions should also be identified by 
the legislation, in order to ensure that concessions are lawful and valid.  
 
The “scope” includes the nature and purpose of the PFIP for which concessions may 
be awarded in the host country. The law should identify the sectors or types of 
infrastructure in respect to which concessions may be granted.
46  
Some 
infrastructures projects related to national defence or security may be excluded from 
the scope. The law should also identify the activities available to the private investor. 
It may be the construction and operation of new infrastructure facilities and systems, 
or the operation and maintenance of existing ones.
47
 Before the Legislative Guide 
was adopted, the opinion was expressed that the legislator should set out only a 
                                                 
44
 Model provision 3: Authority to enter into concession contracts (see the Legislative Guide, 
recommendation 2 and chap. I, paras. 15-18) The following public authorities have the power to 
enter into concession contracts4 for the implementation of infrastructure projects falling within 
their respective spheres of competence:……………. 
     Model provision 4: Eligible infrastructure sectors (see the Legislative Guide, recommendation 4 
and chap. I, paras. 19-22) Concession contracts may be entered into by the relevant authorities 
in the following sectors:…………………. 
45
 The Model Legislative Provisions, Model provision 3, P5. footnote 5 
46
 The Legislative Guide, recommendation 4. 
47
 The Legislative Guide, recommendation 3. 
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priority list of the sectors or types of infrastructure where concessions might be 
granted. However, the UNCITRAL commission points out in the accompanying 
notes
48
 that there was more than one possible way of indicating sectors or types of 
infrastructure where concessions might be granted. Therefore, the UNCITRAL 
commission did not adopt this suggestion.
49
 At the same time, the UNCITRAL 
commission also disagreed to adding more indications on the activities of 
implementation of PFIPs, which is a matter related to the various policy options 
available to the host country.
50
 To sum up, the UNCITRAL commission expected 
the Legislative Guide to be more flexible on the scope of the nature and purpose of 
the infrastructure projects, leaving scope to the decision of the host country. The 
scope made by the host country in light of this feature may have more long-term 
sustainability.  
 
The “scope” also includes the extent of the concession. The law should identify 
whether the right to provide the service is exclusive or whether the concessioner will 
face competition from other infrastructure facilities or service providers. Certain 
sectors have the characteristics of natural monopolies, in which case open 
competition is usually not an economically viable alternative. The decision whether 
or not to grant exclusivity rights to a certain project or category of projects should be 
taken in the light of the host country’s policy on the sector concerned. Therefore, the 
Legislative Guide deals with the issue of exclusivity in a flexible manner.
51
 
However, there should be some principles in issuing exclusive concession.  
 
It is preferable for the law to authorise exclusive concessions when it is deemed to 
be in the public interest. The contracting authority should be required to state the 
reasons for issuing an exclusive concession, prior to starting the selection 
procedure.
52
 The UNCITRAL commission expected that the host country should 
have the flexibility to decide whether to grant an exclusive concession, but the 
                                                 
48 
The Legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, P27 para.18 
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 UNCITRAL, 33th session, A/55/17- Report of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law on the work of its thirty-third session, P60, para.205 
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decision must be based on the consideration of public interest and the authority must 
state the reasons. 
 
To sum up, the enactment of express legislative authorisation can confirm the 
authorised sectors and the scope of the authority to award concessions on PFIPs. It is 
important to foster the confidence of private investors and ensure the long-term 
sustainability of PFIPs. 
4.2.3.1.2 Regulatory sector 
The legislation should identify the regulatory sectors of the host country empowered 
to regulate the implementation of PFIPs. The issue of authority to regulate 
infrastructure services does not been noted in the Model Legislative Provisions. But 
it is analysed and discussed as an important part of the Legislative Guide.
53
 
 
Since the first PFIPs, the activities in their implementation have been subject to a 
regulatory regime that may consist of a regulatory sector, substantive rules, 
procedures, and review.  
 
The term “regulatory sector” refers to the institutional mechanisms required to 
implement and monitor the rules governing the activities of infrastructure 
operators.
54
 One key issue concerning the regulatory sector is whether there is an 
independent body to supervise the whole process of the PFIPs.
55
 The efficiency of 
the regulatory regime in most cases depends on the objectivity with which 
regulatory decisions are taken. Thus, it requires that regulatory sectors should be 
able to take decisions without interference or inappropriate pressures from 
infrastructure operators and public service providers.
56
 On this basis, the legislation 
should have some regulations to ensure these kinds of interference or pressure are 
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 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
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avoided, as in, for example, a conflict of interest when the regulatory officials also 
work for the infrastructure operator. It is noteworthy that the separation of the 
regulatory sector from the authorised sector is not expressly dealt with in the 
recommendations of the Legislative Guide, but that the notes of the Legislative 
Guide indicate that a regulatory sector joined with the authorised sector may affect 
the way they regulate the provision of service.
57
 To some extent, it implies that the 
Legislative Guide prefers a totally independent regulatory sector. 
 
The efficiency and credibility of regulatory sector’s work require transparency and 
objectivity in the regulatory rules and procedures. Rules and procedures should be 
objective and clear so as to ensure fairness, impartiality and timely action by the 
regulatory sectors.
58
 For the purpose of transparency, the law should require that the 
rules and procedures should be made public. Regulatory decisions should state the 
reasons on which they are based and should be made accessible to interested parties, 
through publication or other appropriate means.
59
 The Legislative Guide even points 
out that the regulatory sectors could publish an annual report of their regulatory 
decisions and activities.
60
 Additionally, for the purpose of objectivity, the law could 
require that the regulatory sector’s important decisions should be based upon wide 
consultation, either in the form of a public hearing or the consultation of papers by 
interested groups.
61
 The requirements of transparency and objectivity in the 
regulatory rules and procedures also reflect the principles of the Legislative Guide 
and Model Legislative Provisions.  
 
If the decision made by the regulatory sector is wrong, the law should provide a 
channel to review the decision. This is a safeguard to ensure the transparency and 
objectivity of regulatory procedures. Recommendation 10 of the Legislative Guide 
clearly points out that the law should establish transparent procedures whereby the 
concessioner may request a review of regulatory decisions by an independent and 
impartial body, including court review, and should set forth the grounds on which 
                                                 
57
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, P33 para.40 
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61
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, P35 para.48 
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such a review may be based.
62  
However, it is noteworthy that overturning the 
regulatory sector by way of court decision may be not feasible in China. In China, 
the regulatory sector in PFIPs is often an administrative sector, so the decision made 
by the regulatory sector is treated as an administrative action. Although court review 
is one of the ways to review administrative action, not all administrative actions are 
easy to review by court in China. Some claims of administrative action are 
mandatorily required to have administrative reconsideration before court review.
63 
Some claims of administrative action are final, as ruled by administrative 
reconsideration, which means there is no chance to access them by way of court 
review.
64
 Therefore, if the new legislation on PFIPs expects to ensure the actions of 
the regulatory sector to be reviewed by court, it should either: ensure the regulatory 
sector is more independent, so that its actions are not administrative and may be 
sued freely by the concessioner; or remove the legal barriers from the Chinese laws 
so that administrative action may be sued freely by the concessioner.    
 
The Legislative Guide does not give suggestions on what kind of regulatory sector 
should be established. However, Britain offers a specific example in this regard: 
Britain has established a mechanism to regulate PFIPs, which includes three kinds of 
institutions. The OGC (Office of Government Commerce) issues the regulation and 
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 The Legislative Guide, recommendation 10 
63 
For example, the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People's Republic of China 2009; 
   Article 14: A citizen, legal person, or any other organization that refuses to accept a specific 
administrative act of a department under the State Council, or the people's government of a 
province, an autonomous region, or a municipality directly under the Central Government, shall 
apply for administrative reconsideration to the department under the State Council, or the 
people's government of the province, the autonomous region, or the municipality directly under 
the Central Government that undertook the specific administrative act. The applicant who 
refuses to accept the administrative reconsideration decision may bring a suit before a people's 
court; or apply to the State Council for a ruling, and the State Council shall make a final ruling 
according to the provisions of this Law. 
64 
For example: the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People's Republic of China 2009 
   Article 30:  ……According to the decisions of the State Council or the people's governments of 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government to 
prospect and confirm or adjust administrative divisions into districts, or to requisition lands, an 
administrative reconsideration decision, which is made by the people's governments of 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government, to 
confirm ownership and right to use of natural resources, such as land, mineral resources, rivers, 
forests, mountains, grasslands, unclaimed land, beaches, maritime waters, is a final ruling. 
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policies on PFIPs;
65
 the PUK (Partnership UK)
 66
 and the PRG (Project Review 
Group)
67
 give support on issues of finance; OGC’s GP (Gateway Process)68, Audit 
Commission
69
 and Local Partnerships
70
 monitor PFIPs. In contrast, China has no 
regulatory sectors that only focus on PFIPs. The regulatory sectors on infrastructure 
in China are divided by the different types of the infrastructure, irrespective of 
whether the infrastructure is financed by public or private funding. For example, 
roads in China are regulated by Ministry of Communications of the People's 
Republic of China and its subordinate bodies; hospitals are regulated by Ministry of 
Health of the People’s Republic of China; schools are regulated by Ministry of 
Education of the People's Republic of China and its subordinate bodies, etc. If China 
expects to develop PFIPs, it needs to establish regulatory sectors specific to PFIPs. 
These are beneficial for establishing a guarantee system to help private investors 
obtain loans from banks and they are favourable for dealing with problems in PFIPs 
in a professional manner.
71
 
                                                 
65
 OGC is now a part of the new Efficiency and Reform Group within the Cabinet Office. It used to 
belong to the HM Treasury. OGC has offered guidance on certain financing issues in PFI 
contracts. < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120503092022/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managin
gyourorganisation/NHSprocurement/Publicprivatepartnership/Privatefinanceinitiative/Investme
ntGuidanceRouteMap/DH_4133031> accessed on 26
th
 May, 2013 
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partnerships in the United Kingdom. It was a public limited company formed in 2000, owned 
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established as a separate unit within the Treasury to work alongside the Private Sector on major 
infrastructure projects. As a result, it was announced in May 2011 that PUK was to be 
dissolved. 
67
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processes as part of a wider programme of strengthened spending control. These revisions aim 
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Treasury uses to approve Major Projects more consistent across Government. These revisions 
have included bringing the assurance and approvals processes previously completed by the PRG 
into a standardised Treasury Approval Point (TAP) process. <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/ppp_projectreview_group.htm> accessed on 26
th
 May, 2013 
68
 The OGC Gateway Process examines programmes and projects at key decision points in their 
lifecycle. It looks ahead to provide assurance that they can progress successfully to the next 
stage. < http://www.dfpni.gov.uk/cpd-coe-ogcgateway0-strategic-assessment.pdf> accessed on 
26
th
 May, 2013 
69
 It role is to protect the public purse. < http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/> accessed on 26
th
 
May, 2013 
70
 Local Partnerships is a company that is uniquely and jointly owned by HM Treasury and the Local 
Government Association. It provides commercial expertise on matters of infrastructure, legal 
and contractual complexity and act for the benefit of the Public Sector. 
<http://www.localpartnerships.org.uk/> accessed on 26
th
 May, 2013 
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To sum up, the Legislative Guide does not advocate the establishment of any 
particular model or administrative structure. It only illustrates the different options 
that have been used in various domestic legislative measures to set up regulatory 
frameworks for PFIPs. The UNCITRAL commission expected host countries to 
establish the regulatory regime in light of its specific requirements, to fit for long-
term sustainability of PFIPs in that host country.
72
   
4.2.3.1.3 Administrative coordination 
The legislation should ensure administrative coordination. PFIPs are generally huge 
and complicated, which require the public authorities to be responsible for issuing 
approvals, licences, permits and so on. PFIPs may include the involvement of 
several public authorities, at various levels of government. Thus, it is necessary to 
coordinate the activities of public authorities for the implementation of PFIPs.
73
 The 
Legislative Guide strongly recommends establishing a central unit within the host 
country’s administration with the overall responsibility for formulating policy and 
providing practical guidance on PFIPs.
74
 This ensures institutional capacity in the 
implementation of PFIPs. 
 
To sum up, if the law cannot ensure institutional capacity in the implementation of 
PFIPs, it limits the efficiency of PFIPs and results in reduced service quality and 
increased costs for users, which negatively affects the long-tem sustainability of 
PFIPs at the end. 
4.2.3.2 Marketization 
In order to ensure the long-term sustainability of PFIPs, the legislation on PFIPs 
needs not only to ensure the institutional capability in the host country, but also to 
ensure  marketization that balances competitive and monopolistic provision of 
                                                 
72
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, Section E. 
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 The Legislative Guide, recommendation 6 
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public services.
75
 
 
Competition is beneficial to the long-term sustainability of PFIPs. Competition may 
reduce overall costs and provide more back-up facilities for public services. In 
certain sectors, competition has also helped to increase the productivity of 
infrastructure investment, to enhance responsiveness to the needs of customers and 
to obtain a better quality of public service, thus improving the business environment 
for all sectors of the economy.
76
 
 
A service provider operating under monopolistic conditions is typically able to fix 
prices. Even when the price is regulated by public authority, it does not benefit the 
quality of service since the monopolist may decrease the quality to compensate for 
the lower cost. This means the consumers may have to pay more and the provider 
has no motivation to improve its service, which may have negative repercussions for 
the whole economy. However, monopolies may be supported by legislation for 
special reasons, despite their negative economic effects. One such case is found in 
natural monopolies. When the services attend to an increase of demand, additional 
units decrease the costs of production.
77
 The other is found in legal monopolies. A 
price below cost is set to achieve policy objectives, such as public services for senior 
citizens or low-income earners in the form of state welfare.
78
 
 
To sum up, in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of PFIPs, legislation on 
PFIPs is required to balance competitive and monopolistic provision of public 
services in the market. Legislation on PFIPs should not only protect competition, but 
also certain monopolies as it affects public interest. 
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4.2.4 Eliminating undesirable restrictions 
According to the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, eliminating undesirable 
restrictions for PFIPs means these restrictions on Private Sector participation in 
infrastructure development and operation should be eliminated.
79
 The Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions offer the guidelines on three forms of undesirable 
restriction, which may be eliminated when countries establish legislation on PFIPs.  
4.2.4.1 Eliminating undesirable restrictions in Constitution 
Undesirable restrictions on PFIPs should be eliminated from constitutional rules. As 
the Constitution is the foundation to laws and policies, all specific laws and policies 
on PFIPs made by the country should follow its principles. Some constitutions state 
that public service delivery is reserved for the Public Sector, while other 
constitutions authorise the State to award concessions to Private Sector for the 
development and operation of infrastructure and the provision of public services. 
Therefore, for countries wishing to develop PFIPs, it is important to review existing 
constitutional rules so as to identify possible restrictions on the implementation of 
PFIPs.
80
    
 
The review of existing constitutional rules was discussed in detail during the 
drafting of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. One opinion was that it would not be 
appropriate for the guide to recommend the review of constitutional rules as it is a 
politically sensitive process in many countries. There were also concerns that the 
review of constitution rules is a complicated procedure. The objective of the 
Legislative Guide was to encourage Private Sector investment, which is a matter of 
specific laws and relevant policies rather than the Constitution. However, the 
opponents of these views pointed out that the guide is addressed to legislators and 
policy makers in countries interested in promoting PFIPs. The legislators and policy 
makers should be concerned with the various potential legal difficulties for the 
implementation of PFIPs, especially constitutional restrictions.
81
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As a result, constitutional review is considered in Recommendation 1 of the 
Legislative Guide and the Model Provision 1 of the Model Provisions. That means 
the UNCITRAL Commission aimed to support the review of constitutions to 
eliminate undesirable restrictions. Firstly, “Constitution” was added into the opening 
words of the recommendation 1 in the 33
rd
 Commission Session when the draft of 
the Legislation Guide was discussed.
82
 The UNCITRAL Commission agreed that 
removing undesirable restrictions should be achieved at the constitutional level. 
Secondly, constitutional review is recommended clearly and explained in detail in 
the notes to the Legislative Guide.
83
 
 
It is worth noting that constitutional review is very important to certain Communist 
countries such as China. In Capitalist countries, the main matter under consideration 
is the balance between private investment and public interest. In Communist 
countries, private investment in public infrastructure may become a political 
problem. Generally, constitutions in Communist countries claim that public 
infrastructure is reserved exclusively for the state and for all the people in the 
country. In other words, even if private investors invest in public infrastructure, they 
are not entitled to use the facilities or ask for profits in light of the Constitution. This 
may discourage many private investors from forming PFIPs. However, if this 
restriction is removed from the Constitution, legislators may be concerned by 
possible changes to the character of the state. In this case, the Legislative Guide and 
the Model Provisions have not given suggestions as to removing “socialisation” as 
an undesirable restriction from Communist Constitutions. But the Legislative Guide 
clearly points out that its content does not cover “privatisation” transactions related 
to public infrastructure. It claims that “privatisation” gives rise to legislative issues 
that are substantively different from legislative issues pertaining to PFIPs.
84
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4.2.4.2 Eliminating undesirable restrictions in Land Laws 
Undesirable restrictions on PFIPs should be eliminated from land laws. Since the 
infrastructure is most often built on land, restrictions on the ownership of land may 
lead to the reluctance of private investors to invest, and it also may form an obstacle 
to the operation of PFIPs. For this problem too, the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions do not give suggestions in the recommendations or provisions. But 
during the draft proceedings, it was proposed that the host country should consider 
adopting legislative provisions to authorise the authority sector to make available to 
the concessioner such public land that may be required for the execution of the 
project.
85
 
 
Eliminating undesirable restrictions in Chinese land laws is very difficult. The 
primary reason is that China forbids the private ownership of land. The Constitution 
of the People’s Republic of China clearly states that Chinese land is owned by the 
state or collectives
86
 rather than by any individual or organization.
87
 In the other 
words, it means the land is not allowed to be traded in the market. The land required 
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 UNCITRAL, 32
nd
 session, A/CN.9/458/Add.2 –‘Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects: Draft 
Chapters of a legislative guide on privately financed infrastructure projects - Chapter I. General 
Legislative Considerations’ P2 para.(2)(c); 31st session, A/CN.9/444/Add.2-‘Privately Financed 
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86
 Collective ownership is a special kind of ownership system in Chinese rural areas. The rural areas 
have hundreds collectives such as People’s Communes, Agricultural Producers Cooperatives 
and other forms of cooperatives economy under collective ownership by the working people. 
Generally, these collectives are divided by region. Every rural people works as a member of one 
collective and all Chinese rural land belongs to these collectives. 
87 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on March 14, 2004: 
      Article 10: Land in the cities is owned by the state.  
                       Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions 
which belong to the state in accordance with the law; house sites and privately farmed plots of 
cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives.   
               The state may, in the public interest, requisition land for its use in accordance with the 
law. 
                       No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land or otherwise 
engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means.  
    The Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China (2004 Amendment), adopted on 
August 28th, 2004: 
      Article 2 The People's Republic of China resorts to a socialist public ownership i.e. an ownership 
by the whole people and ownerships by collectives, of land. In ownership by the whole people, 
the State Council is empowered to be on behalf of the State to administer the land owned by the 
State. No unit or individual is allowed to occupy, trade or illegally transfer land by other 
means……. 
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in infrastructure projects may not be obtained by the private investors themselves. 
This kind of land ownership regime is a fundamental policy in China and it is not 
expected to be changed in the next few decades. Therefore, this kind of undesirable 
restriction may not be eliminated. The current Chinese law allows the private 
investor to acquire the rights of land use and land easement required for an 
infrastructure project.
88
 Therefore, the law reform in this regard need only eliminate 
undesirable restrictions that hinder the rights of land use and land easement required 
by private investors in infrastructure projects. Or, to make the process easier, the 
new Chinese legislation on PFIPs could clearly claim that the authority sector has 
the responsibility to make available to the concessioner such land that may be 
required for the execution of the project.
89
  
4.2.4.3 Eliminating undesirable restrictions in Foreign Exchange laws 
The undesirable restrictions on PFIPs should be eliminated from the rules relating to 
foreign exchange laws. In PFIPs, the private investors may be from countries or 
areas where a different currency is used. In this case, the private investor may 
encounter a number of problems with regard to foreign exchange, such as foreign 
currency payment, foreign currency income, foreign exchange guarantees, foreign 
debt, etc. If there are too many undesirable restrictions on foreign exchange in the 
host country, the investor may be discouraged from investing. Although the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions do not give the host country clear 
suggestions on how to remove undesirable restrictions from the foreign exchange 
laws as they pertain to PFIPs, they require the host country to establish law to 
support foreign exchange in PFIPs. For example, they require the host country make 
legislation to facilitate the issue of licences under foreign exchange regulations.
90
 
They emphasise that restrictions on foreign exchange may bring high exchange rate 
risks to private investors.
91
 They suggest the private investor should have foreign 
                                                 
88
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 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.27 
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exchange guarantees in host countries which do not have freely convertible 
currencies.
92
 They require host countries to available legislation of foreign exchange 
for foreign private investors to transfer their capital.
93
  
 
China is a country with very strict foreign exchange administration. It does not have 
freely convertible currencies. The Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on 
Foreign Exchange Administration clearly outlines that the foreign private 
investment in PFIPs shall go through registration formalities at foreign exchange 
control agencies.
94
 The Private Sector may not find it easy to get loans from banks in 
the private investors’ home countries.  The project company implementing the 
infrastructure project in China is often registered in China. According to the 
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration, 
a Chinese company taking a loan from a foreign bank must be registered and follow 
relevant restrictions.
95
 Moreover, the private foreign investor may not be free to 
offer guarantees on their PFIP.
96
  
 
If China expects to attract more foreign private investments into its domestic public 
infrastructure, its laws should be as convenient as possible for foreign exchange.  
Otherwise, the foreign private investor may be discouraged from investment because 
of the risks of unpredictable foreign exchange.  
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 The Legislative Guide, Chap. II on Project risks and Government support, Section C on 
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 The Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration (2008 
Revision) adopt 5
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 August, 2008: 
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registration formalities at foreign exchange control agencies after have been approved by 
relevant competent department. 
95
 Ibid. 
    Article 18: The state carries out the scale administration of foreign loan. Entities or individuals that 
borrow foreign loans shall observe relevant provisions of the state and go through registration 
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96
 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter answers the 3
rd
 research question,  namely how the Chinese general 
legislative and institutional frameworks on PFIPs may be improved, based on the 
guidelines from the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions and making 
supplementary reference to other countries’ laws. 
 
Section 4.1 analyses the structure of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, 
which are considered for use in new Chinese legislation on PFIPs. The structure first 
gives recommendations on the general legislative and institutional frameworks, 
followed by recommendations on the specific areas of concessioner selection, 
contracts in PFIPs and dispute settlement. It is considered to be the most proper 
structure for new Chinese legislation on PFIPs. Additionally, this section indicates 
that the use of the recommendations in the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions is optional and the Chinese law does not need to copy them. 
 
Section 4.2 discusses the four principles offered by the Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions to guide the Chinese law reform on the Legislative and 
institutional framework on PFIPs. 
 
Regarding the principle of transparency, the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions require a clear and readily accessible law and adequate information 
disclosure about administrative decisions. Taking the Beijing Regulation as an 
example, it showed that some provisions in this regulation are vague and barely 
touch on information disclosure. Therefore, the new Chinese legislation on PFIPs 
needs offer clarity in its legal documentation and include provisions on information 
disclosure. 
 
Regarding the principle of fairness, the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
require a point of balance between public interests, private interests and customer 
interests. Through reviewing the Chinese law on PFIPs, it was found that the current 
Chinese law has the “public interest precedent principle”. This principle harms the 
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balance point so it should be removed from Chinese laws. There is no customer 
interest referred to in current Chinese laws on PFIPs, and this should be added into 
the Chinese new legislation. The British Water Voice offers a particularly good 
example of how to protect the customer interest, which could be considered in 
reference to Chinese law reform. 
 
Regarding the principle of long-term sustainability, the Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions require the legislation on PFIPs to confirm the authority and 
regulatory sectors, and ensure administrative coordination among them. China 
already has some provisions regarding this feature, but still has space to improve this 
in further law reform. British regulations about regulatory insinuation are also 
referenced here.  
 
Regarding the principle of eliminating undesirable restrictions, the Legislative Guide 
and the Model Provisions require the removal of all undesirable restrictions from 
laws on PFIPs. Here the chapter discussed three laws (Constitution Law, Land Law 
and Foreign Exchange Law) from which serious undesirable restrictions need to be 
removed. 
 
Following this discussion of the general legislative and institutional frameworks, the 
next chapter, Chapter 5, will discuss concessioner selection. 
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Chapter 5  
The concessioner selection procedure in Privately Financed 
Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs) 
Introduction 
In a PFIP, selecting the concessioner is an important step. As has already been 
discussed, China has no specific legislation on PFIPs. Furthermore, no specific legal 
selection procedure is applied to ensure an appropriate private concessioner is 
selected in Chinese PFIPs. PFIPs have special requirements for concessioner 
selection procedures which may need specific selection procedures rather than 
general selection procedures. Thus, there are a lot of potential problems in the 
concessioner selection procedures of PFIPs in China. In order to ensure the project’s 
success, protect the private investor’s interests and avoid corruption, it is necessary 
to ensure the fairness and transparency of the concessioner selection procedure. The 
recommendations in Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL represent the international standard for legislation regarding PFIPs. 
These recommendations could be tied to current laws in China, with regard to 
specific situations that might guide the establishment of Chinese laws regarding 
concessioner selection in PFIPs. This Chapter argues that Chinese laws on selecting 
the concessioner in PFIPs should be improved. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss how to reform Chinese laws on concessioner 
selection procedure in PFIPs, so that the selection procedure could achieve the levels 
of fairness and transparency set out in the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. 
 
There are four objectives in this Chapter. The first objective is to discuss how to 
reform the Chinese laws on the determination of infrastructure project plans and on 
market access so that private investors have an equal opportunity to participate in 
the selection procedure. This will ensure fairness and transparency in the pre-
selection stage. The second objective is to confirm that a reasonable process for 
selecting concessioners in PFIP offers competitive selection procedures as its 
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primary model, while uncompetitive selection procedures under negotiation may be 
recognised in exceptional circumstances. It also considers how to establish new 
Chinese legislation on the concessioner selection of PFIPs to ensure fairness and 
transparency in both the competitive selection procedures and the uncompetitive 
selection procedures. The third objective is to discuss how to reform Chinese laws 
about the complaint and review mechanism in concession selection procedures to 
ensure transparency in the post-selection stage. The fourth objective is to discuss 
whether the Chinese concessioner selection procedures on PFIPs should accept an 
unsolicited proposal model and how to ensure this kind of special selection 
procedure is fair and transparent. 
 
This chapter consists of four sections. As with the flowchart below, the structure of 
this Chapter follows the three stages of the concessioner selection procedure of 
PFIPs: the preparation before the selection (Figure 5.1: blue), the selection (Figure 
5.1: black) and the dispute settlement after the selection (Figure 5.1: red). 
Additionally, there is a special concessioner selection procedure for PFIPs, namely 
the unsolicited proposal procedure (Figure 5.1: green).  
 
Section 5.1 shows that the pre-selection stage (Figure 5.1: blue part) should be fair 
and transparent. There are two matters relating to this issue. The first is whether an 
infrastructure project should be provided. In China, the decision to build a public 
infrastructure is taken by the authority sectors, while the Private Sector is not 
entitled to suggest an infrastructure is necessary. Public opinion is also ignored, 
which means neither institutions nor individuals have clear legal channels to express 
their desire for infrastructure. The second is whether a private investor is allowed 
access to an infrastructure project. Generally, the public authority in the host country 
decides whether to issue a concession to a private concessioner rather than a State 
Own Entity (SOE) on the basis of both economic and political requirements.
1
 
Therefore, the situations in which a private investor may be considered should be 
clearly defined in the legislation, in case the public authority directly appoints a SOE 
and does not give the private investor sufficient opportunity to compete for projects. 
                                                 
1
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) P157 
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However, the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
2
 do not consider how the law 
authorises private investors to access the host countries’ markets, so the EU is 
referenced in this regard to discuss a possible avenue for Chinese law reform. 
 
Section 5.2 argues that the selection of the private concessioner (Figure 5.1: black) 
should be based on a fair and transparent competition. The aim of this selection is to 
select an appropriate concessioner for PFIPs. Therefore, a competitive selection 
procedure is essential. Competitive procedures not only help to achieve value for 
money for both the contracting authority and the general public users of the 
infrastructure, but help to prevent corruption. Further analysis needs to be made of 
how to set up a proper competitive selection to select appropriate private 
concessioners in PFIPs. PFIPs need not only fairness and transparency but also 
economy and efficiency, so the laws should provide suitable regulations on 
competitive selection procedures.
3
 However, in certain circumstances, concessions 
may be awarded without competitive procedure. The law should clarify these 
exceptional circumstances in order to ensure the fairness and transparency of the 
procedure.
4
 The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL 
give detailed guidelines on how to regulate the concessioner selection procedure for 
PFIPs. 
 
Section 5.3 discusses how disputes on the selection result or the procedure may be 
settled properly, after the concessioner is selected (Figure 5.1: red). In order to 
safeguard a proper adherence to the rules governing the selection procedure, bidders 
should have the right to seek review of actions by the contracting authority in 
violation of those rules or of the rights of bidders.
5
 
 
Section 5.4 notes that, in addition to the general concessioner selection procedure, 
                                                 
2
 Neither the Legislative Guide nor the Model Provisions refer to the pre-selection stage. 
3
 ‘Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Project’ (2001)UNCITRAL 
(A/CN.9/SER.B/4) (hereafter referred to as the Legislative Guide) the Legislative Guide, Chap. 
III on Selection of the concessioner, paras. 18 
4
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section D on Concession award 
without competitive procedures, paras.89  
5
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section I on Review Procedures, 
paras.127 
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there is a special selection procedure (Figure 5.1: green), i.e. unsolicited proposals in 
which public authorities are sometimes approached directly by private companies 
who submit proposals for the development of projects in respect of which no 
selection procedures have been opened.
6
 This situation is different to those governed 
by the general selection procedure, but it could have positive effects on PFIPs and is 
therefore worthy of discussion. However, in China, unsolicited proposals are neither 
acknowledged nor accepted. Unsolicited proposals have neither been used in 
practice in Chinese PFIPs nor discussed in Chinese academic research. The 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL give very detailed 
guidelines on this kind of concessioner selection procedure.
7
 It is worth considering 
the applicability of unsolicited proposals, and offering a hypothesis for the utility of 
this in the future.  
 
This chapter answers the fourth research question, namely how the selection 
procedures of the concessioner of PFIPs should be improved to become more fair 
and transparent in China, with reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide 
and Model Provisions and with supplementary references from other country?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section E on Unsolicited 
Proposal, paras.97 
7
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section E on Unsolicited 
Proposal, paras.97-117 
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Figure 5.1 The structure of concessioner selection procedure 
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5.1 The pre-selection stage should be fair and transparent 
The particular issues pertaining to PFIPs show that preparations have to be made 
before starting the selection of concessioners, i.e. the pre-selection stage (Figure 5.1: 
blue). These preparations are very important in that they may affect the fairness and 
transparency of the selection of the concessioner to the point of determining whether 
the PFIP is successful. Therefore, corresponding rules are required to manage this 
preparation process. As the pre-selection stage of PFIPs, the primary preparations 
are as follows: 
5.1.1 Determination of an infrastructure project 
Before selecting the concessioners, the first thing is to decide whether an 
infrastructure project should be launched. The cost of infrastructure is very high, so 
redundant infrastructure would waste a lot of resources. However, if there is 
insufficient infrastructure, public requirement will not be satisfied. In China, the 
public authority decides whether infrastructure should be built. In this case, there are 
no procedures to involve public opinion
8
 or participation in the project decision. 
Therefore, private investors who are interested in building infrastructure have no 
access to offer initial suggestions as to potential infrastructure development not 
considered by the public authority. In fact, one of the initial steps that should be 
taken in relation to a proposed infrastructure project is to conduct a preliminary 
assessment of its feasibility, including the economic, political and environmental 
impact. Some countries’ experience shows that it is useful to provide for some 
public participation in the preliminary assessment of the project’s environmental 
impact and the various options available to minimise this impact.
9
 
 
Chinese legislators agree that all infrastructure project proposals should be initiated 
by government alone. However, the Legislative Guide hints that UNCITRAL 
                                                 
8
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) 
9
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.30 
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supports private investor participation in the initial determining phases of a project. 
The Legislative Guide considers one such situation: when the public authority has 
not considered an infrastructure or cannot implement the infrastructure because of 
certain technological limitations, a private investor could initially contact the public 
authority if the private investor considers the infrastructure to be essential or the 
investor has special capabilities to implement the project. If it is proved that there is 
public interest in pursuing the project, the project should be launched.
10
 The 
Legislative Guide catalogues this situation as an “Unsolicited proposal”. As a matter 
of fact, the concept of “Unsolicited proposals” has been discussed by Chinese 
scholars, but a move to address the issue of unsolicited offers in the Chinese 
regulations was not accepted.
11
 The “unsolicited proposal” is not discussed in this 
section but it will be analysed in detail in Section 5.4.  
5.1.2 Determination of the market access of private finance  
Once it is determined that an infrastructure project will be launched, the next step is 
to consider whether private finance should be allowed to participate in the project.  
 
Market access to infrastructure projects is more difficult to determine than that to 
general goods and services because of the characteristics of infrastructure and its 
importance. Some special infrastructure projects pertaining to national defence and 
some special industries related to the national economy should not accessible to 
private finance. Only state-owned entities should have market access. In some case, 
the government may maintain preferential policies to support small and Medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs).
12
 Even the UNCITRAL, which strongly supports PFIP 
development, agrees in the Legislative Guide that countries should limit market 
access to infrastructure project in light of specific situations.
13
 However, the 
                                                 
10
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section E on Unsolicited 
proposals, paras.106  
11
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) P157 
12
 Linarelli John, ‘The limited case for permitting SME procurement preferences in the agreement on 
government procurement’, edited Arrowsmith Sue, Anderson Robert D., The WTO Regime on 
Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge 2011)P444 
13
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, Section A 
Introduction, paras.4 
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Legislative Guide also clearly states that the countries’ legislation should clarify the 
market access permission or the market access limitation, to prevent the public 
authorities abusing their rights, which might result in private investor not accessing 
other infrastructure project markets.
14
 
 
When considering the scope of market access to infrastructure projects, countries 
may treat foreign private investment more circumspectly than domestic private 
investment. Countries generally have specific regulations on how foreign private 
investment joins their infrastructure project market.  
 
There are two typical ways in which to manage the movement of foreign private 
finance into the host country’s infrastructure project market. The first is to produce a 
catalogue of industries available to foreign investment, as has been done in China
15
. 
All foreign investment in China is then divided into three categories: encouraged, 
restricted and prohibited. Foreign investment is subject to approval and registration 
by the relevant Chinese authorities. The category of a project influences of the 
degree to which authorities are in charge of the project and also determines access to 
certain incentives.
16
 This way lists the areas of market access, whether access is 
allowed or not allowed, the degree to which access is allowed, and all this is 
confirmed by checking the catalogue. The advantage of this way is that both the 
authorities and the potential private foreign investors can ascertain whether a 
particular kind of infrastructure project is open to foreign private finance, while the 
disadvantage is that the catalogue is not comprehensive and cannot list all the kinds 
of projects. 
 
The second is to create a leverage to balance market access between the host country 
                                                 
14
 The legislative Guide, Chap. I on General legislative and institutional framework, Section C Scope 
of authority to award concessions, paras.18  
15
 On 24 December 2011, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC") 
and the Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") jointly issued a new Guideline Catalogue of 
Industries for Foreign Investment (Amended 2011) ("2011 Catalogue"). The new Catalogue 
came into effect on 30 January 2012. It replaced the old Catalogue of 31 October 2007 ("2007 
Catalogue"). 
16
 C’M’S Cameron McKenna LLP, ‘China revised the guideline catalogue of industries for foreign 
investment’, Law-now China on 31/01/2012<http://www.law-now.com/law-
now/2011/chinafdijan2012.htm> accessed on 07/08/2012.  
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and home country of the foreign private investor, as is found in the EU. The 
European Commission had, after several attempts over many years, finally managed 
to garner enough support to propose a ‘tool’ that would increase EU leverage in 
public procurement negotiations by penalising non-EU countries whose markets 
were closed.
17
 The core principle of this way of doing things is that the host country 
can refuse foreign private investment in its infrastructure project market if the home 
country of the foreign private investor closes its own infrastructure project market to 
the investors of the host country. The advantage of this way is that it is flexible and 
looks like a relatively fair solution to the different market access policies in different 
countries, while the disadvantage is that it is difficult to implement in practice 
because it is unrealistic to expect a contracting authority to turn down low bids from 
foreign private investors that offer better value for money than others.  
 
It is difficult to say whether it is better to give a catalogue of guidelines or use 
leverage. However, in the current situation of market access in the EU and China, 
there seems to be “unbalanced trade” between EU and China. On the one hand, the 
“inadequate protection of intellectual property” and “the fact that China’s standards 
are not in accordance with international rules” are the reasons for EU firms’ 
hesitancy about entering the Chinese market.
18
 On the other hand, it is unrealistic to 
stop EU states looking to provide services and build infrastructure at the lowest 
possible price, particularly in times of economic crisis. Often these prices are offered 
by countries such as China.
19
 This “unbalanced trade” is not helpful to the long-term 
development of investment markets, for the EU or for China. As a matter of fact, no 
matter which way market access is awarded, the aim remains to facilitate foreign 
investment and develop the economy without prejudicing national interest. The EU, 
as a union for almost its members are developed countries, is looking for fair 
opportunities to join infrastructure project markets, while China, as a developing 
country, is looking to acquire advanced technology, and research and development 
through awarding market access
20
. Therefore, a fairer solution would be to set up an 
                                                 
17
 Magazine Mlex, ‘Bar tenders from abroad’ (Issue 10-Europe, July-September 2012), p14 
18  
French MEP Marielle de Sarnez report to Committee on International Trade of European 
Parliament, ‘EU and China: Unbalanced trade?’ (2010/2301(INI)) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2010/2301
%28INI%29>accessed on 2nd September 2012  
19 
Magazine Mlex, ‘Bar tenders from abroad’ (Issue 10-Europe, July-September 2012), p17 
20
 Ibid.  
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international agreement on market access so that all member countries could base 
legislation on the same standard. Thus, it would be useful if China were to improve 
its legislation on PFIPs by referencing the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions made by UNCITRAL, which consists of many countries including EU 
countries. 
 
If private finance is allowed to access these kinds of projects, then it could move 
onto the selection procedure (Figure 5.1, the black). By contrast, if the private 
finance is not allowed to access into this kind of project, unless there were special 
circumstances, the private investor would be excluded from building the project. 
Here is one such special circumstance. If private finance is not allowed to access this 
kind of project but the private investor holds a patent for an essential technology or 
the private investor has better management or technology skills for this project, the 
authority has to try to acquire the technology and skills, following legal procedures 
which should avoid expropriation without compensation
21
. The authority or its 
agents could purchase the patent or take over the whole private entity
22
. (Figure 5.1, 
the blue) 
5.2 The Selection stage should be fair and transparent 
After the decision to launch the PFIP in the pre-selection stage, the next step is to 
select a proper concessioner (Figure 5.1: black). Successful delivery of a concession 
project depends on whether a proper concessioner is selected. Therefore, the 
selection of concessioner is very important. Only an appropriate selection procedure 
will select the best concessioner to ensure the successful delivery of the PFIP.  
 
This selection procedure should be suitable for use in relation to infrastructure 
projects that involve an obligation, on the part of the selected private entity, to 
undertake physical construction, repair or expansion works in the infrastructure with 
a view to subsequent private operation. It is not the selection procedure for selecting 
                                                 
21
 Sims Alexandra, ‘The public interest defense in copyright law: myth or reality?’ (2006), European 
Intellectual Property Review (E.I.P.R. 2006, 28(6), 335-343) P341: “expropriation without 
compensation is prima facie unconstitutional”. 
22
 Wadlow Christopher, ‘The great pharmaceutical patent robbery, and the curious case of the 
Chemical Foundation’ (2010), Intellectual Property Quarterly (I.P.Q. 2010, 3, 256-292) 
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providers of public services through licensing or similar procedures, or of merely 
disposing of State property through capital increases or offerings of shares.
23
 
 
Generally, the selection procedures of concessioner of PFIPs should be the same as 
the award procedure for other public contracts (e.g. traditional government 
procurement) and should attain the fundamental objectives of rules governing the 
award of public contracts: economy
24
, efficiency
25
, integrity
26
, confidence
27
, 
transparency
28
.
29
 
 
It seems that a competitive selection procedure could achieve the above five 
fundamental objectives. The formal procedures, and the objectivity and 
predictability that characterise the competitive selection procedures generally 
provide optimal conditions for economy, efficiency, integrity, confidence and 
transparency.
30
 In most cases, economy is best achieved by means of procedures that 
promote competition among bidders. Competition provides them with incentives to 
offer their most advantageous terms and it can encourage them to adopt efficient or 
innovative technologies or production methods in order to do so. Competitive 
procedure not only helps to achieve value for money for both the contracting 
authority and the general public users of the infrastructure, but also helps to prevent 
                                                 
23
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.4 
24 “Economy” refers to the selection of a concessioner that is capable of performing works and 
delivering services of the desired quality at the most advantageous price or that offers the best 
commercial proposal. 
25 “Efficiency” refers to selection of a concessioner within a reasonable amount of time, with minimal 
administrative burdens and at reasonable cost both to the contracting authority and to 
participating bidders. 
26 “integrity” refers to the selection system will usually contain provisions designed to ensure fair 
treatment of bidders, to reduce or discourage unintentional or intentional abuses of the selection 
process by persons administering it or by companies participating in it and to ensure that 
selection decisions are taken on a proper basis. 
27 “confidence” refers to the public confidence in the selection procedure and in the Public Sector in 
general. Bidders will often refrain from spending the time and sometimes substantial sums of 
money to participate in selection proceedings unless they are confident that they will be treated 
fairly and that their proposals or offers have a reasonable chance of being accepted. 
28 “transparency” refers to the transparency of laws and procedures governing the selection of the 
concessioner, which will help to achieve a number of the policy objectives already mentioned. 
29 
The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.5-16; UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement(2011), Preamble 
30
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.18 
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corruption.
31
 Compared with other selection procedures, the substantive rules and 
the procedures of competition are disclosed and easy to ascertain so that the 
competitive selection procedure is more transparent.   
 
A competitive selection procedure is also supported by many international 
organisations, whose rules often affect the launch and the success of PFIPs. The use 
of competitive selection procedures in PFIPs has been recommended by UNIDO
32
, 
which has formulated detailed practical guidance on how to structure those 
procedures.
33
 The World Bank
34
 advocates the use of competitive selection 
procedures through controlling loan offers. If the concessioner is not selected 
according to the competitive procedure accepted by the World Bank, the World 
Bank may refuse to provide the loan. The World Bank provides that a concessioner 
selected pursuant to bidding procedures acceptable to the World Bank is generally 
free to adopt its own procedures for the award of contracts required to implement the 
project. If the concessioner was not selected pursuant to those competitive 
procedures, the award of subcontracts has to be done pursuant to competitive 
procedures acceptable to the World Bank.
35
 Although this rule is principally used for 
procurement, it is also applicable to PFIPs that apply for loans from the World Bank. 
UNCITRAL, which made the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, also 
prefers competitive selection procedures.
36
  
 
However, besides the five fundamental objectives, i.e. economy, efficiency, integrity, 
                                                 
31 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) P159 
32
 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). UNIDO is the specialized agency 
of the United Nations that promotes industrial development for poverty reduction, inclusive 
globalization and environmental sustainability. 
33
 UNIDO, “Guidelines for Infrastructure Development through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
Projects” (1996) P96. 
34
 World Bank established in 1944. The World Bank provides low-interest loans, interest-free credits, 
and grants to developing countries. These support a wide array of investments in such areas as 
education, health, public administration, infrastructure, financial and Private Sector 
development, agriculture, and environmental and natural resource management. 
35
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Procurement under IBRD and IDA 
Loans” (Washington, D.C., 1996) para.3.13 (a) 
36
 UNCITRAL, 32nd session, ‘Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its thirty-second session’, 
A/54/17 p6 para.98.The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 14; The Model Provisions, chap. 
II on Selection of the concessioner, Model provision 5 
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confidence and transparency, the selection procedures of concessioners in PFIPs 
have other particular requirements in light of the special features of PFIPs, which 
should be considered when establishing legislation on the selection procedure of 
concessioner in PFIPs. Firstly, although competitive procedure can help achieve the 
objective of economy, open competition, without a pre-selection phase, is not 
advisable for the award of PFIPs, i.e. the bidders to be invited should be limited. The 
award of PFIPs involves complex, time-consuming and expensive proceedings, so it 
is unnecessary ask qualified bidders who have already paid high preparation costs to 
compete with unrealistic proposals or proposals submitted by unqualified bidders.
37
 
Secondly, in PFIPs the contracting authority only proposes demands rather than 
methods, so the selection procedure used in PFIPs should emphasise the output 
expected from the project (that is, the services or goods to be provided) rather than 
the technical details of the works to be performed or means to be used to provide 
those services.
38
 Thirdly, the selection procedure used in PFIPs should evaluate a 
number of factors of bidders, in addition to the global price offered for the 
construction and operation works, concerning the capability of ensuring the long-
term stability of construction and operation of the PFIPs.
 39
 Fourthly, the complexity 
and long duration of PFIPs makes it unlikely that the contracting authority and the 
bidder will agree on the terms of a draft project agreement without negotiation, so 
the selection procedure used in PFIPs should allow for this kind of negotiation.
40
 But 
these negotiations should be carried out in transparent and fair manner. 
 
In light of the features of PFIPs, the normal competitive selection procedure cannot 
completely fit the concessioner selection of PFIPs, which needs some amendments 
(e.g. the addition of a pre-selection phase). Additionally, the competitive selection 
procedure is at times a bit rigid, so directly negotiation between the contracting 
authority and the bidder should be allowed in exceptional cases.
41
  
                                                 
37
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.20 
38
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.21-22 
39
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.23-24 
40
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.25-26 
41
 Lesguillons Henry, ‘Selecting a project company’ (I.B.L.J. 1998, 6, 603-622)P606-613 
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Therefore, according to the above analysis and discussion concerning the 
concessioner selection procedure of PFIPs, the conclusion is: the use of competitive 
selection procedures works as a primary model, while the award without competitive 
procedures formulated through negotiation may be recognised in exceptional cases. 
The competitive selection procedure should be adjusted in light of the special 
requirements for concessioner selection in PFIPs, while the award without 
competitive procedure and under negotiation should follow the legal tradition of the 
country concerned. However, no matter whether competitive selection procedures or 
negotiation are used, both should be based on the principle of fairness and 
transparency. In China, the Chinese Bidding Law claims to apply to all bidding 
activities within the territory of China, but the rigidity of the Chinese Bidding law 
may not be appropriate to satisfy the requirements of complex concession projects.
42
 
For example, the negotiation phases, which are needed more or less in selection 
procedure of PFIPs,
43
 are totally forbidden in the Chinese Bidding Law.
44
 Thus, the 
improvement of the Chinese legislation on PFIPs should try to include this standard. 
5.2.1 Concession award in competitive procedures  
Once PFIPs move into the concessioner selection phase, the priority choice is 
competitive procedure (Figure 5.1: black). However, the rules of competitive 
procedure on concessioner selection of PFIPs need to keep in line with the particular 
requirements of PFIPs 
5.2.1.1 Pre-selection of bidders 
The competitive procedure on concessioner selection of PFIPs must include a step 
on the pre-selection of bidders. The award of PFIPs typically involves complex, 
time-consuming and expensive proceedings, and the large-scale of most 
                                                 
42
 Cao Fuguo, ‘Regulating procurement of privately financed infrastructure in China: a review of the 
recent legislative initiatives and the emerging regulatory framework’ (2007), Public 
Procurement law review (P.P.L.R.2007, 3, 147-173) P170-171 
43
 Lesguillons Henry, ‘Selecting a project company’ (I.B.L.J. 1998, 6, 603-622)P605 
44
 The Bidding Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted on August 30,1999; effect as of 
January 1, 2000:  
    Article 43: Before the determination of the bid winner, no negotiations may be conducted between 
the tenderee and any tenderers concerning the substantive contents such as bid price, plans, etc. 
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infrastructure projects reduces the possibility of obtaining proposals from a large 
number of suitably qualified bidders. The suitably qualified bidders may be averse 
to participate in selection procedures, if the competitive field is too large and they 
have to compete with unqualified bidders, which may raise the bidders’ cost.45 In 
fact, competitive procedure does not necessarily require the participation of a large 
number of bidders. For PFIPs, in particular, the contracting authority may wish to 
limit the number of bidders to a manageable number. Provided that appropriate 
procedures are in place, the contracting authority can still take advantage of 
effective competition even where the competitive base is limited.
46
 Therefore, open 
tendering without a pre-selection phase is usually not advisable for the award of 
concessions in PFIPs. Some matters which may arise in the pre-selection of bidders 
are noteworthy: 
 
The pre-selection of bidders in PFIPs is different from normal pre-selection. In the 
normal pre-selection of bidders, all bidders who meet the pre-selection criteria are 
automatically admitted to the tendering phase.
47
 In the pre-selection of bidders in 
PFIPs, the contracting authority may wish to limit the number of bidders from whom 
proposals willbe accepted, even if many bidders satisfy the qualification criteria.
48
 
Therefore, the pre-selection proceedings for PFIPs may involve elements of 
evaluation and selection. For example, a bidder may achieve all the pre-selection 
standards, but if required quota is full, it cannot pass pre-selection to offer a formal 
proposal, because this bidder is not valued as highly by the contracting authority as 
some other bidders. In some countries, they encourage domestic contracting 
authorities to limit the prospective proposals to the lowest possible number still 
sufficient to ensure meaningful competition (for example, three or four). However, 
some multilateral financial institutions prohibit the use of pre-selection proceedings 
for the purposes of limiting the number of bidders to a predetermined number.
49
 As 
                                                 
45
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.20 
46
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.7 
47  
UNCITRAL, “Model Law on Public Procurement” (2011), Article 18: Pre-qualification 
proceedings 
48
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section B on Pre-selection of 
Bidders, paras.34 
49
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section B on Pre-selection of 
Bidders, paras.48 
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a matter of fact, there are very high costs involved in making a formal proposal, so 
the bidder may be more willing to take the risk if the competition is restricted to a 
limited pool of qualified candidates. Additionally, some qualified bidders may be 
denied entry into the formal selection procedure during the pre-selection phase, 
because the government wishes to avoid market domination by bidders who may 
have already been awarded a concession within a given sector of the economy. 
However, for purposes of transparency, it is desirable that the law to provide 
adequate notice that the contracting authority reserves the right to reject a bidder on 
monopolistic grounds in any invitation to pre-selection proceedings.
50
 
 
It is useful for foreign private investors to participate in selection proceedings. 
Foreign participation can not only expand the competitive base, it can also lead to 
the contracting authority and its country to acquire new technologies that are not 
available locally.
51
 However, the country that wishes to benefit from foreign 
participation should ensure that its relevant laws and procedures are conducive to 
such participation. Firstly, the law of the country should identify the publications 
consulted by foreign private investors to find invitations to pre-selection proceedings. 
Invitations to pre-selection proceedings should be published in a language 
customarily used in international trade, in a newspaper of wide international 
circulation or in a relevant trade publication or technical or professional journal of 
wide international circulation.
52
 Secondly, the law of the country should protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors when it deals with domestic 
preferences
53
 in pre-selection. Countries that wish to provide such domestic 
preferences should apply them in the form of special evaluation criteria
54
, rather 
                                                 
50
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section B on Pre-selection of 
Bidders, paras.39 
51
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section A on General Remarks, 
paras.8 
52
 E.g. the Legislative Guide made by UNCITRAL recommends a publication as Development 
Business (DB), published by the Department of Public Information of the United Nations 
Secretariat. Development Business is the official publication for consulting, contracting and 
export opportunities worldwide. <http://www.devbusiness.com/> accessed on 8
th
 September 
2012. 
53
 The laws of some countries provide some preferential treatments for domestic entities or require 
foreign bidders that undertake to use national goods or employ local labor.  
54
 Such preferential treatment is sometimes provided as a material qualification requirement (for 
example, a minimum percentage of national participation in the consortium) or as a condition 
for participating in the selection procedure (for example, to appoint a local partner as a leader of 
the bidding consortium). 
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than by the blanket exclusion of foreign suppliers. In any event, where domestic 
preference is envisaged, it should be announced in advance, preferably in the 
invitation documents.
55
 
 
Given the large scale of most PFIPs, the private investors may participate in the pre-
selection proceedings through consortia formed for that purpose. However, in order 
to ensure the stability of the consortia and to accomplish the project, the law should 
offer some rules to regulate certain problems arising from the use of consortia. One 
regulation is the prohibition that one company, directly or through subsidiary 
companies, joins more than one consortium to submit proposals for the same project. 
If one company joins into two or more consortia to bid the some project, there may 
be an information leak or collusion between competing consortia, thus undermining 
the credibility of the selection proceedings. A breach of this law should cause the 
disqualification of the consortium and of its all individual member companies.
56
 
Another regulation is the strict control of changes in the composition of bidding 
consortia. The contracting authorities may face the problem that the composition of 
bidding consortia during the pre-selection proceedings may change. As a general 
rule, only consortia composed of identical members to those passing the pre-
selection phase should be allowed to participate in the formal selection phase, unless 
the contracting authority ensures that the new members have the same capabilities as 
the retiring members.
57
 
5.2.1.2 Procedure of selecting final proposal 
After the pre-selection of bidders, the contracting authority will request proposals 
from the pre-selected bidders. The rules regulating this step should ensure the 
fairness and transparency of the competition between the proposals submitted by the 
pre-selected bidders, and that these will fit the specific needs of PFIPs. 
 
The competition between proposals should be transparent, which means as much 
                                                 
55 
The Model Provisions, Provision 7 on Pre-selection criteria, Footnote 12 
56
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section B on Pre-selection of 
Bidders, paras.42 
57
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section B on Pre-selection of 
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information concerning the selection of proposals needs to be disclosed as possible 
in light of relevant laws. Firstly, before the pre-selected bidders submit their final 
proposals, the contracting authority needs to issue the final request for proposals. 
The final request for proposal is a document that includes all information necessary 
to provide the basis for the final decision. This will enable bidders to submit 
proposals that meet the needs of the contracting authority and that the contracting 
authority can compare in an objective and fair manner. Thus, the content of the final 
request for proposal should be as detailed as possible. The Legislative Guide lists the 
basic content necessary for the final request for proposals: General information to 
prepare and submit proposals; Project specifications and performance indicators; 
contractual terms; and the criteria for evaluating the proposals.
58
 Secondly, all 
bidders to whom the contracting authority provided the request for proposals must 
be notified of any clarifications and modifications, together with the questions that 
gave rise to the clarifications.
59
 Thirdly, the contracting authority should keep an 
appropriate record of key information concerning the selection proceedings should 
the bidders and public wish to review the decision afterwards.
60
 Fourthly, the 
agreement on contractual terms should be notified to any third parties in time, 
especially financiers such as banks who offer to finance the project. 
 
Although the competition of proposals should be transparent, it is nevertheless also 
necessary to protect a degree of confidentiality by law. Before issuing the final 
request for proposals, the contract authority may need to negotiate with the pre-
selected bidders because in some case it may not be feasible for the contracting 
authority to formulate its requirements in sufficiently detailed and precise project 
specifications or performance indicators. The contracting authority may discuss  any 
aspect of a proposal with its respective bidder. The contracting authority should 
protect these proposals from disclosure to competing bidders. Any discussions need 
to be confidential and one party to the discussions should not reveal to any third 
party any technical, financial or other information relating to the discussions without 
                                                 
58
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 20; The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the 
concessioner, Model provision 11 
59
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section C on Procedures for 
requesting proposals, para.72 
60
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section H on Record of 
selection and award proceedings, paras.120-126 
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the consent of the other party.
61
 
 
Any comparison of the proposals should also consider their sustainability. The 
evaluation criteria for proposals of PFIPs are different from those of normal 
infrastructure projects. The contracting authority should not only rate the technical 
elements but also the financial elements of PFIP proposals. Evaluation criteria 
relating to the physical investment (i.e. the technical elements. for example, the 
construction works) are usually used in general infrastructure projects, but in 
proposals for PFIPs it is more important to show the the concessioner’s capacity to 
deliver long-term stable operation and a high quality of service.
62
 Therefore the 
contracting authority should not only focus on the price when comparing the 
proposals, as some bidders may offer an attractive but unrealistically low price with 
the intention of raising such prices once the concession is obtained.
63
 Thus, the 
contracting authority should address the long-term needs and ensure the continuous 
delivery of the service at the required level of quality and safety, and at regulated 
prices. 
 
The competition between proposals should be fair, which means each proposal 
should be evaluated under the same criteria and by the same procedure. The 
contracting authority should compare and evaluate each proposal in accordance with 
the evaluation criteria, with relative weight accorded to each criterion according to 
the evaluation process set forth in the request for proposals.
64
 Therefore, it is 
recommended that the law should regulate the evaluation processes that contracting 
authorities may use to compare and evaluate proposals and the details of the 
application of these processes.
65
 The Legislative Guide’s Recommendation 24 and 
Model Provision 15(2) offer examples of an evaluation process: 
“The contracting authority may establish thresholds with 
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 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section C on Procedures for 
requesting proposals, paras.57 
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 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section C on Procedures for 
requesting proposals, para.73 
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 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section C on Procedures for 
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64
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respect to quality, technical, financial and commercial 
aspects. Proposals that fail to achieve the thresholds shall be 
regarded as nonresponsive and rejected from the selection 
procedure.”66 
However, in the detailed notes to the Legislative Guide, it describes alternative 
evaluation processes, which require the contracting authority to evaluate non-
financial criteria separately from financial criteria so as to avoid weighting financial 
criteria (such as the price) against nonfinancial criteria (such as the construction 
works). However, each country should select their evaluation process according to 
their specific situation. 
5.2.2 Concession award without competitive procedures 
Although competitive procedure is given priority, concession awards without 
competitive procedure may take place in exceptional circumstances. (Figure 5.1: 
black) 
 
Concession awards without competitive procedure cannot be given priority because 
they have a number of disadvantages. They require highly skilled negotiators with 
sufficient experience in negotiating complex projects, and, since they also imply a 
higher level of discretion, those negotiations might carry with it a higher risk of 
abusive or corrupt practices.
67
 However, the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions made by UNCITRAL still list seven exceptional circumstances under 
which the contracting authority may be authorised to award a concession without 
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 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 24; The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the 
concessioner, Model provision 15(2) 
67
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section D on Concession award 
without competitive procedures, para.88 
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using competitive procedures.
68
 In cases pertaining to the listed exceptional 
circumstances, it is obvious that the competitive procedure is not applicable, 
whereas negotiations outside competitive procedures do apply. It is noteworthy that 
the last exceptional circumstance  listed in Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions is a flexible option. If the country of the contracting authority desires to 
use negotiation procedures rather than competitive procedures, this subparagraph 
should be retained in law in order to offer enough flexibility to apply negotiation 
procedures. In contrast, if the country of the contracting authority wishes to limit 
exceptions to the competitive selection procedures, legislators may prefer not to 
include the subparagraph.
69
. 
 
Negotiation outside competitive procedures does not mean arbitrary choice. By 
contrast, the law is all the more necessary to ensure transparency and fairness in the 
conduct of the selection process. 
 
Firstly, the law should require the approval of a higher authority to ensure that the 
award of concessions without competitive procedures is only possible in appropriate 
circumstances. A contracting authority must obtain the approval of a higher 
authority prior to engaging in a selection process through negotiation and outside 
competitive procedures. Therefore, the Model Provision suggests that the host 
country should appoint an authority that is competent to authorise negotiations.
70
 
 
                                                 
68
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 28; The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the 
concessioner, Model provision 18: (a) When there is an urgent need for ensuring continuity in 
the provision of the service and engaging in a competitive selection procedure would therefore 
be impractical; (b) In case of projects of short duration and with an anticipated initial investment 
value not exceeding a specified low amount; (c) Reasons of national defense or national 
security; (d) Cases where there is only one source capable of providing the required service (for 
example, because it requires the use of patented technology or unique know-how); (e) In case of 
unsolicited proposals of the type referred to intellectual property, trade secrets or other 
exclusive rights; (f) When an invitation to the pre-selection proceedings or a request for 
proposals has been issued but no applications or proposals were submitted or all proposals 
failed to meet the evaluation criteria set forth in the request for proposals, and if, in the 
judgment of the contracting authority, issuing a new request for proposals would be unlikely to 
result in a project award; (g) Other cases where the higher authority authorizes such an 
exception for compelling reasons of public interest. 
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 The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the concessioner, Model provision 18(g), Footnote 
27 
70
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Secondly, the law should require the contracting authority to engage in negotiations 
with as many consortia judged capable of carrying out the project as circumstances 
permit.
71
Although the award is made without competitive procedures, proper 
competition is still bolstered by encouraging the participation of bidders. It is 
noteworthy that a host country wishing to enhance transparency in the use of 
negotiated procedures may establish, through specific regulations, qualification 
criteria to be met by consortia invited to negotiations.
72
 
 
Thirdly, the law should require the contracting authority to establish evaluation 
criteria against which proposals will be evaluated and ranked.
73
 The contracting 
authority should identify the proposals which meet those criteria and engage in 
discussions with each candidate in order to refine and improve the proposal to the 
point where it is satisfactory to the contracting authority and the candidate. Then the 
project should be awarded to the party offering the “most economical” or “most 
advantageous” proposal amongst those amended through negotiation. 74  The 
establishment of evaluation criteria could curb the abusive and corrupt practices that 
may be brought by a high level of discretion in negotiation.     
 
Fourthly, the law should require as much disclosure of information on the 
negotiation process as possible, with the exception of cases involving national 
security interests or business secrets. At the outset of the process, the contracting 
authority should publish a notice of its intention to commence negotiations for a 
concession contract. The notice should also disclose the specific circumstances and 
reasons for the decision to award the concession without competitive procedures.
75
 
Then the contracting authority should establish a record of the selection 
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 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section D on Concession award 
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concessioner, Model provision 19(b) 
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proceedings.
76
 In order to further ensure transparency, the record of the selection 
proceedings and the project agreement should be open to public inspection.
77
 
Additionally, third parties such as banks, who offer a part of the finance for the 
project, should be notified in time as to the negotiation proceedings and the 
contractual terms. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that competitive procedures should be given priority, but that 
negotiation procedures may replace competitive procedures when concessions 
cannot be awarded through competitive procedure (Figure 5.1: black). In China, 
concession awards have been granted without competitive procedures in case 
pertaining to PFIPs, but there are no relevant laws to regulate such awards. The 
recommendations of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions indicate that the 
negotiation procedure of PFIPs in China should be regulated. 
5.3 The post-selection stage should be fair and transparent  
When the selection process is completed, bidders may disagree with the result. 
Bidders may claim to have suffered unfair treatment during the selection procedures. 
In this case, bidders should be entitled by law to appeal against the result. (Figure 
5.1: red) 
 
The bidder may claim to have suffered unfair treatment during the selection 
procedure because of a breach in duty imposed by the law on the contracting 
authority.
78 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL 
advocate granting bidders the right to seek review of actions by the contracting 
authority, to determine whether these have been in violation of selection rules or of 
the rights of bidders. In this regard, the Legislative Guide and the Model provisions 
                                                 
76
 The selection proceeding requires a record, but the record of the negotiation proceeding should be 
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compare and discuss administrative review and judicial review. Although China 
currently has relevant laws on both administrative review and judicial review, the 
key problem is that the nature of concessioner selection of PFIPs has not been 
determined. If PFIP concessioner selection is regarded to be an administrative 
action ， the bidders could seek  administrative review. However, if PFIP 
concessioner selection is regarded to be a general contractual action, the bidders 
should seek judicial review.
79
 At this stage, China must confirm the nature of 
concessioner selection pertaining to PFIPs. 
 
However, two concepts suggested by the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions are worthy of consultation. The first is a “pre-contract” recourse system. 
This system requires the review of the contracting authority’s actions as early in the 
selection proceedings as is feasible. Before the concession is awarded, the 
contracting authority may be willing to correct any improper behaviour (of which it 
may even not have been aware). The contracting authority could then take corrective 
action before loss is caused, thus avoiding cases where monetary compensation is 
the only redress left for improper actions taken.
80
 The second is a “post-contract” 
compensation system. If the concession award was declared to be invalid due to 
improper action by the contracting authority, both the Public Sector and the Private 
Sector may suffer greater losses, especially when public works have already been 
initiated. Therefore, when dealing with concession awards where there has been 
improper action by the contracting authority, due consideration must be paid to the 
integrity of the selection procedure, possible delays to the rendering of a public 
service, and the interests of the bidders. Excepting those cases where a concession 
award was the result of unlawful action, a good general solution is that the 
concession award should not be invalid, but that compensation is given to the 
injured party. Such compensation should not include loss of profits, but be limited to 
the costs incurred by the competitor in preparing for the competition.
81
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The bidder may claim to have suffered unfair treatment during the selection 
procedure because the other bidders have made some improper action in the 
competition. Neither the Legislative Guide nor the Model Provisions refers to the 
review procedures for this kind of matter. However, improper action by a bidder is 
not rare in a selection process, and includes unfair competition and collusion 
between bidders. As a matter of fact, some countries have set up relevant laws to 
regulate the improper actions of bidders. In China, if the bidder’s improper action 
arises during bidding procedures, it may be regulated by the Bidding Law of the 
People's Republic of China
82; if the bidder’s improper action arises in a selection 
procedure without competition, it may be regulated by the Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law of the People's Republic of China
83; and if the bidder’s improper action is 
serious, it may be punished by the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China
84
. 
 
To sum up, a review procedure is a basic requirement for attracting serious and 
competent bidders and for reducing the cost and the length of award proceedings. 
Therefore, it is essential to establish fair and efficient review procedures for 
concessioner selection of PFIPs in China. 
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 The Bidding Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted on August 30,1999; effect as of 
January 1, 2000:  
  Article 53: If a bidder colludes with one or more other bidders or with the bid inviting party in the 
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 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted on September 2
nd
, 
1993; effect as of December 1
st
, 1993:  
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st
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shall also, or shall only, be fined. 
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As discussed above, if the concessioner selection is regarded to be a general 
contractual action, the bidders could seek judicial review. However, due to the 
specific character of concessioner selection in PFIPs, involving long-term 
negotiations and government actions, none of Biding Law, Government 
Procurement Law, Anti-unfair Competition Law or Administrative Reconsideration 
Law can be used to review selection procedure in PFIPs. There are even conflicts on 
how to deal with selection review within these statutes. Additionally, although 
China has not subscribed WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) yet, it 
is worth mentioning the domestic review procedure
85
 in WTO GPA as a possible 
model to improve Chinese laws on protecting bidder’s review rights. The new 
legislation on concessioner selection of PFIPs should offer bidder proper channels to 
review the selection procedure. Firstly, the bidder should be authorised to require the 
contracting authority to review selection procedure so that the contracting authority 
could take corrective action before loss is caused. Secondly, a procedure should be 
provided by law so that the bidder could look for fair review from independent third-
parties. Finally, the bidder should have right to litigate if they dispute the result 
reached either by the contracting authority or through the review process. 
5.4 Unsolicited Proposals should be fair and transparent 
Apart from the concessioner selection procedures discussed above, there is a special 
selection procedure for PFIP concessioners regarding Unsolicited Proposals (Figure 
5.1: green). The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions have described this 
kind of procedure and discussed at length how to regulate it. However, it is 
inconceivable that unsolicited proposals have never arisen in either Chinese practice 
or academic research concerning PFIPs. 
                                                 
85
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When private investors identify an infrastructure need that may be met by a 
privately financed project, they may approach the public authority directly and 
submit an initial proposal for the development of a project in respect of which no 
selection procedure has been opened. The proposal is usually referred to as an 
“unsolicited proposal”.86 
 
Developed countries are very reluctant to accept unsolicited proposals because they 
consider the model of unsolicited proposal difficult to assess in its validity or 
seriousness, and because it weakens free competition.
87
 By contrast, developing 
countries, especially countries which expect to develop PFIPs, find the unsolicited 
proposal model useful because this approach may be the only means by which these 
less experienced countries are exposed to PFIPs. Without the submission of an 
unsolicited proposal, the host government may never have entertained the notion of 
the PFIP as a viable development option.
88
  
 
If a country decides to use unsolicited proposal, relevant regulations should be 
issued. The regulations should safeguard the public interest, while protecting the 
rights of the promoter of the unsolicited proposal.
89
 
 
The World Bank, UNIDO and some countries have issued some regulations about 
unsolicited proposal,
90
 but the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions give 
further suggestions for detailed procedures to deal with unsolicited proposal in 
accordance with the law (Figure 5.1: green): 
 
First of all, Public departments themselves which have the right and responsibility to 
entertain the unsolicited proposal should be authorised to do so by law. The 
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Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions assume that the power to entertain 
unsolicited proposals lies with the contracting authority with the right to award the 
concession. However, some countries may consider a body separate from the 
contracting authority to have the power to entertain unsolicited proposals. In such a 
case, the body needs to be adequately coordinated with the contracting authority.
91
 
 
Following the receipt of an unsolicited proposal, the next step is to determine the 
admissibility of the unsolicited proposal. The primary thing is to evaluate whether or 
not the project will be in the public interest. Evaluating whether a proposed project 
is in the public interest entails judgments regarding the potential benefits to the 
public offered by the project, and its relationship to existing government policies in 
the infrastructure sector concerned.
92
 The further information that must be evaluated 
is the promoter’s qualifications, the technical and economic feasibility of the project, 
and its environmental impact.
93
 In order to ensure the integrity, transparency and 
predictability of the procedures for determining the admissibility of unsolicited 
proposals, the law should provide criteria for these evaluations. 
 
After evaluating the unsolicited proposal, if the proposal is considered to be 
inadmissible and is then rejected, it should be returned to the promoter and its 
confidential content should be protected. If the proposal passes evaluation and the 
decision is to implement the project, selection procedures should be initiated. 
According to the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, there are two ways to 
implement this special selection process: 
5.4.1 No proprietary concepts or technology 
Procedures for handling unsolicited proposals without proprietary concepts or 
technology should consider rewarding the initial promoter. 
 
                                                 
91
 The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the concessioner, Model provision 20, Footnote 31 
92
 The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the concessioner, Model provision 21(1), Footnote 
32 
93
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 31; The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the 
concessioner, Model provision 21(2) 
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When the evaluation is finished and the decision has been made to implement the 
project, unsolicited proposals which do not involve proprietary concepts or 
technology still have to participate in a normal competitive selection procedure (as 
in 5.2.1) against other participants to acquire the concession. However, the bidder 
who offered the unsolicited proposal should be given certain benefits to reward its 
initial submission, e.g. the initial bidder must be invited to participate in the 
competition unless it gives up this right, or the bidder may be given a premium.
94
 
This reward is necessary and significant. On the one hand, it provides incentive to 
encourage private investors to participate in the building of public infrastructure, 
whether they have proprietary concerns or not. On the other hand, unsolicited 
proposals submitted initially by private investors reflect a public voice and indicate 
public participation in the preliminary assessment of an infrastructure project, rather 
than government-initiated infrastructure project proposals (refer to 5.1.1). The 
difficulty in rewarding the initial bidder is determining its value, which should not 
be set too high or too low. The reward should not be so high as to discourage 
competing meritorious bids, which might result in the receipt of a project of lesser 
value simply in exchange for the preference given to the innovative bidder. The 
reward should not be so low as to frustrate the initiative of the author of the 
unsolicited proposal.
95
 
5.4.2 Proprietary concepts or technology 
There are two procedures for handling unsolicited proposals involving proprietary 
concepts or technology. 
 
When the evaluation is finished and the decision has been made to implement a 
project, unsolicited proposals that involve irreplaceable proprietary concepts or 
technology may be awarded the concession directly (Figure 5.1: green). The 
problem here is determining whether the proprietary concept or technology is 
irreplaceable or not. The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions suggest 
obtaining elements of comparison from the unsolicited proposal. The essential 
                                                 
94
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 33; The Model Provisions, chap. II on Selection of the 
concessioner, Model provision 22 
95
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section E Unsolicited proposals, 
para.113 
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output elements of the unsolicited proposal could be published, including for 
example, the capacity of the infrastructure facility, quality of the product or the 
service or price per unit. Then other interested parties may be invited to submit 
alternative or comparable proposals within a certain period.
96
 If no alternative 
proposals are received or the received proposals will not achieve the projected 
outputs, this would confirm that there is no reasonable alternative or substitute to the 
method or technology put forward in the unsolicited proposal. The unsolicited 
proposal could then be awarded the concession directly.
97
 If other parties offer other 
alternatives or substitute the method or technology in a way that would meet the 
projected outputs, the unsolicited proposal should engage in competitive selection 
procedures against other participants but it should be given an incentive or a similar 
benefit.
98
 
 
In China, it is impossible for private investors to submit unsolicited proposals for 
public infrastructure because only government has the right to decide whether to 
implement an infrastructure project or not. Even if private investors submit 
unsolicited proposals to relevant authorities, the unsolicited proposal may be ignored 
and the relevant authority may consider the private investor to be challenging their 
authority. However, it should be noted that unsolicited proposals are useful for 
facilitating the development of PFIPs. On the one hand, the China government, 
which may have not considered adopting a PFIP model at the beginning, may 
consider adopting a PFIP model through the submission of an unsolicited proposal. 
On the other hand, the private investor who initially submits the unsolicited proposal 
could gain some premium, which would encourage private investors to participate in 
PFIPs. In European countries which have experience in implementing PFIPs, 
                                                 
96
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section E Unsolicited proposals, 
para.115 
97
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section E Unsolicited proposals, 
para.116(a) 
98
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner, Section E Unsolicited proposals, 
para.116(b) 
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unsolicited proposal is allowed and regulated by appropriate laws.
99
 Those countries, 
such as China, which wish to facilitate PFIPs, may wish to establish legal 
procedures for dealing with unsolicited proposal. 
Conclusion 
This chapter answers the 4
th
 research question, namely how the Chinese 
concessioner selection procedures of the PFIPs may be improved, based on the 
guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions with supplementary 
reference to other countries’ laws. 
 
This Chapter summarises the concessioner selection procedures of PFIPs (Figure 
5.1). The general concessioner selection procedure of PFIPs has three steps: pre-
selection stage (Figure 5.1: blue); selection stage (Figure 5.1: black); post-selection 
stage (Figure 5.1: red). Additionally, if the project is initiated by unsolicited 
proposal, a special selection procedure should be applied (Figure 5.1: green). 
Countries such as China, which want to develop PFIPs, should establish laws that 
confirm concessioner selection procedures and support the implementation of each 
selection step, in order to offer fair and transparent competition to private investors, 
avoid corrupting contracting authorities, and ensure the successful accomplishment 
of PFIPs.    
 
In the pre-selection phase, PFIPs should be launched in light of laws. Although PFIP 
launches are traditionally decided by government in China, it would be helpful to 
allow the public to participate in the preliminary assessment of the feasibility of a 
PFIP. Additionally, private finance’s access to the infrastructure project market may 
be regulated in laws, so Chinese laws should guarantee market access to private 
                                                 
99
 EC Directive 96/92 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [1997] O.J. 
L27/20, Art.4, in Petros Vellas, ‘Price regulation in energy project finance: the need for 
comprehensive state intervention’ (I.E.L.T.R. 2005, 3, 61-68) P63; French practice of the 
contrats de partenariat (Article L. 1411-11 of the CGCT) & Public Private Partnership Act 
2005 (Poland) Article 10, in Maria Hauser and Jean-Baptiste Morel, ‘New Polish law on public-
private partnership’(I.B.L.J. 2006, 1, 3-19)P10; European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, ‘Public Private Partnerships’, 
<http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/legal/concessions/ppp.shtml> accessed on 5th October, 
2012 
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finance insofar as this is possible, excepting areas of national security, if China 
wishes to facilitate the development of PFIPs. While due caution should be shown in 
the use of foreign finance, Chinese treatment of foreign finance should approach 
international standards to attract foreign private finance and high-level technology. 
 
In the selection phase,  Chinese laws should ensure the competitive selection 
procedure works as the primary model of selection, in order to select the most 
appropriate concessioner. Awards determined without competitive procedures 
through negotiation should be recognised only in exceptional cases. Moreover, in 
light of the features of PFIPs, regulations should be adjusted to fit the specific 
requirements of the concessioner selection procedure of PFIPs (for example, adding 
the pre-selection of bidders), to ensure the whole selection procedure is economical 
and efficient, and demonstrates integrity, confidence and transparency. 
 
In the post-selection phase, the laws should offer competitors reasonable channels to 
query the selection result. On the one hand, the bidders should be able to review the 
contracting authority for improper action during the selection procedure. On the 
other hand, competitors should be protected from unfair action by fellow 
competitors. An important safeguard for the rules of the selection procedure is to 
offer the bidders the right to review actions by the contracting authority and other 
competitors. However, considering the public interest, an improperly awarded 
concession may be not invalid if the project has already been implemented. 
Nevertheless, injured competitors should be awarded due compensation in these 
instances. 
 
Chinese laws have never referred to unsolicited proposal, but it is obvious that the 
model of unsolicited proposal is useful for developing PFIPs. Therefore, by 
referencing the recommendations in the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, 
relevant regulations on unsolicited proposal should be considered in the reform of 
Chinese laws on PFIPs.  
 
To sum up, the concessioner selection procedures are very important in the 
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successful accomplishment of PFIPs. The Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions made by UNCTRAL offer very detailed guidelines on establishing 
regulations regarding the selection procedures of PFIPs. Although the Legislative 
Guide and the Model Provisions have their own limitations in certain aspects, they 
are still useful for helping the reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs in this regard. The 
successful experience of other countries also offers valuable references for the 
reform of Chinese laws on concessioner selection procedures in PFIPs.   
 
When the concession is awarded to the selected concessioner, the concessioner will 
face various relationships with other parties of PFIPs during the construction and 
operation of infrastructure. Countries such as China who wish to develop PFIPs 
need to establish laws regulating the rights and responsibilities of each party so that 
the project could be implemented smoothly. The issues arising when establishing 
laws to regulate the rights and responsibilities of each party of PFIPs will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
- 170 - 
 
 
Chapter 6  
Construction and Operation of PFIPs: the legal framework and the 
agreements 
Introduction 
After a concession is awarded to the selected concessioner, the concessioner will 
need to negotiate with the various participants of the PFIP concerning the 
construction and operation of the project.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the content of various agreements of PFIPs and 
the potential impact of relevant laws on these agreements, with reference to the 
recommendations of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions. It also 
considers the impact of current Chinese laws and policies on these agreements, so 
that the Chinese laws and policies may be adjusted. 
 
This Chapter has six objectives. The first objective is to present the legal framework 
used in the construction and operation of PFIPs, which is formed through various 
agreements. The second objective is to analyse the relationships between the 
agreements. The third objective is to discuss the content of the project agreement, 
which is at the core of the legal framework, and the impact of relevant laws on this 
agreement to provide suggestions as to how China might improve these laws to 
facilitate PFIPs. The fourth objective is to discuss the content of the finance 
agreement and the impact of relevant laws on this agreement to provide suggestions 
as to how China might improve these laws to facilitate PFIPs. The fifth objective is 
to discuss the content of the subcontracting agreement and the impact of relevant 
laws on this agreement to provide suggestions as to how China might improve these 
laws to facilitate PFIPs. The sixth objective is to discuss the content of the user 
agreement and the impact of relevant laws on this agreement to provide suggestions 
as to how China might improve these laws to facilitate PFIPs. 
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This Chapter consists of two sections.  
 
Section 6.1 addresses the types of agreement that may be included in PFIPs (see 
Figure 6.1), and the restrictions and impact of these agreements (see Figure 6.2). 
PFIPs include five principal parties: the contracting authority, the concessioner, the 
financer, the user and the sub-contractor (Figure 6.1: black). There are four kinds of 
agreement between these five parties, which clarify the rights and obligations of the 
parties: the project agreement, the finance agreement, the user agreement and the 
subcontracting agreement (Figure 6.1: red). The project agreement is the core 
agreement of the PFIP and may restrict the other three kinds of agreement. At the 
same time, these three agreements may also affect each other. These agreements 
comprise the entire framework of PFIPs, and need to be addressed to ensure PFIPs 
are successful.   
 
Section 6.2 discusses the contents of each agreement, with reference to some special 
issues and the possible impact of relevant laws. 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions
1
 suggest that the content of a 
project agreement should be flexible enough to enable negotiation, but that there 
may be some mandatory requirements in the agreement based on the specific laws of 
the country in question. Six issues pertaining to the project agreement are discussed:  
 Organisation of the project company 
 Real estate (project assets, land, easements) 
 Security interests 
 Performance guarantee 
 Protection of customers 
 Duration, extension and termination 
 
                                                 
1
 The Model Provisions, Model provision 28-48; the Legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction 
and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project agreement and Chap. V on 
Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement. 
- 172 - 
 
 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
2
 suggest that the finance agreement 
should address the issue of set-in right, which permits lenders to take over the 
concession when the concessioner cannot continue the project. This suggestion 
should be considered in Chinese law reform. 
 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
3
 suggest that the subcontracting 
agreement should address the issue of a conflict in interests within the project 
company when its investors are also subcontractors. This suggestion should be 
considered in Chinese law reform. 
 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
4
 suggest that the user agreement 
should address the issue of extra protection for special customers using the public 
service. This suggestion should be considered in Chinese law reform. 
 
In countries such as China, which want to facilitate PFIPs, it is necessary to clarify 
the responsibilities and rights in agreements pertaining to PFIPs, and establish 
proper and relevant laws to regulate the contents of agreements and guarantee the 
efficacy of the agreements.  
 
This Chapter answers the fifth research question: How should the laws relating to 
the agreements involved in PFIPs be reformed in China, with reference to the 
guidelines of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, and with 
supplementary reference to other countries?  
 
 
                                                 
2
 The Model Provisions, Model provision 42; the Legislative Guide, Recommendation 60, Chap. IV 
on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project agreement, 
Section J. General contractual arrangements, para148. 
3
 The Model Provisions, Model provision 28(l); the Legislative Guide, Recommendation 56, Chap. 
IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project 
agreement, Section J. General contractual arrangements, para.99-101. 
4
 The Model Provisions, Model provision 38,1(c); the Legislative Guide, Recommendation 53(c), 
Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project 
agreement, Section I. Operation of infrastructure, para88-89. 
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Figure 6.1 The five main parties and four agreements in PFIPs 
 
 
Figure 6.2 The relationships among the four kinds of agreement 
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6.1 The legal framework in construction and operation of PFIPs   
The construction and operation of PFIPs includes five principal parties: the 
contracting authority, the concessioner, the financer, the user and the sub-contractor 
(Figure 6.1: black). There are four kinds of agreements (Figure 6.1: red) between the 
five parties, which regulate the rights and obligations of the parties.   
6.1.1 The agreements 
The project agreement regulates the rights and obligations between the contracting 
authority and the concessioner. After the concessioner selection process, the selected 
concessioner makes a project agreement with the contracting authority concerning 
the construction and operation of PFIPs. The project agreement defines the scope 
and purpose of the project, provides details on the execution of the project, sets forth 
the conditions for the operation of the infrastructure or the delivery of the relevant 
services, and settles the project duration and the specific circumstances relating to 
extension or termination.
5
 
 
The finance agreement regulates the rights and obligations between the financers 
and the concessioner. Due to the difficulties the concessioner of PFIPs might face, 
were it to raise the project finance by itself, the concessioner is likely to enter into a 
finance agreement with a finance lender. In large-scale infrastructure projects, 
different lenders are often involved at different phases of the project. More than one 
lender may be involved at the same phase of the project. In order to avoid disputes 
that might arise from conflicting actions taken by different lenders, lenders funding 
a large project sometimes do so under a common finance agreement, in which one or 
more financial institutions take a leading role in negotiating on behalf of the other 
participating financial institutions. The finance agreement generally includes the 
finance amount, the duration of the loan, the interest or other returns, the collateral 
requirements and the settlement of any breach in the agreement. If funding is 
provided by different lenders under separate finance agreements, the lenders may 
                                                 
5
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section A General provisions of the project agreement, 
paras.1 
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negotiate a so-called “inter-creditor agreement” between them, in case of conflict.6 
 
The user agreement regulates the rights and obligations between the public users and 
the concessioner. After completing the construction of the infrastructure, the 
concessioner operates it as a service to public users, who may be individuals or 
groups. There should be an express or implied contract
7
 between the public users 
and the concessioner, which constitutes the user agreement. The user agreement 
often describes the service scope, charge criteria, directions for use and 
compensation for breach.   
 
The sub-contracting agreement regulates the rights and obligation between the sub-
contractors and the concessioner. Given the complexity of infrastructure projects, the 
concessioner may contract the services of one or more construction companies to 
implement some or most of the construction work, and may also contract the 
services of companies with experience in the operation and maintenance of 
infrastructure during the operational phase of the project.
8
 The concessioner may 
make various sub-contracting agreements with different sub-contractors. The sub-
contracting agreement, as with any general commercial contract, includes the rights 
and obligations of each party, payment options, compensation for breach, and 
dispute settlement.  
6.1.2 The relationships among the agreements 
The detailed content of the above four agreements may overlap with each other, 
since they support and limit each other (see Figure 6.2). The “project agreement” 
between the contracting authority and the concessionaire is the central contractual 
                                                 
6
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, Section B on 
Background information on privately financed infrastructure projects, paras.73 
7
 Implied contract means though it is not a written contract, the behaviors of purchase and service 
provision equals the contract has already concluded. For example, the regulations printed 
behind the train ticket are regarded as the consent between the passenger and the train operator 
since the passenger uses it. 
8
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J General contractual arrangements, paras.99 
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document in a PFIP,
9
 and therefore may restrict the other three agreements. 
 
The project agreement may restrict the finance agreements. The principal advantage 
of PFIPs is that the contracting authority does not offer, or only partly offers, the 
project funds and the concessioner takes responsibility for the funds required to 
construct and operate the project. The total private funds for the project mainly come 
through three channels: a portion of the funds are contributed directly by the 
concessioner’s shareholders; a portion is derived from loans extended to the 
concessioner by commercial banks and international financial institutions; and a 
portion is raised from the proceeds of the placement of bonds and other negotiable 
instruments in a capital market.
10
 Generally, the law should not unnecessarily restrict 
the concessioner’s ability to enter into financial arrangements as it sees fit for the 
purpose of financing the infrastructure. However, due to the specific requirements of 
PFIPs, in order to accomplish the project successfully and consider the public 
interest, legislation usually allows or requires the project agreement to make certain 
restrictions on the finance agreements, used to raise funds for the project.  
 
Firstly, the project agreement may require a limitation on the investment freedom of 
the project company’s shareholders. This would mean the shareholders could not 
transfer their equity participation without obtaining the prior consent of the 
contracting authority. In PFIPs, concessioners are selected to carry out infrastructure 
projects at least partly on the basis of their experience and capability to undertake 
that sort of project. Therefore, if the concessioner’s shareholders are entirely free to 
transfer their investment in a given project, contracting authorities may worry that 
there will be no assurance as to who will actually deliver the relevant services, 
which may negatively affect the success of the project or the service offered.
11
 
                                                 
9
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section A General provisions of the project agreement, 
paras.1 
10
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section D on Financial arrangement, paras.35; The 
Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, Section B on 
Background information on privately financed infrastructure projects, paras.54-67. 
11
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section G on Transfer of controlling interest in the project 
company, para.64; The legislative Guide, Chap. III on Selection of the concessionaire, paras. 
38-40 
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However, there are some arguments as to whether laws should allow the 
concessioner’s shareholders to transfer their investment freely. Although the 
Legislative Guide intends to minimise limitations to the shareholders’ rights to 
transfer their investment
12
, these rights have been strictly controlled in the previous 
PFIPs in China
13
. This issue will be discussed in detailed in Section 6.2.3. 
 
Secondly, the project agreement may restrict guaranteed items in the finance 
agreement. Commercial banks and international financial institutions such as finance 
lenders may not want to finance the concessioners of PFIPs, considering the huge 
risks involved. One of the risks is that the new “project company” 14  lacks an 
established credit or financial record on which the lenders might rely, so lenders 
have to confirm the credit limit only on the basis of the project’s cash flow and 
projected earnings. Lenders are afraid to offer large amounts in loan solely on the 
basis of a project’s expected cash flow or assets. Another risk stems from the 
shareholders’ lack of liability for the loan, which means that the lender cannot ask 
the project company’s shareholders for the repayment of loan. The project’s assets 
and revenue are strictly separated from the assets of the project company’s 
shareholders, i.e. the project company’s shareholders are not responsible for any 
finance over and above that which they have already invested in the project 
company. If a PFIP fails, the lender can only claim the project company’s assets, not 
the shareholders’.15 Thus, the lender may require some guarantee or other means of 
credit support from the contracting authority, users or other interested third parties to 
ensure repayment of loans. However, there are some restrictions on this guarantee in 
PFIPs, as written in the project agreement and to protect public interests. For 
example, the infrastructure or facility of the project may be public property, which 
                                                 
12
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section G on Transfer of controlling interest in the project 
company, para.65-66 
13 
For example: The Company Law of the People's Republic of China, effect on January 1,2006: 
  Article 142: The shares of a company held by the initiators of this company shall not be transferred 
within 1 year as of the day of establishment of the company. The shares issued before the 
company publicly issues shares shall not be transferred within 1 year as of the day when the 
stocks of the company get listed and are traded in a stock exchange……  
14  
A large-scale infrastructure project is often carried out by a new corporate entity specially 
established for that purpose by the project promoters. Such a new entity, often called a “project 
company”, becomes the vehicle for raising funds for the project. 
15  
The Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs, Section B on 
Background information on privately financed infrastructure projects, paras.54-55. 
- 178 - 
 
 
may not be used as the project company’s guarantee for the repayment of loans. This 
issue of financial guarantee will be discussed in detailed in Section 6.2.4.   
 
The project agreement may also restrict the user agreement. Although the user 
agreement is an agreement between the concessioner and public users, the 
contracting authority has the responsibility to ensure that the public users are 
satisfied with the infrastructure’s facilities and the service offered by the 
concessioner. Therefore, in the project agreement, the contracting authority often 
requires some restrictive items pertaining to the standard charge in the user 
agreement to keep charges affordable.
16
 The concessioner, in turn, may be worried 
that its projected profits will become unrealistic because of a change in public policy. 
Therefore, the concessioners also expect to have an agreement concerning the 
possibility of adjusting the charge.
17
 The issue of restricting standard charges will be 
discussed in Section 6.2.5.   
 
The project agreement may impose restrictions on the sub-contracting agreements. 
In PFIPs, the concessioner may hire subcontractors to perform the construction or 
operation work agreed upon in the project agreement. Generally, the contracting 
authority should not restrict the concessioner’s freedom to hire subcontractors 
because the investors in the Project Company may include construction or operation 
companies whose participation in the project is on the basis that they will be given 
sub-contracts for the execution of the construction or other work. If the contracting 
authority interferes excessively with the making of sub-contracts, it may discourage 
potential investors from investing in the PFIP. However, the concessioner should not 
enjoy an unlimited freedom to select its subcontractors. The contracting authority 
who awards the concession is responsible for monitoring the quality of the project, 
so the contracting authority needs to pay close attention to the subcontractor’s 
technical capabilities and financial standing. If the subcontract lacks capacity, it will 
hinder the accomplishment of the project and harm the public interest. Therefore, the 
contracting authority often retains the right to review and approve the project 
                                                 
16
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section D on Financial arrangement, paras.37-46 
17
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J on General contractual arrangement, paras.124 
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company’s subcontracts in the project agreement. In these cases, however, the 
project agreement should clearly define the procedures of review and approval and 
the circumstances under which the contracting authority’s approval may be withheld. 
As a general rule, approval should not be withheld unless the subcontracts are found 
to contain provisions manifestly contrary to the public interest or contrary to 
mandatory rules with the nature of public law that apply to the execution of PFIPs in 
the host country.
18
 
 
Aside from the restrictions imposed by the project agreement on the other three 
kinds of agreement, the three kinds of agreements may affect each other (Figure 6.2). 
The lenders may wish to ensure that the project company’s subcontractors are not 
overpaid, to prevent repercussions on the project company’s ability to repay loans. 
One particular instance may arise where the subcontractor is also one of the project 
company’s shareholders, since there may be a potential conflict of interest between 
the project company and this shareholder. Therefore, it is possible for the lender to 
make certain restrictive items in the finance agreement, which may affect the 
subcontracting agreement.
19
 The lender may even require a “direct payment” clause, 
enabling the contracting authority to pay sub-contractors directly to avoid this 
conflict of interest. A guarantee given in most PFIPs is the assignment to lenders of 
proceeds from the user agreement. The finance agreements may require that the 
proceeds of infrastructure projects be deposited in an escrow account managed by a 
trustee appointed by the lenders.
20
 Therefore, the payments given in the user 
agreement may affect the loan repayments in the finance agreement. During the 
operation of the PFIP, subcontractors who operate the infrastructure directly offer 
services to public users in light of the user agreement, and the public users who pay 
for the service have the right to receive the same level of service detailed in the user 
agreement. Therefore, the service standard laid out in the user agreement should 
equal to the service quality requirements set forth in the subcontracting agreement, 
so that the operator offers a satisfactory level of service to the public users. 
                                                 
18
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J on General contractual arrangement, paras.99-101 
19
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J on General contractual arrangement, paras.101 
20
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section E Security interests, paras.58 
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To sum up, there are five principal parties in the construction and operation of 
PFIPs: the contracting authority, the concessioner, the financer, the user and the sub-
contractor. Therefore, there are four kinds of agreements between the five parties, 
which regulate the rights and obligations of the parties: Project Agreement, Finance 
Agreement, User Agreement and Sub-contracting Agreement. The project agreement 
between the contracting authority and the concessioner is the central agreement. In 
order to protect the public interest, the project agreement may restrict the other three 
kinds of agreement. At the same time, the three kinds of agreements may affect each 
other.  
6.2 Detailed accounts of the issues in the agreements 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions have discussed the different 
approaches to certain issues in the 4 kinds of agreement. The section will compare 
these approaches with the methods used under Chinese law in similar circumstances. 
6.2.1 Project Agreement 
Both the Legislative Guide and the practice of various countries show that 
legislation concerning the project agreement of a PFIP should allow for the 
contracting authority and the concessioner to have the necessary flexibility to 
negotiate an agreement that takes into account the needs and particularities of a 
specific project. Legislation concerning the project agreement of PFIPs should only 
offer general legislative provisions on certain essential elements of the project 
agreement. If it is necessary, however, the legislation may make certain mandatory 
provisions concerning the content of clauses to be included in the agreement.
21
 
Some contentious issues in the project agreement will be discussed with regard to 
which solution may be applicable and suitable in the specific circumstances of 
Chinese law.  
                                                 
21
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section A General provisions of the project agreement, 
paras.2-4 
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6.2.1.1 Organisation of the project company 
The legislation may allow or require the project agreement between the contracting 
authority and the concessioner to affect the organisation of the project company.  
 
As was discussed in Chapter 5, the private concessioner may be a project consortium 
which will establish a special purpose entity to be an independent legal entity with 
its own juridical personality under the project agreement after a successful bid. In 
this special purpose entity, the project’s assets and revenue, and the rights and 
obligations relating to the project, are independently estimated and are strictly 
separated from the assets of the entity’s shareholders. This special purpose entity is 
the project company. Although the project company is often required to be 
established as a legal entity under the Company Law of the host country,
22
 according 
to the laws the project agreement may also be allowed or required to limit the 
organisation of the project company:  
 
Company law often requires the company to formulate its articles of association to 
regulate its business scope and members such as shareholders, directors and 
managers. If the company wants to modify its articles of association, it has to go 
through certain process and obtain a certain level of shareholder agreement. 
However, as PFIPs are closely related to the public interest, the laws that regulate 
project agreements may also provide that the entry into force of changes in the 
article of association of the project company should be effective upon approval by 
the contracting authority.
23
 
 
Company law often requires that shares should be transferred under certain 
conditions. For example, the transfer of shares should require the prior approval of a 
certain percentage of the other shareholders, or the original shareholders have to 
undertake to keep their shares for a certain period. However, due to the close 
relationship between PFIPs and public interest, the laws may require the project 
                                                 
22
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section B on the organization of the concessioner, paras.14 
23
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section B on the organization of the concessioner, paras.18 
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agreement to give some limitations on the transfer of shares in the project company. 
One such limitation is the requirement that the contracting authority approve the 
transfer. Project agreements according this kind of right to the contracting authority 
must consider two primary aspects. Firstly, the contracting authority may be 
satisfied with the experience that the selected bidding consortium demonstrated in 
the pre-selection phase or satisfied with the guarantees provided by the parent 
organisations of the original consortium and its subcontractors. Therefore, the 
contracting authorities may be worried that, if the project company’s shareholders 
are entirely free to transfer their shares, the project may be not completed by the 
consortium who satisfied the contracting authority at the outset.
24
 Secondly, the 
contracting authority may want to prevent transfer of shares to particular investors 
because of protecting public interest. For example, the contracting authority may 
wish to control the acquisition of controlling shares in public service providers to 
avoid monopolies through liberalised shares transfer. At the same time, it may not be 
appropriate for a company that has defrauded one part of Government to be 
employed by another through a newly acquired subsidiary.
25
 
 
The Legislative Guide expects the host country to have adequate company law in 
place to support the organisation of project companies. In China, the organisation of 
project companies is also required to follow the Chinese Company Law, which has 
general provisions on how to regulate articles of association
26
 and the transfer of 
                                                 
24
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section G on Transfer of controlling interest in the project 
company, para.64 
25
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section G on Transfer of controlling interest in the project 
company, para.67 
26 
The Company Law of the People's Republic of China, effect on January 1,2006: 
   Article 11: The Company established according to this law shall formulate its articles of association 
which are binding on the company, its shareholders, directors, supervisors and senior managers. 
   Article 44: The discussion methods and voting procedures of the shareholders' meeting shall be 
prescribed in the articles of association, unless it is otherwise provided for by this Law. A 
resolution made at a shareholders' meeting on amending the articles of association, increasing or 
reducing the registered capital, merger, split-up, dissolution or change of the company form 
shall be adopted by the shareholders representing 2 / 3 or more of the voting rights. 
   Article 104: When a shareholder attends the shareholders' meeting, he shall have one voting right 
for each share he holds……when the shareholders' meeting makes a decision to modify the 
articles of association or to increase or reduce the registered capital, or a resolution about the 
merger, split-up, dissolution or change of the company form, the resolution shall be adopted by 
shareholders representing 2/3 or more of the voting rights of the shareholders in presence. 
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shares
27
. Moreover, although there is no specific law on PFIPs in China, the 
provincial regulations, such as the Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession 
Regulation of 2005, includes provisions that allow the project agreement to give the 
contracting authority the right to restrict the transfer of shares in the project 
company.
28
 Therefore, in Chinese PFIPs, if the project agreement includes items that 
limit the organisation of the project company, this could be supported by relevant 
laws. 
6.2.1.2 Real Estate 
Provisions relating to the real estate of the project are an essential part of the project 
agreement. There are three issues relating to real estate in PFIPs, which need 
appropriate laws to regulate. These are the ownership of project assets; land required 
for execution of the project; and easements. 
6.2.1.2.1 Project Assets 
The ownership of project assets refers to the ownership of the physical infrastructure 
and affixes required for the provision of the public service in the project, whether it 
is the infrastructure offered by the contracting authority at the beginning of the 
project, new infrastructure constructed by the concessioner, or improvements or 
                                                 
27 
The Company Law of the People's Republic of China, effect on January 1,2006: 
   Article 72: All or some of the stock rights of the shareholders of a limited liability company may be 
transferred between the shareholders. Where a shareholder intends to transfer his/its stock rights 
to any non-shareholder, he/it shall be subject to the approval of more than half of the other 
shareholders. The shareholder shall notify the other shareholders in written form of the matters 
on the transfer of stock rights for their approval. If any of the other shareholders fails to give it a 
reply within 30 days after the receipt of the written notice, it shall be deemed to have agreed to 
the transfer. If half or more of the other shareholders disagree to the transfer, the shareholders 
who disagree to the transfer shall purchase the stock rights to be transferred. If they refuse to 
purchase these stock rights, they shall be deemed to have agreed to the transfer. Under the same 
conditions, the other shareholders have a prior right to purchase the stock rights to be 
transferred upon their approval. If two or more shareholders claim the prior rights, they shall 
determine their respective percentage of purchase through negotiation. If they fail to reach an 
agreement during the negotiation, they shall exercise the prior rights on the basis of their 
respective percentage of capital contributions. Unless it is otherwise provided for of the transfer 
of stock rights in the articles of association, the articles of association shall be followed. 
   Article 142: The shares of a company held by the initiators of this company shall not be transferred 
within 1 year as of the day of establishment of the company. The shares issued before the 
company publicly issues shares shall not be transferred within 1 year as of the day when the 
stocks of the company get listed and are traded in a stock exchange. 
28
 Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005, Provision 14: “The concession 
agreement could agree on limitation of the transfer of shares”. 
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additions to the original infrastructure.
29
 The Legislative Guide considers it 
advisable for the project agreement to specify which assets will be public property 
and which will become the private property of the concessioner, with the exception 
of host countries which have laws that clearly state that physical infrastructure and 
its affixes required for the provision of public services must be regarded as public 
property.
30
 The project agreement could identify which assets the concessioner must 
transfer to the contracting authority without any charge once the project has been 
completed; which assets the contracting authority could purchase from the 
concessioner if this is necessary; and which assets the concessioner may freely 
remove or dispose of once the project is completed.
31
  
 
However, most Chinese PFIPs adopt a BOT or BT format, which means that project 
assets are transferred to the contracting authority without charge after the 
completion of the project. Although Chinese laws have not determined that physical 
infrastructure for the provision of public service is to be considered public property, 
and have allowed project agreements to approach other kinds of consensus
32
, there 
are rarely cases in practice in which the infrastructure is purchased by the 
contracting authority or owned by the private concessioner. As a matter of fact, 
Chinese legal scholars have been suggesting that laws should facilitate private 
investors to own public infrastructure for a long time
33
, but with insubstantial effect.   
6.2.1.2.2 Land 
Land may be required for execution of the project. The issues related to this land are 
very complicated. Infrastructure is often large-scale, such as roads, power stations or 
hospitals, and requires a large piece of land (e.g. power stations) or large cross of 
land (e.g. roads). The land required may belong to a large number of individual 
                                                 
29
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.21 
30
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.22 
31
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.26 
32
 For example, Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005, Provision 4(3): “…or 
other ways agreed by the local government.” 
33
 Liang Huixing, “Nationalization, it is dangerous!” (2006) < 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleId=35983>  access on 19/01/2013 
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owners. Therefore, acquiring the land may involve a long and complex process of 
negotiation with numerous property transfers. The Legislative Guide anticipates that 
the contracting authority would take responsibility for providing the land required 
for the implementation of the project, adopting the most efficient process of 
acquisition (e.g. “expropriation”)34, so as to avoid unnecessary delays or  costs.35 
The Legislative Guide also suggests the laws authorise the concessioner to perform 
certain actions to facilitate the expropriation and share the ownership of land with 
the contracting authority.
36
  
 
This issue is particularly tough and complicated in China, since land ownership in 
China is a fraught issue. The Chinese land ownership regime is different from other 
countries’ land regimes, where parties are free to trade in land. In China, urban land 
belongs to the state. Rural land also belongs to the state, unless it has been allocated 
to a rural collective
37
. Although Chinese laws on the registration of land ownership 
and the categories of land use are messy,
38
 both Chinese Constitution Law
39
 and the 
subsequent laws
40
 passed under this constitution framework all assert one basic 
principle: socialist public ownership over all land rather than the ownership of land 
                                                 
34
  “Expropriation” means the procedure whereby private property is compulsorily acquired by the 
Government against the payment of appropriate compensation to the owners. The Legislative 
Guide calls it as “compulsory acquisition”. However, in order to consist with the Chinese 
domestic legal system, “expropriation” is used in this thesis.  
35
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.27 
36
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.29 
37
 The definition of “collective ownership” (see Chapter 4 of this thesis footnote94); Xiaojing Qin, 
‘The impact of political forces on urban land ownership reform in transitional China’ 
(I.J.L.B.E. 2010, 2(3), 206-217)P207 
38
 Riley Mary L., ‘People's Republic of China: land rights - enforcement of regulations’(I.C.C.L.R. 
1997, 8(3), C45-46) 
39 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on March 14, 2004: Article 10 (See 
Chapter 4 of this thesis footnote95) 
40
 E.g. the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China (2004 Amendment) 
        Article 2: The People's Republic of China resorts to a socialist public ownership i.e. an 
ownership by the whole people and ownerships by collectives, of land. In ownership by the 
whole people, the State Council is empowered to be on behalf of the State to administer the land 
owned by the State. No unit or individual is allowed to occupy, trade or illegally transfer land 
by other means. Land use right may be transferred by law. The state may make expropriation or 
requisition on land according to law for public interests, but shall give compensations 
accordingly. The State introduces the system of compensated use of land owned by the State 
except the land has been allocated for use by the State according to law. 
       Article 8: Land in urban districts shall be owned by the State. Land in the rural areas and 
suburban areas, except otherwise provided for by the State, shall be collectively owned by 
peasants including land for building houses, land and hills allowed to be retained by peasants. 
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by any individual or organisation.
41
 In other words, no individuals or organisations 
(with the exception of the rural collectives) who occupy the land have ownership of 
the land although they enjoy the right to use it. They only have the ownership and 
trade use of the buildings or facilities attached to the land rather than the land itself.  
 
It is not permitted to transfer absolute land ownership but land-use rights may be 
transferred subject to certain conditions.
42
 Two levels of urban land transaction are 
permitted in Chinese law. The first level is the assignment of a right to use the land, 
in which the state, as the owner of the land, assigns the right to use the land for a 
specified time period to land users, who in turn pay fees for the assignment thereof 
to the State (except allocated land,
43
 which is assigned without charge but is 
taxed).
44
 The state can assign land use rights through auction, tender or 
negotiation.
45
 The time period assigned for the right depends on the purpose of the 
proposed development. 70 years are assigned for residential use, 50 years for 
industrial, educational, scientific, technological, cultural, health, athletic, or multiple 
uses, and 40 years for business, tourism, and recreational use.
46
 The second level of 
urban land transaction is the transfer of land-use rights, in which land users re-assign 
their land use right to other users through sale, exchange, and donation. However, if 
the land has not been developed and utilised in accordance with the requirements of 
first level land transaction, the land use right may not be transferred.
47
 In other 
words, the first level of the land market is monopolised by the state while the second 
level is where private land transactions are conducted.
48
 By way of a simple example, 
the estate developers buy the land use right from state in the first level (residential 
                                                 
41
 Lo T. Augustine, ‘Debate surrounding the new property law in China’ (C.S.L.R. 2008, 4(2), 182-
200) P188; K. Wilhelm, ‘Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China’(2004, 9 UCLA J. Int'l 
Law & For. Aff) P243 
42
 Qin Xiaojing, ‘The impact of political forces on urban land ownership reform in transitional 
China’ (I.J.L.B.E. 2010, 2(3), 206-217) P213 
43
 In PFIPs, the land required for the project should be allocated land according to the Land 
Administration Law of the People's Republic of China (2004 Amendment), 
    Article 54: A paid leasing should be go through in use of land owned by the State by a construction 
unit. But the following land may be obtained through government allocation with the approval 
of the people's governments at and above the county level according to law: 1……; 2.Land for 
building urban infrastructure and for public welfare undertakings; 3……; 4……. 
44 
Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of 
the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas 1990, Article 8.  
45
 Ibid, Article 13. 
46
 Ibid, Article 12. 
47
 Ibid, Article 19. 
48
 (n 42) 
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use is 70 years) and then sell the apartments in the second level after building 
residential buildings. When people buy an apartment, the payment includes the cost 
of the apartment and the land-transfer fee. Due to the 70 year time limitation of the 
land use right, the owner of an apartment still has to pay the land-transfer fee every 
seventy years. Meanwhile, the apartment owner cannot dispute expropriation by the 
state because the state retains ownership of the land.  
 
Large-scale infrastructure in PFIPs may need a large amount of urban land and 
occupy the land for a long time. It would be prohibitive to ask private investors to 
purchase so many land use rights and the private investor could not afford to pay so 
many land-transfer fees. Moreover, if the land required for a PFIP includes rural land 
belonging to collectives, the state must expropriate the land from the collectives 
before the land can be assigned to the project conductors. Although the collective 
owns their land, the land can only be transferred to the state from the collective.
49
 
Therefore, there is no way that a private investor could buy the land directly from 
the collective. 
 
Even though the land policy hinders the development of welfare, the market and the 
economy in China, and despite the many arguments for reform put forward by 
academics
50
, information from the Chinese Communist Party and government shows 
that it will not be changed for the foreseeable future.
51
 Therefore, it would be 
impossible to change domestic laws to comply with the expectation of the 
Legislative Guide made by UNCITRAL in a short amount of time. In this case, only 
the contracting authority can take responsibility for allocating the land required for 
the implementation of the project in Chinese PFIPs. It would be impossible for the 
Chinese contracting authority to authorise the concessioner to expropriate land or 
share the ownership of land as suggested in the Legislative Guide. However, it is 
more noteworthy that, in China, as individuals and organisations own the buildings 
                                                 
49
 Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China (2004 Amendment), Article 43, 44. 
50
 Xu Cheng Gang, ‘State monopoly of land ownership brings social problems’, Chinese Reform 
(2011.4). The Chinese University of Hong Kong website, 
<http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=8098> accessed on 27th May, 
2013 
51
 Zheng Yong Nian, ‘Land ownership reform’, News of the communist party of China Website, 
<http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0427/c83865-21309832-2.html> accessed on 27th May, 
2013 
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or facilities attached the land, it is essential to compensate the owners during an 
expropriation process. This kind of compensation has requirements in the form of 
criteria and procedure in Chinese domestic law.
52
 However, the private concessioner 
should be warned that cases of expropriation in the past few years indicate that the 
execution of expropriation in China is not always smooth. There is fierce conflict 
between the contracting authority and the property owners concerning compensation, 
which results in serious delays and a large increase in the project’s costs. For 
example, in a famous case in Zhejiang province of China, the contracted road had to 
be built around a house as the occupants refused to move (shown as Figure 6.3).
53
 
Therefore, during the negotiation and drafting of the project agreement, the 
contracting authority and the concessioner should have an agreement on project 
delays or increased costs in response to failed expropriation. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Expropriation failed 
54
 
 
                                                 
52
 Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation(2011); 
Regulation on the Dismantlement of Urban Houses(2001); Land Administration Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2004 Amendment) 
53
 BBC news on 23 November 2012, ‘Road built around house as Chinese couple refuse to move’, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20463192> accessed on 20/01/2012 
54
 China news, photo from <http://www.chinanews.com/tp/hd2011/2012/11-22/150035.shtml> 
accessed on 20/01/2012  
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6.2.1.2.3 Easement 
Easement is the right to use another person’s property for a specific purpose. 55 
Common examples of such rights are the private right of way, the right to light and 
the right of support. In PFIPs, the concessioner often needs to use the property of 
third parties to access the project site or to perform or maintain any work required 
for the provision of the public service (for example, to install poles or electric 
transmission lines above third parties’ property or to lay oil, gas or water pipes).56 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions indicates that there are two ways to 
acquire this easement
57
: One is that the law itself to authorises the concessioner to 
enter, pass through or do work or affix installations upon the property of third parties, 
as required for the construction, operation and maintenance of public infrastructure. 
If the behaviour of the concessioner substantially hinders the property owner’s rights 
and interests when they use this owner’s property, the owner may be entitled to 
compensation under law.
58
 The other is that the concessioner makes use of the 
property with the owner’s consent. As it is neither expeditious nor cost effective to 
leave the direct acquisition of easements from owners to the concessioner, the 
Legislative Guide advises that those easements be acquired compulsorily by the 
contracting authority at the same time as the project site is acquired.
59
 
 
At present, there is a big gap in easement in Chinese law. China passed the first 
Property Law to refer to easements in 2007, but this only regulates the creation of an 
easement between equal parties in civil law through contract, rather than easements 
                                                 
55
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.31. 
The case of Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 is the leading English case on easement, 
which also show the easement is separated from the land ownership. 
56
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.30 
57
 The Model Provisions, Chap. III on Contents and implementation of the concession contract, 
Model provision 33 Easements, Variant A & B; The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on 
Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project agreement, 
Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.30-32 
58
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.32 
59
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section C The project site, assets and easements, paras.31 
- 190 - 
 
 
acquired for public infrastructure and the provision of public service.
60
 Specific 
regulations on the infrastructure construction in specific sectors may include articles 
on easements. The Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Protection Law of the People's 
Republic of China (2010) clearly states that the pipeline enterprise is entitled to 
easement when it patrols, inspects or maintains the pipes.
61
 The Highway Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2004) indicates that construction units are entitled 
easement when they construct or maintain the road.
62
 However, these regulations in 
these specific sectors are only applied to the specific areas, rather than to general 
public infrastructure, so some constructors or operators are not entitled to easements 
by law. As a matter of fact, legally authorised easements for public service providers 
have been discussed by Chinese scholars for a long time. A number of Chinese 
scholars strongly agree that “legal easements” should be confirmed in law.63 “Legal 
easements” mean that the public service provider is automatically empowered 
through easements by law to transit through the property of third parties to access 
the project site or do work or affix installations upon the property of third parties. 
Legal easements could convenience the performance of public infrastructure 
projects and avoid the risk of corruption present in expropriation. In Chinese PFIPs, 
when the private concessioner makes a project agreement with the contracting 
authority, it is better to ask the contracting authority to acquire the easements from 
third party property owners, no matter the sector of the public infrastructure, to 
                                                 
60
 The Property Law of the People's Republic of China (2007), Chapter XIV Easement Rights, Article 
156-169. 
    Article 157: “For the creation of an easement, the parties concerned shall conclude an easement 
contract in written form….” 
61
 Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (2010) 
    Article 27: “The relevant entities and individuals along a pipeline route shall provide necessary 
convenience for such operations as the patrol, inspection and maintenance of pipeline by the 
pipeline enterprise.    ….” 
62
 The Highway Law of the People's Republic of China (2004) 
    Article 28: “No unit or individual is allowed to intrude or collect fees illegally for the use of State 
owned waste hills, wasteland or for the digging of sand, stone or earth from the State owned 
waste hills, wasteland, river beds and polders for highway construction only if necessary 
procedures as provided for by related laws and administrative decrees have been undertaken for 
the respective actions.” 
   Article 38: “People's governments at the county and township levels should organize free services 
of rural residents on both sides of roads for highway construction and maintenance according to 
the related regulations of the State.” 
63
 Li yan-rong, “Research on the Legal Easement in the Context of Land Administration”(2012), 
China Land sciences(Vol.26 No.6. Jun.,2012); Chen, shujuan,“The Application of easements 
under Public Ownership”(2012), Science of Law (Vol.03, 2012); Cai wu, “Preliminary 
analysis of nature of servitude administrative”(2004), Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre 
Institute of Politics and Law (Vol.19. No.2.Mar.2004) 
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avoid project process delays or cost increases. 
6.2.1.3 Security Interests 
Security arrangements
64
 are crucial for financing infrastructure projects, particularly 
where the financing is structured under the modality of the PFIP. In PFIPs, the 
project company established by the private concessioner takes responsibility for 
raising finance, and constructing and operating the infrastructure project. The project 
company, as the main entity implementing the project, is often required by the other 
parties of the project to provide security, so that the sale of assets or contributions by 
the third party guarantor will first go towards repaying their outstanding debts. 
However, the project company cannot create this security without restrictions. 
Firstly, as the most important agreement in the PFIP, the project agreement may 
involve some items on security interests, which may affect the security arrangements 
between the project company and other parties in the PFIP. The security 
arrangements created by Project Company should be subject to any restrictions 
contained in the project agreement.
65
 Secondly, the project agreement is not simply 
free to create security interests either. Some security arrangements often derive from 
general principles of law or from statutory provisions and cannot be waived by the 
contracting authority through contractual arrangements in the project agreement.
66
 
Besides the above two restrictions, the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
also suggest that the concessioner should have the right to create security interests 
over any of its assets, rights or interests, including those relating to the infrastructure 
project, as required to secure any financing needed for the project.
67
 The following 
sections will analyse and discuss how security arrangements may be created by the 
project company in the project agreement. 
                                                 
64
 Security arrangements in project finance generally play a defensive or preventive role by ensuring 
that, if a third party acquires the debtor’s operations, all of the proceeds resulting from the sale 
of those assets will go first to repayment of outstanding loans. 
65
 The Model Provisions, Chap. III on Contents and implementation of the concession contract, 
Model provision 35 Security interests; The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and 
operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project agreement, Section E Security 
interests, paras.52 
66
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section E Security interests, paras.53 
67
 The Model Provisions, Chap. III on Contents and implementation of the concession contract, 
Model provision 35 Security interests 
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6.2.1.3.1 Guarantee by the contracting authority or other governmental sectors 
The project company may ask the contracting authority or other governmental 
sectors to provide certain loan guarantees when they conclude the project agreement. 
The Legislative Guide points out that some countries’ domestic laws authorise the 
contracting authority or other agencies in the host government to provide loan 
guarantees for the repayment of loans taken by the project company of a PFIP.
68
 In 
other words, it means the contracting authority or the governmental sector has to 
take responsibility for the repayment of the loan when the private concessioner 
cannot repay the financer or the project fails. In countries where governments are 
powerful and reliable, this kind of guarantee is often welcomed by creditors. 
However, this model is not applied in China. The Guarantee Law of the People’s 
Republic of China strictly prohibits the state organs from providing any guarantees 
for commercial entities.
69
 The Bank of China has notified all its subsidiary finance 
institutes that state organs are not accepted as guarantors for loans.
70
 The Legislative 
Guide concurs that the contracting authority should not make any guarantees on the 
debts incurred by the concessioner to the sub-contractors. 
6.2.1.3.2 Guarantee by physical assets 
The project agreement could allow the project company to create security interests 
through its physical assets. It means the project company could create security 
interests if it had the ownership of the project assets or the relevant land. The reason 
why there is a discussion on the ownership of the project assets and its relevant land 
in Section 6.2.1.2 about Real Estate is that the confirmation of the ownership 
decides what physical property could be used by the project company to create 
security interests.  
 
                                                 
68
 The legislative Guide, Chap. II on Project risks and government support, Section C Government 
support, paras.38 
69
 The Guarantee Law of the People's Republic of China （1995） 
    Article 8: “No State organs may act as a surety, except in the case of securing loans, for on 
lending, from a foreign government or an international economic organization as is approved by 
the State Council.” 
70
 Notice of Bank of China on the state organ cannot be guarantor after take effective of The 
Guarantee Law(1995) 
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If project assets are public property or have to be transferred to the public body at 
the end of the project, there may be legal obstacles to negotiating the security 
arrangements required to obtain financing for the project. As the project company 
lacks the title deeds to the property, in many legal systems it has no (or only limited) 
power to encumber the property. Therefore, the project agreement should facilitate 
the negotiation of security arrangements by indicating the types of asset which may 
are permitted as collateral for such security interests. In China, where most PFIPs 
are formed according to the BOT or BT model, the project assets cannot be used as 
security interests because they have to be transferred to the contracting authority at 
the end of the project. Moreover, even if the PFIP adopted another model, which did 
not need to be transferred at the end of the project, the Guarantee Law of the 
People’s Republic of China forbids the creation of mortgages on public facilities.71 
If the project assets of PFIPs are to be allowed to be owned by the project company 
in China, the Guarantee Law of the People’s Republic of China should be amended 
to correspond with this principle.  
 
In some legal systems, if the project company owns the land used in the project or 
owns the adjacent land or the leasehold interest or the right to use the land, the 
project company could use these to create security interests.
72
 However, this kind of 
security arrangement would be impossible in China because all Chinese land 
belongs either to the state or to collectives. Moreover, in Chinese PFIPs, the land 
offered by the contracting authority may only be used for the purpose of 
constructing the project, so the leasehold interest or right to use the land could not to 
be used to create security interest. 
6.2.1.3.3 Guarantee by intangible assets 
The project agreement could allow the project company to create security interests 
on its intangible assets. The main intangible asset in an infrastructure project is the 
                                                 
71
 The Guarantee Law of the People's Republic of China （1995） 
    Article 37 The following property may not be mortgaged: 
   (3) educational facilities, medical and health facilities of schools, kindergartens, hospitals and other 
institutions or public organizations established in the interest of the public and other facilities in 
the service of public welfare;  
72
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section E Security interests, paras.52 
- 194 - 
 
 
concession itself, which is the concessioner’s right to conduct and operate the 
infrastructure and to charge users who use the service provided by the project. The 
concession provides its holder with the authority to control the entire project and 
entitles the concessioner to earn revenue generated by the project and to acquire 
reasonable profits. Sometimes the value of the concession is much greater than the 
combined value of all of the physical assets involved in a project. Therefore, the 
lender may regard the concession to be an important part of the security 
arrangements negotiated with the concessioner.
73
 If there is a security interest in the 
concession, failure to repay the loan would entitle the lender to take over the 
concession and make arrangements for the continuation of the project under another 
concessioner. It should be noted that, in many legal systems, the security interest 
created on the concession must be made with the consent of the contracting 
authority.
74
 The contracting authority must consider the capability of the new 
concessioner. Moreover, the contracting authority needs to follow the same 
procedures that applied to the selection of the original concessioner. It is impossible 
for the contracting authority to accept a new concessionaire that has not been 
selected according to those procedures and has been chosen by the lender directly.
75
 
In China, the law also regulates the concessioner’s obligation not to dispose of the 
concession or related assets without the prior consent of the contracting authority, 
regardless of whether this disposal is in the form of assignment, lease, security or 
any other form.
76
 
     
The project agreement may allow the project company to create security interests on 
its trade receivables. A form of security interest often used in PFIPs is the 
assignment to lenders of proceeds from contracts with future customers of the 
concessioner. This kind of security arrangement is a typical element in the financing 
arrangements negotiated with the lenders, by which the proceeds of infrastructure 
projects are deposited in an escrow account managed by a trustee appointed by the 
lenders. This way is also accepted in China. 
                                                 
73
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section E Security interests, paras.56 
74
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section E Security interests, paras.57 
75
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J General contractual arrangements, paras.149 
76
 Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005, Article 25. 
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6.2.1.4 Performance Guarantee 
The concept of security interest put forward in Section 6.2.1.3 is a guarantee to 
ensure repayments by the project company to the lender. This Section discusses the 
guarantee to ensure the performance by the project company of the PFIP to the 
contracting authority. In some countries, the law generally requires adequate 
guarantees of performance to be provided by the concessioner and these 
performance guarantees are concluded in the project agreement.
77
 The Legislative 
Guide gives two types of performance guarantee: the first is a monetary performance 
guarantee, i.e. the guarantor pays the contracting authority funds up to a stated limit 
to satisfy the liabilities of the concessioner in the event of non-performance. The 
second is a performance bond, i.e. the guarantor rectifies defective structures or 
finishes incomplete structures, and the guarantor compensates the contracting 
authority for losses caused by the concessioner’s failure to perform.78 In Chinese law, 
a performance guarantee is also required for project agreements, but the level of 
performance guaranteed is not regulated.
79
 
6.2.1.5 Protection to Customers 
The contracting authority may require the project company to provide services to the 
general public with the specific obligation to ensure the availability of the service 
under the same conditions for all users and customers of the same category, 
excepting where the objective criteria are different (e.g. the difference between 
normal consumers and business or industrial consumers; the difference between the 
hours of low-level and peak consumption).
80
 Moreover, the different treatment of 
certain users or customers may be the result of legislative action (e.g. discounted 
transport for schoolchildren or senior citizens).
81
 In China, the project company 
                                                 
77
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J on General contractual arrangements, paras.108 
78
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J on General contractual arrangements, paras.109 
79
 Beijing Regulation 2005, Chapter 2 Award procedures, Article 12(9): 
   Article 12: The concession agreement should include: 
   ……(9) performance guarantee 
80
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section I on Operation of infrastructure, paras.88 
81
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section I on Operation of infrastructure, paras.89 
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undertakes to comply with the price formulated by the competent price authority in 
the form of a fixed or guided price when delivering the product or service to the 
public.
82
  
 
However, the Legislative Guide agrees that if the defective construction or operation 
of an infrastructure facility results in the death of or personal injury to employees of 
the concessioner, users of the facility or any other third parties, or it results in 
damage to their property, the project company alone should bear the responsibility in 
that regard and that the contracting authority should not be part of any guarantee as 
regards such third-party claims, except where the damage was caused by a serious 
breach by or the recklessness of the contracting authority.
83
 
6.2.1.6 Duration, extension and termination 
The project agreement must specify a period for the concession.  This period may be 
decided through negotiations between the contracting authority and the concessioner, 
with consideration to the length of time necessary to allow the concessionaire to 
repay its debts in full and to enjoy reasonable profits.
84
 Although the period is 
generally negotiated by both the contracting authority and the concessioner, some 
unexpected impediments or other changes of circumstances may arise during the life 
of the concession. Thus, extension should be applied in certain exceptional 
situations. These situations may be specified in the project agreement through 
negotiation between the contracting authority and the concessioner, or they may be 
listed in laws.
85
 In China, the duration of the concession is to be provided in the 
project agreement, depending on the nature of the sector, the scope of project, the 
form of the concession and other relevant factors, but in no case shall it last for more 
than 30 years.
86
 The project company may request an extension of the concession 
period subject to the evaluation and approval of the municipal government.
87
 The 
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 Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005, Article 23. 
83
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J General contractual arrangements, paras.105-106 
84
 The legislative Guide, Chap. V on Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement, 
Section B on Duration of the project agreement, paras.3 
85
 The legislative Guide, Chap. V on Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement, 
Section C on Extension of the project agreement, paras.8 
86
 Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005,  Article 13. 
87
 Beijing Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation 2005,  Article 22. 
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municipal government has exclusive power in this decision and is often also the 
contracting authority. There is no Chinese law that restricts the exclusive power of 
the municipal government if it rejects a project extension. 
  
Although the project agreement may include items on the termination of the project, 
the grounds for terminating the project agreement before the expiry of its term and 
the consequences of any such termination are often dealt with in domestic 
legislation.
88
 However, there is no Chinese law that deals with the consequences of 
the decision by one of the parties to terminate the project. Though the Contract Law 
could be applied, it is not appropriate to PFIPs because it need more strict 
restrictions on terminating the project. 
6.2.2 Finance Agreement 
The concessioner may negotiate with the lender on all aspects of the loan, but the 
finance agreement cannot contravene the relevant laws and the project agreement. 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions
89
 emphasise the step-in rights for 
the lender in those instances when the concessioner is unable to complete the project. 
In PFIPs, the lenders’ main security is the profits accrued by operating the project, 
so they are particularly concerned with risks of interruption or termination prior to 
any repayment of their loans. If the concessioner is unable to complete the project, 
the lenders would be interested in looking for a new concessioner to complete the 
project and operate it profitably. 
 
Although it may be in the interest of all the parties involved in a PFIP to avert the 
termination of the project by allowing the project to continue under the 
responsibility of a new concessioner chosen by the lender, the appointment of the 
new concessioner should be subject to the approval of the contracting authority. 
                                                 
88
 The legislative Guide, Chap. V on Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement, 
Section D on Termination, paras.9 
89
 The Model Provisions, Model provision 42; the Legislative Guide, Recommendation 60, Chap. IV 
on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project agreement, 
Section J. General contractual arrangements, para147-150 
- 198 - 
 
 
Therefore, a number of recent agreements for large infrastructure projects have 
included clauses allowing the lenders to select, with the consent of the contracting 
authority, a new concessioner to perform under the existing project agreement.
90
 
6.2.3 Sub-contracting Agreement 
The concessioner has the freedom to make contracts with subcontractors, but the 
sub-contracting agreement cannot contravene the relevant laws and the project 
agreement. 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions particularly point out that laws 
intended to prevent conflicts of interest in corporate management may be more 
important in PFIPs because the project company may engage its own shareholders to 
perform work or provide services.
91
 However, PFIPs have a special feature in that 
private investors may join the project company simply because it expects to be given 
the principal sub-contracts for the construction of the project or for other work. If 
legal limitations to this behaviour are too strict, they may discourage the 
participation of potential investors and raise the financial burden of the 
concessioner.
92
 
 
Modern company laws should contain specific provisions regulating the conduct of 
managers so as to prevent conflicts of interest. Provisions of this type require that 
managers act in good faith in the best interest of the company and do not use their 
positions to foster their own or any other person’s financial interests to the detriment 
of the company. This issue should also be regulated in the project agreement. The 
contracting authority may disallow subcontracts which harm the company’s 
interests.
93
 
                                                 
90
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J. General contractual arrangements, para150 
91
 The Model Provisions, Model provision 28(l); the Legislative Guide, Recommendation 56, Chap. 
IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project 
agreement, Section J. General contractual arrangements, para.99-101. 
92
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section J. General contractual arrangements, para.100 
93
 The legislative Guide, Chap. VII on Other relevant areas of law,  para.32 
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Although the Chinese Company Law does not particularly deal with issues 
pertaining to the project company in PFIPs, it sets out the general tenet that the 
company shareholders should not injure the company’s interests.94 The interests of 
the project company in a PFIP are protected by the Chinese Company Law. However, 
if China expects to protect the project company better through a specific law on 
PFIPs, it should give the contracting authority the power to monitor any 
subcontracts made between the project company and its shareholders so that 
subcontracts which may harm the project company’s interest could be prohibited 
from the outset. 
6.2.4 User Agreement 
The concessioner and the users are free to negotiate responsibilities and rights, but 
the user agreement cannot contravene the relevant laws and the project agreement.  
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions require the concessioner to offer 
service under the same conditions to all users and customers of the same category.
95
 
In China, universal service obligation
9697
 is not common, but the Chinese Customer 
Law
98
 does require the concessioner to offer a quality of the service consistent with 
                                                 
94
 The Company Law of the People's Republic of China, effect on 1
st
 January,2006 
    Article 20: The shareholders of a company shall comply with the laws, administrative regulations 
and articles of association, and shall exercise the shareholder's rights according to law. None of 
them may injure any of the interests of the company or of other shareholders by abusing the 
shareholder's rights, or injure the interests of any creditor of the company by abusing the 
independent status of juridical person or the shareholder's limited liabilities…… 
    Article 21: Neither the controlling shareholder, nor the actual controller, any of the directors, 
supervisors or senior managers of the company may injure the interests of the company by 
taking advantage of its connection relationship…… 
95
 The Model Provisions, Model provision 38,1(c); the Legislative Guide, Recommendation 53(c), 
Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative framework and project 
agreement, Section I. Operation of infrastructure, para88-89. 
96
 Universal service obligation means that the basic fixed line services are available at an affordable 
price to all citizen-customers across the country.  
97
 Prosser Tony, ‘The Regulatory Enterprise: Government, Regulation, and Legitimacy’(Oxford 
Unversity Press,2010) 
98 
The Consumer protection Law of the People's Republic of China 1993, adopted on 31
st
 October, 
1993: 
    Article 10 Consumers shall enjoy the right of fair deal. Consumers shall, in their purchasing 
commodities or receiving services, have the right to obtain fair deal prerequisites such as 
guarantee of quality, reasonable prices and correct measurement, and have the right to refuse 
any compulsory transaction of business operators. 
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the price. 
 
The Legislative Guide and Model Provisions also point out that the user agreement 
may follow some special laws concerning special customers using the public service. 
For example, reduced water or electricity rates may apply to lower-income or rural 
users.
 99
 
Conclusion 
This chapter answers the 5
th
 research question, namely how the Chinese legal 
framework and agreements in PFIPs may be improved, based on the guidelines from 
the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions and with supplementary reference to 
other countries. 
 
This chapter summarises all the agreements that may form part of PFIPs clarifying 
the responsibilities and rights of each party. These agreements compose a framework 
to ensure the project’s success, so they are very important. According to the aims of 
the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, the agreements should be 
concluded with the consent of the two parties, but the content of the agreements 
should not breach any mandatory rules in law. Moreover, the agreements on finance, 
user and subcontract should be subordinate to the project agreement, which is the 
core of the framework. Therefore, countries as China, which want to facilitate PFIPs, 
may find it necessary to establish relevant laws to regulate these agreements and 
remove unreasonable barriers in the legislation. 
 
According to Figures 2.6 5.1, the five parties (contracting authority, concessioner, 
financer, user and sub-contractor) can make four kinds of agreements (project 
agreement between the concessioner and the contracting authority, finance 
agreement between the concessioner and the financer, user agreement between the 
concessioner and the users and subcontracting agreement between the concessioner 
                                                 
99
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section I. Operation of infrastructure, para89. 
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and the subcontractor), which form the legal framework of PFIPs. Furthermore, the 
concessioner is the core party of the PFIPs, since it makes agreements with other 
parties. The project agreement between the concessioner and the contracting 
authority is the core agreement of the PFIP’s legal framework, and restricts the other 
three agreements. Meanwhile, the other three agreements (finance agreement, user 
agreement, and subcontracting agreement) may impact each other as well. 
 
This chapter discussed each agreement in a PFIP. The Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions aim to grant the agreements enough freedom to regulate 
responsibilities and rights of the parties by the parties themselves. However, the 
project agreement cannot contravene mandatory laws in the host country. The other 
three agreements cannot contravene the project agreement, in addition to mandatory 
laws in the host country. Therefore, the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
suggest that countries which expect to establish legislation on PFIPs may need to 
review any unreasonable mandatory rules in their domestic laws.  
 
The law should not set up too many restrictions to the contents of project agreements. 
It should grant the concessioner and the contracting authority enough flexibility to 
negotiate an agreement that is satisfactory to both parties. However, there may be 
some mandatory rules in the domestic laws of the host country that significantly 
affect this negotiation. Here are the six issues discussed in this chapter, arising from 
mandatory rules in domestic law.  
 Organisation of the project company: The Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions suggest that the project agreement gives the contracting authority 
rights to monitor the modification of articles of association and any transfer 
of in the project company. 
 Real estate: The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions suggest that the 
project agreement identify the ownership of the project’s assets because the 
domestic law of the host country may forbid the private investor from 
owning the infrastructure (as does China). They suggest that the project 
agreement should ensure the contracting authority offers the land and 
easements required in the project, if there are mandatory rules on land 
ownership. 
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 Security interests: The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions suggest 
that the project agreement confirm those physical assets and intangible assets 
of the project company which may be used as security interests. In China, 
certain assets may not be used as security interests due to mandatory rules. 
 Performance guarantee: The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
suggest that the project agreement should request the project company to 
offer guarantees to ensure the performance of the project. 
 Protection of customers: The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
suggest that the project agreement ensures the project company provides 
proper service to customers.  
 Duration, extension and termination: The Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions suggest that the project agreement fixes the duration of the project 
with concessioner, and clarifies the exceptions which could extend or 
terminate the project.  
 
Regarding finance agreements, the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
suggest that domestic laws should not restrict the lender from looking for a new 
concessioner when the previous concessioner is proved incapable of completing the 
project. However, the appointment of the new concessioner needs the approval of 
the contracting authority. 
 
Regarding subcontracting agreements, the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions suggest that the domestic laws of the host country restrict possible 
conflicts of interest, such as a situation where the subcontractor is also one of the 
shareholders of the project company. However, the subcontracting agreement should 
be allowed if it obtains the approval of the contracting authority 
 
Regarding user agreements, the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions suggest 
the domestic laws of host country should protect the customers so that the customers 
may receive satisfactory service. 
 
These agreements form the legal framework of PFIPs and ensure the project’s 
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success. However, disputes may arise between the parties. The fair, proper and 
timeous resolution of these disputes would increase the confidence of participants in 
PFIPs. Host countries which offer proper dispute settlements would attract more 
private investors. Chapter 7 will discuss how to establish proper dispute settlement. 
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Chapter 7  
Dispute settlement 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 analysed the various agreements among the participant parties in PFIPs. 
However, it is inevitable that disputes concerning these agreements will arise. The 
resolutions of these disputes, if made fairly, properly and timeously, could enhance 
the confidence of the parties participating in PFIPs. A host country which can offer 
proper dispute settlement would attract more private investors. In other words, the 
investors, lenders, subcontractors and users would be encouraged to participate in 
projects, if they have confidence that any disputes arising from contracts forming 
part of the project will be resolved fairly and efficiently. The contracting authority 
could also execute its monitoring function more effectively and reduce its 
administrative costs through an efficient procedure of dispute settlement.
1
 As the 
recent, popular theory on the relationship between global justice and international 
economic law
2
 shows, an efficient dispute settlement system in international 
economic law can promote global justice as well.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss what dispute settlements of PFIPs could be used 
in China and how to remove undesirable restrictions to these settlements in Chinese 
law, according to the recommendations of the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions.  
 
There are three objectives in this chapter. The first objective is to present a method 
for solving disputes on project agreements between the contracting authority and the 
private concessioner (Project Company). The second objective is to present a 
method for solving disputes on sub-contracting agreements or finance agreements or 
other normal agreements, which may arise between equal parties (between the 
                                                 
1
 The legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section A General remarks, paras.1 
2
 Carmody Chios, Garcia Frank J., and Linarelli John, ‘Global justice and international economic 
law: opportunities and prospects’ (Cambridge, 2013), p287 
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Project Company and the financers, or between the Project Company and the sub-
contractors, or between the investors, or between the subcontractors and their 
suppliers). The third objective is to present a method for solving disputes on user 
agreement between the user and the private concessioner (Project Company). 
 
This Chapter consists of four sections.  
 
Based on the framework of agreements in PFIPs presented in the last chapter, the 
disputes that might arise in PFIPs may be divided into three types. (Figure 7.1: red 
parts) 
Figure 7.1 The disputes between the parties in PFIPs 
 
Section 7.1 addresses the disputes that might arise between the contracting authority 
and the private concessioner (Project Company), i.e. the disputes on project 
agreement. (Figure 7.1: red I) 
 
Before considering how to settle the disputes in light of the project agreement of 
PFIPs, the first step would be to consider the nature of the project agreement in 
PFIPs. Academics have argued intensely whether the project agreement should be 
defined as a “public” contract or as a “private” contract. In certain countries, the 
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“public” contract and the “private” contract are treated separately by public law and 
private law. The result of this argument is very important because it determines what 
settlements or relief may be offered to the disputants. This issue will be discussed in 
terms of the nature of project agreement in Section 7.1.1.  
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend a series of methods for 
preventing or settling disputes concerning project agreements in PFIPs, from 
conciliatory methods such as early warning, to antagonistic methods such as 
arbitration and judicial proceedings.
3
 In Chinese legal practice, the definition of the 
nature of the project agreement in PFIPs is vague, so the public authority often 
intervenes in this kind of agreement and a lot disputes are solved by administrative 
act or Administrative Law. However, if China expects to facilitate PFIPs and attract 
more foreign private investors, it is necessary to improve and reform its current laws. 
It is important to remove possible legal obstacles, so that the contracting authority 
and the project company are free to agree on non-judicial methods, including 
arbitration, for the settlement of disputes arising in connection with PFIPs. These 
issues will be discussed in Sections 7.1.2-7.1.5. 
 
Section 7.2 addresses disputes that might arise between equal parties, such as 
between the Project Company and the financers, or between the Project Company 
and the sub-contractors, or between the investors, or between the subcontractors and 
their suppliers, i.e. the disputes on common contracts. (Figure 7.1: red II) 
 
These kinds of contracts are common contracts between two commercial entities 
about which there is no argument on its nature as a “public” or “private”.  
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend that equal parties to 
commercial contracts within an infrastructure project should be free to agree on a 
method to settle the dispute, whether litigation or arbitration, and a forum which will 
                                                 
3
 The Model Provisions, chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 49; The legislative 
Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section B Disputes between the contracting 
authority and the concessionaire, paras.10-41 
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settle any dispute in a binding decision. Host countries wishing to facilitate PFIPs 
should review their laws so as to eliminate any uncertainty in this regard.
4
 Chinese 
laws on such commercial contracts will be analysed for obstacles to the freedom of 
the parties to agree to dispute settlement mechanisms, and suggestions will be made 
as to improvements on these laws. 
 
Section 7.3 addresses the disputes that might arise between the public user and the 
private concessioner (Project Company), i.e. the disputes on user agreement. (Figure 
7.1: red III) 
 
The user agreement is generally considered to be a common contract, but the user 
agreement in PFIPs often has direct consequences for the public users, in which the 
public interest is reflected. Since this kind of contract involves a public element, the 
methods to deal with the disputes concerning the user agreement are necessarily 
different from common contracts. 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend that host countries 
should establish special mechanisms for handling claims brought by their customers, 
apart from the settlement methods of litigation and arbitration. Certain host countries 
may allow regulatory agencies to make administrative interventions on occasion. 
Irrespective of the settlement method applied in the host country, it is important to 
remove possible legal obstacles and to provide a clear authorisation for those 
entities.
5
 Chinese laws concerning user agreements should be reviewed, and then 
improved or reformed if legal obstacles exist. 
 
Section 7.4 proposes a hypothesis. Through the discussion of the above three kinds 
of disputes, it may be concluded that arbitration can settle disputes in most 
circumstances, if the law allows the freedom of the parties to choose the method of 
                                                 
4
 The Model Provisions, chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 50; The legislative 
Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section C Disputes between project promoters and 
between the concessionaire and its lenders, contractors and suppliers, paras.42 
5
 The Model Provisions, chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 51; The legislative 
Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section D disputes involving customers or users of 
the infrastructure facility, paras.43-45 
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dispute settlement in the agreements of PFIPs. Therefore, it is worth noting that the 
parties in PFIPs would have to establish consistency across the arbitration provisions 
in the various contracts.
6
 While arbitration could establish a consistent procedure of 
dispute settlements, the differing goals and preferences of the parties of PFIPs make 
this theory unachievable. 
 
The three kinds of dispute settlement recommended by the Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions will be discussed in the following sections. These settlements will 
be connected with the current situation in China, to consider which methods would 
work and which methods would not. Combined with the methods summarised in 
Chinese PFIP practice, the analysis and discussion will integrate an appropriate 
model to solve the disputes in Chinese PFIPs. 
 
This chapter answers the sixth research question. With reference to the guidelines of 
the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions, and with supplementary references to 
other countries, how should the laws on dispute settlement in PFIPs be reformed in 
China? 
7.1 The disputes between the contracting authority and the private 
concessioner (Project Company) 
In PFIPs, disputes may arise between the contracting authority and the private 
concessioner (Project Company), i.e. the disputes on the project agreement. (Figure 
7.1: red I) 
 
This kind of dispute is different from the disputes outlined in Chapter 5, which 
addressed the fairness and transparency of the selection procedure used by the 
contracting authority (Section 5.3 argued that the post-selection stage should be fair 
and transparent). The disputes currently under review are those disputes which arise 
in the various phases of implementation of PFIPs after a concession has been 
awarded and where the selected bidder is already considered the concessioner. 
                                                 
6
 Hoffman Scott L., ‘the law and business of international project finance’(2008),Cambridge, P408 
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Disputes in connection with the project agreement are often special because they 
may involve problems that do not frequently arise in common contracts. One reason 
is that complex infrastructure projects involve a number of participant parties and a 
lot of technical problems. The other reason is that one of the parties is the 
contracting authority so these disputes may refer to governmental functions and 
public interests.
7
 Therefore, the methods for preventing and settling this kind of 
dispute may be different to the general dispute methods used in common contracts. 
7.1.1 The nature of the Project Agreement 
Scholars from different countries debate the nature of the project agreement in 
PFIPs.
8
 Most Chinese scholars consider it to be a contract with public and private 
characteristics, which should be managed by both public law and private law.
9
 
Vincent-Jones defines it as a new public contract in which powers and 
responsibilities are devolved to public agencies in various contracting arrangements, 
while preserving central government controls and powers of intervention. It is a 
distinctive mode of governance and appears to require a new legal system to 
regulate it.
10
 British legislation has given a broad definition to public contracts to 
include public services contracts, public supply contracts or public works 
contracts.
11
 To sum up, most scholars consider the project agreement of PFIPs to be 
neither a purely “private” contract nor a purely “public” contract. 
 
The nature of the project agreement in PFIPs is difficult to define because it involves 
characteristics of both “private” and “public” contracts. It could be considered to be 
a “private” contract because it requires an agreement between the parties to decide 
their rights and obligations, rather than insisting on absolute obedience by one 
                                                 
7
 The legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section B Disputes between the 
contracting authority and the concessionaire, paras.3 
8
 Public Contracts in Legal Globalization (PCLG) ， website: http://www.public-
contracts.net/inhalte/home.asp 
9
 Deng Xiaopeng, Shen Liyin, ‘Research on Attributes of PPP Contract from an Administrative Law 
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Issues of PPP Agreement’ (Legal Science, 2007.03) 
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side.
12
 However, it could also be considered to be a “public” contract because one 
party of the agreement is the public authority and the content of the agreement offers 
an infrastructure facility or service which the public requires. The most important to 
this distinction is that some of concessioner’s rights need a concession to be 
awarded by the public authority, for example, the concessioner’s authority to collect 
tariffs
13
.  
 
There has been no definitive decision in the discussion on the nature of the project 
agreement in PFIPs and the debate may continue for a long time. However, 
irrespective of the definition given, the legal reliefs and settlements applied to 
disputes on project agreements in PFIPs always mixes methods of private law and 
public law in practice. In China, the nature of the project agreement of PFIPs is not 
defined either, but it is doubtless that public powers inevitably intervene. Therefore, 
it would be better to review and improve current Chinese laws so that the public 
power could be used under reasonable limitation by law to avoid cases where the 
concessioner suffers loss because of an abuse of public power. 
 
The nature of the project agreement (whether a “public” contract or a “private” 
contract) determines the judicial relief or dispute settlement applied in connection 
with the project agreement in the host countries. The so-called “private” contract 
occurs between two equal parties who freely negotiate their rights and obligations to 
make a consistent agreement,
14
 which is often controlled by the private law
15
. 
According to the general principle of contract law,  the equal parties are free to make 
an agreement on the method of dispute settlement, with due consideration for the 
mandatory provisions of the host country.
16
 Traditional “public” contracts are quasi-
                                                 
12
 Deng Xiaopeng, Shen Liyin, ‘Research on Attributes of PPP Contract from an Administrative Law 
View’(Construction Economy, 2007. 01) 
13
 The legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and operation of infrastructure: legislative 
framework and project agreement, Section D Financial arrangement , paras.37 
14
 O’Sullivan & Hilliard, ‘The law of contract’(Oxford University Press, 2008), P2 
15
 Private law means the laws manage the interactions among individuals, organizations or states 
worked as civil subjects without the intervention of the state or government, such as Contract 
Law, Tort Law, Civil Law and so on.  
16
 The mandatory provisions would not invalid due to the agreement in the contract between two 
parties. For example, some prohibitions to protect the public interests could be agreed to 
execute in contract. O’Sullivan & Hilliard, ‘The law of contract’(Oxford University Press, 
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contracts made by the public government to administer and to develop public 
affairs
17
, and are often controlled by the public law.
18
 This means that the public 
authority may intervene in this kind of contract. The reason for the particular 
emphasis on public contracts here is that exclusively public contracts restrict the 
freedom of the two parties to arrange dispute settlement. 
7.1.2 Conciliatory dispute settlement 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend some conciliatory 
methods to settle disputes between the contracting authority and the concessioner on 
the project agreement in PFIPs, in addition to those antagonistic methods such as 
arbitration and judicial proceedings. The advantages of these conciliatory methods 
are that it could prevent disputes from arising in advance so as to preserve the 
business relationship between the parties and that conciliatory methods are flexible 
enough to allow for a choice of competent experts to assist in the settlement of 
disputes. However, the disadvantage of these conciliatory methods is that they are 
not as strong as antagonistic methods. The settlements are often launched and 
organised by the parties themselves so they are difficult to recognise and enforce, 
even if the final decision is made through a conciliatory dispute settlement. 
 
The project agreement could involve an early warning provision. Under this 
provision, if one of the parties feels that events that have occurred, or claims that the 
party intends to make actions, which have the potential to cause disputes, the party 
who finds these events or has claims should warn the other party as soon as 
possible.
19
 
 
A “partnering charter” could be set up alongside the project agreement to design a 
resolution procedure to determine claims and resolve other problems, beginning at 
                                                 
17
 Vincent-Jones Peter, ‘The new public contracting: regulation, responsiveness, relationality’ 
(Oxford university press, 2006), P11-18  
18
 Public law means the laws govern the relationship between the state and the general population, 
such as Administrative Law, Constitution, Criminal Law and so on. 
19
 The legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section B Disputes between the 
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the lowest possible level of management and at the earliest possible opportunity. 
This could be drafted and signed in workshops attended by the key parties in the 
project. The aim of this charter would be to create an environment of trust, focusing 
on teamwork and cooperation for all key parties involved in the project.
20
 
 
The parties of the project agreement could appoint a facilitator who would assist the 
parties in resolving any disputes. This facilitator does not give subjective opinions 
on the dispute, but rather facilitate the parties in analysing the merits of their cases.
21
 
 
The parties of project agreement could arrange conciliation and mediation before 
adopting antagonistic methods to dispute settlement. Conciliation and mediation 
require third-person assistance whereby a person or a panel assists the parties in an 
independent and impartial manner to reach a harmonic settlement of their dispute. 
This kind of dispute settlement is generally non-binding and does not enforce 
settlement. The conciliator’s responsibility is to facilitate settlement by directing the 
parties’ attention to the core issues and possible solutions, rather than by giving a 
judgment. If this conciliation and mediation ends unsuccessfully, it is not an obstacle 
to the parties choosing to apply litigation or arbitration.
22
 In EU procurement law, 
the European Commission can propose a conciliator drawn from a list of 
independent people, who then organises a panel to conciliate the dispute.
23
 The 
Legislative Guide also gives suggestions on how to use conciliation and mediation
24
, 
and it even gives a sample provision
25
 of a project agreement that agreed to use 
conciliation and mediation to settle a dispute.  
 
The parties of the project agreement could employ a neutral third party to give a 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. paras.12 
21
 Ibid. paras.13 
22
 Ibid. paras.14-16 
23
 Bovis Christopher, ‘EC public procurement: case law and regulation’(Oxford university press, 
2006), p597 
24
 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, 
Supplement No. 17 (A/35/17) 
25
 Accompanying UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, a model conciliation clause could be: “Where, in 
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non-binding expert estimate on the merits of the dispute and a suggested outcome. 
The neutral expert third party attends to the possible outcome of the more expensive 
and usually slower binding procedures such as arbitration or court proceedings, 
rather than the issue of the dispute.
26
 
 
The senior executives of the parties of the project agreement could stage a mini-trial 
with a “tribunal” composed of a senior executive of each party and a third neutral 
person. The purpose of this mock trial is to demonstrate how the senior executives 
of the parties understand the issues of the dispute and to predict what the outcome of 
a real trial might be.
27
 
 
The parties of project agreement could arrange for an estimate of an expected 
settlement to be made by senior executives from both parties.
28
 
 
The project agreement could appoint an independent expert to review disputes about 
technical aspects of the construction of the infrastructure facility, but the powers of 
the independent expert, and the circumstances under which the independent expert’s 
advice or decision may be sought by the parties, should be set forth in the project 
agreement.
29
 
 
The project agreement could establish a permanent board composed of experts 
appointed by both parties to assist in the settlement of disputes that may arise during 
the construction and the operational phases (hereafter referred to as “dispute review 
board“). The dispute review board may prevent misunderstandings between the 
parties from developing into formal disputes that would require settlement in arbitral 
or judicial proceedings. Generally, when potential conflicts are detected, the board 
would propose solutions. As the solutions are given by experts with standing and 
prestige, the parties are likely to accept them. Then, even if the arbitral or judicial 
                                                 
26
 The legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section B Disputes between the 
contracting authority and the concessionaire, paras.17 
27
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proceedings are used, the court or arbitral tribunal may regard the decision made by 
the dispute review board as a powerful recommendation made by independent 
experts familiar with the project from the outset and based on contemporaneous 
observation of the project prior to, and at the time of, the dispute having first 
arisen.
30
 
 
The parties of project agreement could arrange non-binding arbitration before 
commencing with judicial proceedings. Non-binding arbitration is conducted in a 
similar manner to binding arbitration and the same rules may be used, but the 
procedure ends with a recommendation rather than an enforceable decision. 
Therefore, if the dispute is still unresolved under non-binding arbitration, it is 
unnecessary to have a second arbitration and litigation may be pursued instead.
31
 
 
The use of conciliatory methods to settle disputes on the project agreements of 
PFIPs have not been forbidden in relevant Chinese laws. Therefore, these dispute 
settlements may be arranged freely between the contracting authority and 
concessioner. The methods of conciliation and mediation are especially popular in 
practice in Chinese PFIPs.
32
 However, there are two issues that arise: firstly, current 
Chinese laws need to be improved to protect the private concessioner from abuse by 
the public authority, for example accepting the recommendations of conciliation and 
mediation under pressure from the government. Secondly, these conciliatory 
methods should not be mandatory for project agreements. Although these 
conciliatory methods are helpful in resolving disputes, safeguards must be created so 
that they are not used as merely a delaying tactic before the result is appealed 
according to an antagonistic method such as litigation or arbitration. The time 
allowed for attempts to resolve disputes through these methods should be limited.
33
 
The Legislative Guide points out that the project agreement should avoid 
excessively complex procedures or to impose too many different procedures, which 
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in China’(Adult Higher Education Journal, 2010.02) 
33
 Hoffman Scott L., ‘the law and business of international project finance’(2008),Cambridge, P406 
- 215 - 
 
 
may also delay the settlement of disputes.
34
 
7.1.3 Litigation 
Judicial proceedings may be used to settle disputes about the project agreement 
between the contracting authority and the concessioner, unless the parties have 
agreed to exclude judicial proceedings excepting arbitration, and this agreement is 
not prohibited by the mandatory laws of the host country. 
 
Litigation is used to settle disputes about the project agreement with the following 
advantages. Unlike arbitration, whose essence is compromise, litigation bases 
decisions on fact and law. Even after arbitratio, judicial proceeding may still be used 
to compel arbitration or enforce an arbitration award. Judicial proceedings 
developed over time are more mature, and provide more readily available measures 
such as interim relief.
35
 Generally, the contracting authority, lenders and insurers 
prefer litigation. The contracting authority prefers litigation because the contracting 
authority is familiar with the local judicial proceedings and language, and the local 
court is more likely to protect public policy and public interest.
36
 Lenders and 
insurers prefer litigation because judicial proceedings offer them strict and legally 
enforceable claim to the loan and collateral documents.
37
 
 
On the other hand, litigation is sometimes excluded from dispute settlements on 
project agreements for the following disadvantages: The judicial proceeding often 
takes more time; the court may lack experience in the highly technical and complex 
issues involved in infrastructure projects; the local court may have unjust intentions 
with regard to the contracting authority.
38
 Generally, the concessioner, project 
investors and subcontractors dislike litigation. The private investors, especially 
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foreign investors, may be unwilling to engage in judicial proceedings, especially 
when the rules are unfamiliar.
39
 In China, where judicial corruption is considered an 
issue, most foreign private investors are very reluctant to litigate. 
7.1.3.1 Jurisdiction 
Although the project company established by the concessioner may be registered in 
a foreign country, and the members of the consortia comprising the concessioner 
may be foreign investors, the court of the host country retains territorial jurisdiction 
on the disputes relating to the project agreement between the contracting authority 
and the concessioner in PFIPs. There are four reasons for this territorial jurisdiction: 
firstly, the infrastructure is generally considered to be immovable property. 
According to the general rule of private international law, the title claims to 
immovable property are governed by the lex situs, i.e. the law of immovable 
property where the immovable property is situated governs disputes.
40
 Secondly, 
there is a sufficient connection between the substance of the claim and the court of 
the host country.
41
 The claim relates to a dispute about a PFIP project agreement for 
an infrastructure project mainly to be performed in the host country, and in which 
both of the parties may be domiciled in the host country. Therefore, the host country 
has the closest connection with the claim. Thirdly, the court of the host country is the 
most convenient forum in which the case can most suitably be tried in the interests 
of the parties and the ends of justice.
42
 Fourthly, the decision made by the court of 
the host country is most easily recognised and enforced. The project assets are under 
the control of the country where it is located, and the law of that country may refuse 
to recognise a foreign judgment relating to these assets.
43
 The principal account of 
the project is generally located in a bank of the host country, from which it is easy to 
adopt interim relief proceeding and enforcement after the proceedings. In light of the 
above four reasons, the court of the host country should have territorial jurisdiction, 
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although there may be courts in other countries that have jurisdiction because of 
particular factors. 
7.1.3.2 Choice of laws 
Although the court of the host country has territorial jurisdiction, the law applied to 
the dispute may be controversial. If the dispute about the project contract is 
considered to be an administrative dispute (See Section 7.1.1 on the nature of the 
project agreement), it should exclusively apply Administrative Law protocols, rather 
than the choice of law agreed upon by the parties. With regards to public contracts, 
the public interests are prioritised over the arrangement of private interests. On the 
other hand, if the dispute is considered to be a general dispute between two equal 
parties (See Section 7.1.1 on the nature of the project agreement), the contracting 
authority and the concessioner
44
 are permitted to agree to an appropriate law to be 
applied to their dispute.
45
 If the law applied to this dispute is not chosen expressly by 
the parties, the governing law should be the law of the country with which the 
contract is most closely connected.
46
 In PFIPs, the law which is the most possible to 
govern the project agreement is the law of the host country to which the project is 
undoubtedly regarded as most closely connected. Firstly, the infrastructure, as an 
immovable property, is situated in the host country. Secondly, the performance of the 
project, which is at the heart of the contract, is implemented in the host country.
47
 It 
is also worth noticing that an agreement about the choice of law may be invalid, if 
the agreement is in conflict with the public interest or the mandatory rules of the 
host country.
48
 As a matter of fact, the Legislative Guide gives tacit consent to 
applying the law of the host country.
49
 This avoids trouble because it keeps the laws 
regulating the nature of the project agreement and its application consistent. 
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7.1.3.3 Application to China 
China has also adopted the international principles on jurisdiction discussed above. 
Therefore, when PFIPs are implemented in China, Chinese courts have territorial 
jurisdiction on disputes relating to the project agreement. With regard to the choice 
of law, when the dispute refers to an administrative award, litigation is 
administrative and should exclusively apply Chinese administration law. If disputes 
about the project contract only refer to general business matters, in which it could be 
considered to be a private contract, it has to apply Chinese Contract Law as well 
because the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China involves mandatory 
rules to the effect that the law of the People’s Republic of China must be applied to 
the project agreement,
50
 even though Chinese laws allow parties to choose the law 
under agreement.
51
 To sum up, under the current Chinese laws, if disputes about the 
project agreement of PFIPs in China are to be settled through litigation, they may be 
sued in Chinese courts to which only Chinese laws may be applied. 
7.1.4 Arbitration 
The countries which wish to facilitate PFIPs and attract foreign investment should 
review their current laws and remove possible legal obstacles to provide clear 
authorisation for the domestic contracting authority and the concessioner to agree on 
arbitration to settle disputes. Arbitration is different from litigation. It requires the 
parties themselves to set up the machinery to handle a dispute, or series of disputes, 
involving forums and laws.
52
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Arbitration has the following advantages, when it is selected to settle disputes about 
the project agreement: the arbitration forum offers more neutrality, which could 
result in a more transparent and unbiased decision. The concessioner may be 
reluctant to resolve disputes in the host country where the government is likely to 
meddle or otherwise interfere in court proceedings. The parties can choose 
arbitrators who have expert knowledge in the particular type of project to ensure a 
quick and efficient resolution.
53
 Arbitral proceedings are flexible and informal, 
which may be less disruptive of business relations between the parties than judicial 
proceedings. The proceedings and arbitral awards can be kept confidential, while 
judicial proceedings and decisions are required to be open to public scrutiny.
54
The 
concessioner, in particular the foreign concessioner, generally prefers arbitration 
because of the neutral decision-making of the arbitration forum, its speed and 
efficiency.
55
 
 
Arbitration does also have some disadvantages when it comes to settling disputes 
about the project agreement. Arbitration has a limited or complete lack of discovery 
proceedings, such as the presentation of evidence. Arbitration may not be able to 
provide any meaningful interim relief to allow the project to stay in construction or 
operation while the dispute is resolved.
56
 The legal doctrine of Pacta Sunt 
Servanda
57
 is difficult to apply to the project agreement of a PFIP by an arbitrator 
because of considerations of the public interest. The arbitrator may also be tempted 
to allow the host government to change the project agreement, even if it will affect 
the rights of the concessioner.
58
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7.1.4.1 Choice of forum 
The parties of a project agreement in a PFIP could make an agreement to choose to 
resolve their disputes in an arbitration forum. It is different from the litigation 
proceedings where the court of the host country has territorial jurisdiction based on 
certain principles. The jurisdiction of the arbitration forum is only authorised by the 
agreement of the contract parties. Therefore, arbitration only has the jurisdiction to 
solve the dispute when the parties consent to the arbitration forum before the 
disputes or after. In light of disputes about the project agreement in PFIPs, it is 
essential to consider some issues when choosing an arbitration forum:  
 
Firstly, it is uncertain whether these commercial arbitration centres and institutions 
may rule on disputes about project agreements, since they are difficult to define as 
public or private. This uncertainty also impacts on sovereign immunity. If the type of 
dispute is regarded to be a commercial dispute between equal parties, most national 
and international arbitration centres could arbitrate the disputes. If this type of 
dispute is regarded to be an administrative dispute, these disputes would be not in 
the regulatory scope of commercial arbitration. Even if arbitration has already been 
agreed upon between the parties to the project agreement, it may be frustrated or 
hindered if the contracting authority is able to plead sovereign immunity, either as a 
bar to the commencement of arbitral proceedings or as a defence against the 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitration award.
59
 
 
A second issue relates to which arbitration forum should be chosen, between an ad 
hoc model
60
 and an institutional model. While some arbitration forums take place in 
international or national institutions, the parties of the contract could also choose 
arbitrators who would organise their own temporary arbitration forum. However, 
temporary arbitration forums convened on an ad hoc basis have many disadvantages: 
the complexity of PFIPs combined with the number of parties and interests may 
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make it difficult to approach a comfortable decision for all concerned. Also, the 
decision made by the temporary arbitration forum is not easily recognised or 
enforced after the process is completed.
61
 
 
Moreover, when the parties to a PFIP project agreement choose an arbitration forum, 
the selection must consider whether the government will be likely to meddle in that 
forum, and whether the concessioner will be confident that an unbiased, transparent 
decision may be reached in that place.
62
 Therefore, it is better for the arbitration 
forum to take place outside the host country, to ensure that the decision is not biased 
because of governmental pressure. China has its own arbitral tribunal—CIETAC, 
which has been developing and extending its influence in the world, but the parties, 
may choose another forum outside of China. The parties may sense the possibility of 
unfairness in the arbitration procedure when the powerful Chinese government is 
one party to the dispute. 
 
It is worth noting a well-known arbitration forum—the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID). This arbitration forum is fit specifically 
to solve disputes about project agreements in PFIPs. The ICSID, which was 
established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (hereafter referred to as “Washington 
Convention”) provides facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of disputes 
between member countries and investors who qualify as nationals of other member 
countries. The parties to the dispute must voluntarily consent in writing to submit to 
decisions of the centre. Investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries 
include natural persons and juridical persons. Consent by an agency of a State 
requires the approval of that State unless the State notifies the Centre that no such 
approval is required. Once the parties have given their consent to arbitration under 
the ICSID Convention, neither may withdraw its consent unilaterally. All ICSID 
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members are required to recognise and enforce ICSID arbitral awards.
63
 The 
Legislative Guide also suggests that disputes about project agreements in PFIPs are 
suitable for submission to the ICSID, which solves disputes on genera; investment 
issues between states and foreign investors.
64
 
7.1.4.2 Choice of laws 
In addition to their choice of arbitration forum, the parties of the project agreement 
may also freely choose the laws to be applied by the arbitration forum to solve their 
disputes. However, the law applied to the arbitration agreement may be different 
from the law applied to the substantive disputes between the parties. Therefore, laws 
applied to the arbitration include three aspects:  
 
Firstly, laws decide the validity of the arbitration agreement made between the 
contracting authority and the concessioner.  
 
 (1) The parties’ capability to make an arbitration agreement affects the validity of 
the arbitration agreement. The law about the capability of the parties to make 
arbitration agreement may not be chosen generally. The capability of the host 
country to make an arbitration agreement is authorised by the law of the host country, 
while the legal status of the concessioner to make an arbitration agreement is 
generally authorised by the law of the country where it is registered. On the one 
hand, if the host country wishes to solve disputes about the project agreement 
through arbitration, its domestic laws should remove legal obstacles to this and 
clearly authorise the contracting authority to do so, to prevent the contracting 
authority from rejecting arbitration agreements based on limited capacity. On the 
other hand, the project company may reject the arbitration agreement, based on a 
lack of legal status such as its failure in legal register. However, in practice, in order 
to stabilise the investment relationship, the arbitration agreement should be treated 
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as valid, if the capacity of the parties may be authorised by the law under which the 
parties choose to solve the substantive dispute, or the law of the seat of the arbitral 
forum or the convention compiled by the international arbitral institution, when 
there is no choice is made by the parties.
65
 
 
(2) Whether the disputes on the project agreement of PFIPs are allowed to submit to 
arbitration affects the validity of the arbitration. The parties may consent to laws 
about the validity of the arbitration subject, which are generally the same as laws 
that are chosen to apply the substantive project agreement. Only when disputes 
about the project agreement of PFIPs are allowed to be settled through arbitration in 
light of the law chosen by the parties, is the arbitration agreement valid. If the law 
chosen by the parties regards disputes about the project agreement to be 
administrative, the arbitration agreement may be invalid since these disputes may 
not be arbitrated. If the parties fail to make a choice, the decision could be made in 
light of the convention with which the international arbitral institution complies or 
the law of the place where the arbitral forum is located. However, the arbitration 
agreement still may be invalid if there are mandatory rules in the convention with 
which the international arbitral institution complies, or in the law of the place where 
the arbitral forum is located, or in the law of the place where the arbitration award 
will be enforced (i.e. these mandatory rules regard the disputes on the project 
agreement of PFIPs to be administrative disputes which may not be arbitrated), even 
if the law chosen by the parties considers disputes possible to arbitrate.
66
 
 
Secondly, laws regulate the procedure of the arbitration, i.e. the procedural law 
which governs the arbitration proceedings (such as the proceedings of the arbitration 
forum in accepting arbitration applications and in granting an award). The parties 
may consent to the law used in the arbitration proceedings. If the parties fail to make 
a choice, the arbitration forum generally applies the convention with which the 
international arbitral institution complies or the law of the seat of the arbitral forum. 
However, the procedural law chosen by the parties may not be applied if there are 
mandatory rules in the convention with which the international arbitral institution 
                                                 
65
 Clarkson C. M. V. and others, ‘The conflict of laws’ (3rd ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2006), P252 
66
 Ibid, P257 
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complies, or in the law of the place where the arbitral forum is located. For example, 
the arbitration forum may require that the arbitration submitted to this forum must 
apply its own procedure rules or the procedure law of the seat of the arbitration 
forum.
67
 
 
Thirdly, the law should apply to the disputes about the project agreement, i.e. a 
substantive law to solve the disputes. The parties may consent to the law to be 
applied to the substance of the disputes. The doctrine of renvoi
68
 is generally 
excluded.
69
 If the parties fail to make a choice, the arbitration forum generally 
applies the law determined by rules governing a conflict of laws. Arbitrators first 
decide which law rule is applicable (for example the principle with the closest 
connection to the dispute), and then apply the rule to identify the substantive law of 
that country. This means arbitrators have a lot of discretionary power over which 
law to use to solve the dispute, when there is an absence of consensus between the 
parties.
70
 However, when arbitrators consider which rule is applicable to the 
particular conflict of law, they also have to consider the substantive law identified by 
the rules to assess whether it includes provisions that conflict with the mandatory 
rules of the seat of the arbitration forum, the place of enforcement, and international 
laws (for example the substantive laws applied may include provisions against 
public policy in other relevant places). 
7.1.4.3 ICSID 
It is important to note how laws are applied if a request for arbitration is submitted 
to the ICSID. Laws are much more conveniently applied if the request for arbitration 
is submitted to the ICSID.  
 
                                                 
67
 Ibid, P252-254 
68
 It means, in the conflict of law, a reference to a foreign law involves applying that country’s 
conflicts rules as opposed to its domestic laws.  
69
 Hoffman Scott L., ‘the law and business of international project finance’(Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), P408 
70
 Clarkson C. M. V. and others, ‘The conflict of laws’ (3rd ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2006), P256 
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Since the Washington Convention
71
 confirms both the capability of the parties to 
apply the arbitration and the arbitration subject, arguments about the validity of the 
arbitration agreement are rare. The capacity of the contracting authority to make an 
arbitration agreement is confirmed by all host countries who are signatories to the 
ICSID. Member states can notify the ICSID of the class or classes of disputes which 
it would consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre.
72
 It also has precedents 
to confirm whether the action is on behalf of the state or the commercial entities 
themselves. In the case of Consortium L.E.S.I. v. Algeria, ANB was a representing 
the Algeria government, so its behaviour was treated as the behaviour of the state.
 73
 
In the case of Joy v. Egypt, Egypt’s actions in this case followed the protocols of 
business behaviour, so ICSID had no jurisdiction.
74
 
 
The capabilities of the project company are also confirmed in the Washington 
Convention.
75
 In the case of Société v. Senegal, a company registered in the host 
country was treated as a foreign private investor because its primary shareholders 
were foreign private investors.
76
 
 
The jurisdiction of ICSID, as defined by the Washington Convention, includes 
disputes about the project agreement on the investments made by the contracting 
authority and the project company.
77
 Investment dispute is defined in the case of 
Salini v. Morocco, which gives five criteria to confirm whether a dispute is 
controlled by ICSID, although in practice these criteria are quite flexible.
78
 
Arbitration proceedings are therefore already offered by the Washington 
Convention.
79
 Variation in these proceedings is possible through the parties’ 
                                                 
71
 The Washington Convention 1965 relates to settlement of investment disputes between nation 
states and citizens of other countries. The Convention created the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (or ICSID). 
72
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(hereafter refer to “1965 Washington Convention”), Article 25(4) 
73
 Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/8) 
74
 Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11) 
75
 1965 Washington Convention, Article 25(2) 
76
 Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Senegal (ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1) 
77
 1965 Washington Convention, Article 25(1) 
78
 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4) 
79
 1965 Washington Convention, Chapter IV, Section 3 
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agreement, excepting when the mandatory rules disallow it.
 80
   
 
The ICSID decide on disputes in light of the law chosen by the parties. If the parties 
fail to make a choice, the ICSID clearly states that the law of the host country should 
be applied, although international law may also be applicable.
81
 
7.1.4.4 Recognition and enforcement 
Irrespective of the arbitration forum or the decision, a dispute settlement may only 
be considered a success if the award is recognised and enforced. 
 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(hereafter refer to “New York Convention”), which has 148 contracting countries82, 
deals recognising and enforcing foreign arbitral awards, and the grounds on which a 
court may refuse to recognise or enforce the award. Irrespective of the arbitral forum 
that makes the arbitral award, whether a national, international or provisional 
arbitral forum, if the country required to recognise and to enforce the award is a 
contracting member of the convention, to some extent there is some assurance of a 
binding commitment and of the reliability of the arbitration. However, the 
contracting members of the convention are also allowed to have reservation clauses 
to refuse the recognition and enforcement of certain foreign arbitral awards.
83
 
 
Arbitral award made by the ICSID should be recognised and enforced by the 
contracting states of the 1965 Washington Convention.
84
 Enforcement of the award 
shall be governed by laws concerning the enforcement of judgments in the state in 
whose territories such enforcement is sought.
85
 
 
                                                 
80
 1965 Washington Convention, Article 37-40&56; Christoph H.Schreuer, ‘The ICSID convention: a 
commentary’(Cambridge University Press, 2005), P672 
81
 1965 Washington Convention, Article 42(1) 
82
 1958 New York Arbitration Convention, website: http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ 
83
 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereafter refer 
to “New York Convention”), Article 1(3) 
84
 1965 Washington Convention, Article54(1) 
85
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Additionally, if there are other bilateral treaties or multilateral treaties concerning 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral award made by the country where the 
enforcement is claimed, the country also needs to follow those treaties. 
7.1.4.5 Application to China 
In China, there have been no disputes about the project agreement in a PFIP settled 
by arbitration thus far.
86
 However, there is intense controversy as to whether 
disputes about the project agreement are to be considered administrative disputes or 
not. If it is considered to be an administrative dispute, it may not be arbitrated by the 
Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China. 87  Even if this dispute is 
arbitrated in a foreign arbitral forum, it would not be recognised or enforced in 
China because the arbitration would contravene the mandatory rules of China. 
However, if China wants to facilitate and develop PFIPs, it should reform and 
improve its current laws to allow arbitration to settle disputes about project 
agreements in PFIPs. In light of the experience of other countries, arbitration would 
be of benefit to the Chinese situation. 
 
The primary work of Chinese legislators is now to ensure that disputes about the 
project agreements in PFIPs, or parts thereof, may be settled through arbitration, i.e. 
these disputes are no longer regarded to be administrative disputes. The Legislative 
Guide suggests that the legislator should clarify the areas where contracting 
authorities may or may not plead sovereign immunity.
88
  
 
The secondary work of Chinese legislators is to remove unnecessary mandatory 
rules from the relevant Chinese laws, in case they trouble the jurisdiction of the 
national or international forums, and the choice of laws applied to arbitration. 
                                                 
86
 Huang Teng and others, ‘the comparison analysis on the government management of PPP’, Project 
Management Technology (2009.01), P9 
87
 the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China(1994),  
    Article 3 The following disputes shall not be submitted to arbitration: 
    (1) ……; and 
    (2) administrative disputes falling within the jurisdiction of the relevant administrative organs 
according to law. 
88
 The legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section B Disputes between the 
contracting authority and the concessionaire, paras.33 
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Finally, China should clarify its reservation clauses in international conventions. 
China is the member of the New York Convention but it has two reservation clauses: 
in the first, China only recognises and enforces foreign arbitral awards made in the 
territory of another contracting state; in the second, China only applies the 
convention to legal relationships considered to be commercial under Chinese laws. 
If the disputes are regarded as commercial under Chinese law, the foreign arbitral 
awards would be recognised and enforced in China.
89
 However, the Chinese 
Supreme Court issued a notice stressing that the definition of a commercial legal 
relationship does not include investment relationships between foreign private 
investors and the host state.
90
 Therefore, it is means the arbitration awards on project 
agreements in PFIPs would not be recognised or enforced in China. 
 
The Chinese reservation clause to the 1965 Washington Convention is similarly 
important. Although China joined the 1965 Washington Convention and accepts 
arbitral awards made by the ICSID, it retains a reservation clause by which it only 
considers submitting ‘disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation and 
nationalisation’.91 Therefore, not all disputes about the project agreements in PFIPs 
could be submitted to the ICSID. As a result of this reservation, China has only 
participated in ICSID arbitration twice so far.
92
 If China expects to use arbitration as 
a dispute settlement, it should consider amending this reservation to the 1965 
Washington Convention. 
 
There is still a long way to go before disputes about the project agreements of 
Chinese PFIPs may be settled through arbitration. However, if China is intent on 
developing PFIPs, Chinese legislators should start to review and reform Chinese 
                                                 
89
 Tao Jingzhou, ‘Arbitration law and practice in China’(2nd ed, Kluwer Law International BV, 
2008), P188 
90
 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Implementing the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China(No. 5 [1987] of the Supreme 
People's Court, April 10, 1987), Article 2 
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 Yang Shu-dong, ‘Investment Arbitration and China: Investor or Host State?’, Op. J., Vol.2/2011, 
Paper n. 6, pp. 1 - 19, <http://lider-lab.sssup.it/opinio> accessed on 9
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 March, 2013 
92
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laws.  
7.2 The disputes may arise between the equal parties 
In PFIPs, disputes may arise between the concessioner (Project Company) and other 
parties as equal subjects of law or among equal parties, i.e. the disputes about 
general agreements (Figure 7.1: red II). These disputes include disputes between the 
project financers, or disputes between the concessioner (Project Company) and its 
shareholders, lenders, subcontractors, suppliers and other business partners. 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend that the parties to this 
type of dispute shall be free to choose the appropriate mechanisms for settling the 
dispute.
93
 Therefore, all the dispute settlement methods discussed in Sections 7.1.2-
7.1.4 could be applied, on the basis of a free agreement between the parties, and 
without doubts as to the nature of the agreement. However, due to the different 
preferences of the participants in PFIPs (lenders may prefer litigation while the 
subcontractors may prefer arbitration) the dispute settlement may be a compromise 
through negotiation. The law should give the maximum freedom to parties to choose 
a method of dispute settlement congenial to all parties. 
 
Third parties are regulated differently in different countries. In the US, agreements 
on dispute settlements may apply to the project participant who is not party to the 
contract in dispute. Some parties in PFIPs may benefit from the contracts, even 
though they are not one of the direct contractual parties. For example, the project 
company is not a party to a subcontract between its construction contractor and the 
contractor’s supplier, but the project company benefits from the performance of the 
subcontract as it helps to accomplish the whole project. In this case, if the project 
company wants to sue the supplier for a failed performance that results in the delay 
of the whole project, the project company could act as a third-party beneficiary of 
the subcontract. It would still have to adhere to the arbitration provisions in the 
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 The Model Provisions, chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 51; The legislative 
Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section C Disputes between project promoters and 
between the concessionaire and its lenders, contractors and suppliers, paras.42;  
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subcontract made by the construction contractor and the supplier.
94
 In the UK, the 
third party could be treated as a party to the arbitration agreement as regards 
disputes between itself and the promisor, relating to the enforcement of a substantive 
term by the third party.
95
 In China, there are no provisions relating to the effect of an 
arbitration agreement on a third party.  
 
In Chinese PFIPs, these disputes are settled as disputes in general agreement in 
which the dispute settlement is freely agreed upon by the parties. It follows a similar 
pattern to the requirements set out in the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions. 
7.3 Disputes between the user and the private concessioner (Project 
Company) 
In PFIPs, disputes may arise between the user and the private concessioner (Project 
Company), i.e. the disputes about the user agreement. (Figure 7.1 : red III) 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend that simplified and 
efficient mechanisms should be established for handling claims submitted by the 
individual persons acting in their non-commercial capacity. These mechanisms 
could be either a special facility or department set up within the project company for 
receiving and handling claims expeditiously, or a regulatory agency set up by the 
public authority. 
96
 
 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend that, for the entities or 
enterprises, disputes could be settled by the usual methods used in general contracts, 
including litigation and arbitration. However, it is important to note whether the user 
agreement is regarded as a “public” contract, which would make the disputes 
administrative disputes, since the buyer is a state-owned enterprises or the public 
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 Hoffman Scott L., ‘the law and business of international project finance’(2008),Cambridge, P412 
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 UK Contract and Third Party Act 1999, Section 8 
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 The Model Provisions, chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 50; The legislative 
Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section D Disputes involving customers or users of 
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authority. If the host country expects to settle this type of dispute by free agreement, 
the law of the host country should clarify that this user agreement is a general 
agreement.
97
 
 
In Chinese PFIPs, claims from individual persons that lead to the use of dispute 
settlement mechanisms involve either a department set up within the project 
company or a public regulatory agency. The customers may also opt to go to court. 
For the entities or enterprises, the dispute is considered to be a normal dispute 
between equal parties and is settled by the method agreed upon by the parties, 
regardless it is the public authority, a state-owned enterprise or a normal enterprise.  
7.4 Hypothesis 
The following is an idealised hypothesis that all disputes arising in PFIPs could be 
settled by one method.
98
 According to the dispute settlement of arbitration, all the 
disputes in the same PFIP could submit to the same arbitration forum and apply the 
same laws. 
 
The advantages would be consistent results, efficient resolution without project 
delays, less expense and so on. However, this hypothesis is impossible, since the 
differing goals and preferences of the parties involved in PFIPs cannot make a single 
settlement procedure achievable.  
Conclusion 
This chapter responds to the 6
th
 research question, namely how Chinese dispute 
settlements in PFIPs may be improved, based on the guidelines from the Legislative 
Guide and Model Provisions, and with supplementary reference to other countries. 
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The principle of dispute settlement in PFIPs is to solve the dispute in an efficient 
and fair way. The resolution proceedings should be quick and professional, ensure 
fair and transparent treatment, and protect the project’s continuance during the 
resolution process.  
 
The disputes in PFIPs may be divided into three types, in light of the different 
agreements: 
 
The first involves disputes between the contracting authority and the concessioner. 
The Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend two types of dispute 
settlement: one uses conciliatory methods such as conciliation and mediation; the 
other uses antagonistic method, i.e. litigation and arbitration.
99
 The conciliatory 
settlements to dispute may be optional according to the law of the host country. 
Considering that one of the parties of any project agreement is the public authority 
and the subject of the agreement refers to an infrastructure with close connection to 
the public interest, the nature of the project agreement (whether public contract or 
private contract) may be identified differently in different countries. If the project 
agreement is identified as a public contract, disputes about the project agreement 
would be administrative disputes that the host country has exclusive jurisdiction 
over and the only law that might be applied is its administrative law. Arbitration may 
not be used. If the project agreement is identified as a private contract, the dispute 
would be a dispute of general commercial contract, which means that the dispute 
settlement could be decided upon by agreement of the parties as long as it obeyed 
certain mandatory rules in the host country. In Chinese PFIPs, the nature of the 
project agreement is vague. Therefore, in practice, no arbitration has been applied to 
disputes about project agreements thus far, and most of these disputes have been 
solved by mediation or litigation in China. To sum up, if China is intent on 
facilitating PFIPs and gaining the confidence of foreign investors, Chinese law 
should clarify the nature of project agreements and remove improper restrictions to 
related settlements of disputes. Private investors often prefer settle disputes through 
methods such as arbitration since this would be less affected by the host government.  
                                                 
99
 The Model Provisions, chap. V on Settlement of disputes, Model provision 49; The legislative 
Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of disputes, Section B General provisions of the project 
agreement 
- 233 - 
 
 
 
The second type of dispute occurs between the concessioner and other parties as 
equal subjects of law or among equal parties. The Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions recommend that this type of dispute shall be solved by the settlement 
method agreed by the parties.
100
 In Chinese PFIPs, the way to solve this type of 
dispute is consistent with the recommendations of the Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions. 
 
The third type of dispute occurs between the concessioner and the users. The 
Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions recommend that simple and efficient 
mechanisms should be offered to individual persons, while the general dispute 
settlement to normal commercial contracts should be offered to entities, excepting 
when the entity is the public authority or a state-owned enterprise when the contract 
may be considered to be an administrative contract.
101
 In Chinese PFIPs, all user 
agreements are considered to be normal purchase agreements no matter the nature of 
the entity. 
 
Although it would be ideal if all the disputes could be solved according to the same 
settlement procedure to prevent a conflict in the decisions, this would be impossible 
in practice. 
 
The previous seven chapters (include this one—Chapter 7) have analysed and 
discussed all the aspect issues of PFIPs, the next Chapter which is the last chapter—
Chapter 8 will summarise all these discussions and present the conclusions of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis has great significance for both the study and the practice of infrastructure 
development in China. Its subject matter will continue to be of relevance for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
The Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects made by 
UNCITRAL
1
 was published in 2000 and the Model Legislative Provisions on 
Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects was published in 2003. They were 
published over ten years ago. However, when compared with other well-known 
model laws
2
 made by UNCITRAL, it seems that the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions have not been paid enough attention, since they have rarely appeared in 
the domestic laws of countries and have not been the subject of extensive academic 
discussion. However, with increased development in developing and developed 
countries, there has been an increase in attention on financial models channelling 
private investment into public infrastructure, and the relevant legislation to facilitate 
them. It is no doubt that the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL will become more and more important as an international standard for 
national legislations on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects. 
 
The more exact word “PFIPs” replaces the old word “BOT”. According to the 
suggestion of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions, this would unify the 
term used for infrastructure projects financed by private investors. In the past 
decades, private investors financed public infrastructure through various models 
                                                 
1
 It stands for United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. It is the core legal body of the 
United Nations system in the field of international trade law. In order to increase these 
opportunities worldwide, it is formulating modern, fair, and harmonized rules on commercial 
transactions. 
2
 Such as UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010); Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration(2006); Model Law on Public Procurement(2011); United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980) 
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such as BOT, BOO, PFIP, M&Q, etc. The name PFIPs could invoke all these models. 
An exact and unified name could avoid misunderstanding and facilitate international 
harmonisation. 
 
According to the current data, Chinese plans for developing infrastructure in China 
are forecasted to 2030.
3
 UK plans for developing its infrastructure in the UK are also 
forecasted to 2030
4
. However, according to their fiscal data, neither China as a 
developing country nor the UK as a developed country could accomplish these plans 
if they only rely on their national finance. The Chinese Ministry of Finance has 
received many reports from various provinces to claim the national deficit to 
develop infrastructure.
5
 
6
 Meanwhile, the report of the UK HM Treasury has claimed 
that: 
“Estimates suggest that demand for infrastructure investment 
could remain high until 2030, and possibly beyond. The 
majority of investment in economic infrastructure in the UK 
is already provided by the Private Sector and this additional 
investment will also need to be met primarily from Private 
Sector sources.”7 8 
PFIPs would provide a remedy to this fiscal gap, given their success in various 
countries. PFIPs have also been used in China, with varying degrees of success and 
failure.   
                                                 
3
 Notice of the State Council on the long-term planning of major national scientific and technological 
infrastructure construction (2012-2030); Ministry of Transport of PRC, ‘National Expressway 
Network Plan’ (Jan,2005);State Council Standing Committee, ‘long-term railway network plan 
(to 2020)’(Jan, 2004) 
4
 HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, ‘National Infrastructure Plan: update 2012’(December,2012), 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/national_infrastructure_plan_051212.pdf>accessed on 20
th
 
March,2013 
5
 Ministry of Finance of People’s Republic of China, <http://www.mof.gov.cn/>accessed on 20th 
March,2013 
6
 There are some doubt voices that China should be rich enough to fund its infrastructure developing 
because it spent much money to buy a large number of US government bonds. However, as a 
matter of fact, Chinese government buying the plenty of US government bonds is not conflict 
with the Chinese deficit to develop infrastructure but it has no better choice. See the detail 
explanation in 1.2.1 in Chapter 1. 
7
 HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, ‘Strategy for national infrastructure’(March, 2010), P9 
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digit
alasset/dg_186451.pdf>accessed on 20
th
 March,2013 
8
 Though there are doubt voice that the PFIPs in the UK is to make the profits private and the risk 
public, this result is not caused by the model of PFIPs itself but the shortcoming of relevant 
laws and policies. 
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The significance of this thesis is that it establishes the defects of the current Chinese 
laws on PFIPs, and suggests ways of improving and reforming Chinese laws to 
achieve international standards in order to facilitate the development of PFIPs in 
China, since PFIPs need fair, efficient and transparent laws. As PFIPs provide a 
possible way to remedy fiscal insufficiencies in the development of infrastructure, 
the topic of improving and reforming laws on PFIPs will undoubtedly be popular in 
the next decades in both Chinese academia and legislative practice.   
 
The thesis suggests that the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions made by 
UNCITRAL can be used to guide the improvement and reform of Chinese laws on 
PFIPs, attracting more foreign private investors and facilitating the development of 
PFIPs. The law of other countries are used as model where the content of the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions are not appropriate for the specific situation 
of China. There are six primary research questions answered in this thesis: 
8.1 The answer for the first research question  
Do Chinese laws on PFIPs need to be reformed to facilitate the development of 
PFIPs?  
 
This question was addressed in Chapter 2, which concludes that Chinese laws on 
PFIPs must be reformed, otherwise they would remain an obstacle to the 
development of PFIPs in China.    
 
Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 gives evidence of how the PFIP model has already been 
applied in the construction of Chinese infrastructure and how it would be used more 
and more in the next few decades. It details five exemplary cases: the first successful 
infrastructure built according to the PFIP model in China, Shajiao B Power Plant in 
1984; the largest-scale Chinese infrastructure construction involving the PFIP model 
to date, China’s Western Development; the most famous Chinese PFIP, Beijing 
Olympic Stadium; the most concerning current infrastructure construction in China, 
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Low-rent housing; the longest-term Chinese infrastructure development plan,  the 
“long-term railway network plan” to 2020. 
 
Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 points out that PFIPs are worthy of further development 
because they can bring enormous benefits to China. PFIPs were proposed to resolve 
a conflict between government funding shortages and the public demand for 
infrastructure. PFIPs were shown to promote initiatives by the Private Sector to 
assist public services. PFIPs were also proposed to break government or State-
owned enterprise monopolies in the Chinese infrastructure market. PFIPs thus 
promote value for money and might limit corruption in Chinese infrastructure 
constructions. 
 
Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 claimed that the defects of current Chinese laws on PFIPs 
may hinder or risk the development of PFIPs. The deficiencies in Chinese current 
laws are listed as follows: 
 The current Chinese laws on PFIPs are unstable. There is no stable national 
law on PFIPs in China, but certain provinces of China have issued provincial 
regulations on PIPs, which are only valid in that province. 
 The current Chinese laws on PFIPs are contradictory. Provincial regulations 
from different provinces contradict each other. 
 The provincial regulations on PFIPs in China are not comprehensive and not 
specific to all aspects of PFIPs. Even if these provincial regulations were 
compiled together, they would not be comprehensive and specific to all 
aspects of PFIPs. Neither the selection procedure for private concessioners 
nor the definition of rights and obligations of the Public and Private Sector 
are clear. 
 The private investors in PFIPs do not have adequate legal protection in China. 
 The public interest in PFIPs does not have enough legal protection in China 
either. 
 
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 showed that the objective conditions in China are now 
ready for a legal reform on PFIPs. China has almost abandoned governmental 
monopoly in the public service market and is encouraging private finance to invest 
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in public infrastructure through the issue of a series of policies, while the Chinese 
market economy has matured. Additionally, provincial regulations on PFIPs offer a 
basic foundation to establish a national legislation on PFIPs although this needs 
further support from the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions issued by 
UNCITRAL. 
 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 proposed the aims for the reform of Chinese legislation on 
PFIPs. Such legislation should establish a nationally comprehensive legislation on 
PFIPs which could achieve international standards so that the law of China could 
balance private and public interests to facilitate the development of PFIPs. 
 
To sum up, from the development of PFIPs in China and the review of Chinese 
current laws on PFIPs, it concluded that the defects of Chinese laws hinder the 
development of PFIPs in China. Therefore, it is urgent to improve and reform the 
Chinese laws on PFIPs.   
8.2 The answer for the second research question 
Why use the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
9
 made by UNCITRAL as 
guidelines to improve the Chinese laws on PFIPs? Why use other countries’ laws10 
on PFIPs as supplementary reference? 
  
This question is analysed and discussed in Chapter 3, which concludes that the 
Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL provide the best 
guide for the reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs. Moreover, it is necessary to use 
other countries’ laws as a supplementary reference. 
 
In addition to the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL, 
Chapter 3 lists four international conventions and treaties which refer to PFIPs. 
                                                 
9
 The Legislative Guide, Introduction and Background information on PFIPs; and the Model 
Provisions, Chap. I on General provisions. 
10
 Such as British law, EU law and so on. 
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Although each has their own advantages, their disadvantages indicate they are not 
proper to guide the reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs. 
 
The working group on Trade and Investment made by the WTO was quickly 
dismissed since the Agreement on Trade Related Aspect of Investment Measures 
(hereafter referred to as “TRIMs”) is the only multi-agreement on investment issued 
by the WTO. It is not applied to general international investment but only to 
investment-related trade, and does not refer to the question of PFIPs. Therefore, 
neither the working group nor the TRIMs could offer guidance on the reform of 
Chinese laws on PFIPs. 
 
The OECD has made some measures and institutes that refer to PFIPs, but these 
efforts do not form a systematic guide specific on PFIPs. The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (hereafter referred to as “MAI”) made by the OECD has 
been seen as a great attempt to harmonise the fragmented BITs on investment but it 
quickly collapsed because it could not balance the interests of the various parties 
involved. Although the substantive provisions issued by the OECD are too few to be 
useful to guide the reform of Chinese Laws on PFIPs, institutions established by the 
OECD such as the Istanbul Center, and the Public-Private Partnership Units, could 
support the reform in China. 
 
The World Bank has not issued any substantive provisions about PFIPs, but it set up 
a famous dispute settlement centre—ICSID—which could greatly affect the 
arbitration system in the reform of Chinese law on PFIPs.  
 
After analysing the disadvantages of the various international agreements on 
investment issued by the three international institutes—the WTO, the OECD, the 
World Bank—Chapter 2 lists the exclusive advantages of the Legislative Guide and 
Model Provisions made by the UNCITRAL. The Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions made by the UNCITRAL provide an international standard to guide all 
aspects of laws on PFIPs in order to facilitate the development of PFIPs worldwide. 
China, as a member of UNCITRAL, has adopted other guidance made by 
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UNCITRAL, so it will be easy for China to accept the Legislative Guide and Model 
Provisions in its reform of laws on PFIPs. 
 
Some countries’ laws on PFIPs may be used as a supplementary reference because 
of their rich experience in using PFIPs. Although the focus on their own situation in 
some countries’ laws on PFIPs means they could not become the primary guideline 
for Chinese law reform, these examples could be used to remedy gaps in the 
guidelines from the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. 
 
Through these comparisons, this chapter concludes that the Legislative Guide and 
Model Provisions made by UNCITRAL provide the best guide to reform Chinese 
laws on PFIPs. Nevertheless, it is necessary to use other countries law as a 
supplementary reference. 
8.3 The answer for the third research question  
With reference to the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
11
 and with 
supplementary references from other countries
12
, how should the general legislative 
and institutional framework on PFIPs in China be improved?  
 
This question is analysed and discussed in Chapter 4, which concludes that the 
reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs should be based on the principles of transparency, 
fairness, long-term sustainability and elimination of undesirable restrictions, as 
suggested by the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. 
 
The structure of the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions is appropriate for 
use in the new Chinese legislation on PFIPs. The structure first gives the general 
legislative and institutional framework, and then follows this with the specific areas 
of concessioner selection, contracts in PFIPs and dispute settlement. It is considered 
                                                 
11
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 1-11, Chap. I on general legislative and institutional 
framework; the Model Provisions, Chap. I on General provisions, Model Provision 1-4 
12
 The British regulations about the regulatory institutions; The British special regulations about  the 
customer protection by Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) 
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the most proper structure for the new Chinese legislation on PFIPs. Additionally, the 
law reform in China can adopt and modify the recommendations in the Legislative 
Guide and the Model Provisions rather than copy them. 
 
To achieve the goal of transparency, the Chinese laws on PFIPs should offer clear 
and readily accessible laws, and efficient procedures so that the potential private 
investors may predict and estimate the costs and risks involved in their investments, 
and may thus offer their most advantageous terms. Additionally, the Chinese laws on 
PFIPs should involve mandatory rules on disclosing administrative information. 
 
To achieve the goal of fairness, the reform of legal framework on PFIPs in China 
should attempt to balance more the public interest and the private interest. 
Additionally, the protection of the customer’s interests is necessary as one of the 
primary objectives in further Chinese legislation on PFIPs. 
 
To achieve the goal of long-term sustainability, the Chinese legislation on PFIPs 
should ensure the institutional capacity to undertake the various tasks entrusted to 
public authorities involved in infrastructure projects, throughout the phases of 
implementation. It should identify the authorised sectors empowered to award 
concessions and to enter into agreements for the implementation of PFIPs; it should 
identify the regulatory sectors that are empowered to regulate the implementation of 
PFIPs; and it should ensure the administrative coordination. Additionally, in order to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of PFIPs, Chinese legislation on PFIPs not only 
needs to ensure its institutional capability, but also to ensure the Chinese 
marketisation to achieve a proper balance between competitive and monopolistic 
provision of public services. 
 
To achieve the goal of the elimination of undesirable restriction, the reform of 
Chinese laws on PFIPs should review all the laws on PFIPs and eliminate any 
undesirable restrictions. Although China is a communist country, the Chinese 
Constitution should confirm the legality of private investment into public services. 
Although Chinese land may only be owned by the state, the laws should ensure that 
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private concessioners can obtain the land use rights required for projects (as 
allocated land without charge). Although foreign exchange has long-standing 
restrictions in China to protect the Chinese monetary market, the laws should offer 
essential exemptions to foreign private investors in PFIPs. Therefore, all the Chinese 
laws on PFIPs should be reviewed and improved. 
8.4 The answer for the fourth research question  
With reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
13
 
and with supplementary reference to other countries
14
, how should the selection 
procedures of the concessioner of PFIPs be improved to make the process more fair 
and transparent in China? 
  
This question is analysed and discussed in Chapter 5, which concludes that the 
selection procedure of the concessioner of PFIPs in China has defects and should be 
reformed. 
 
In the pre-selection phase, the Chinese laws should encourage the public to 
participate into the infrastructure contracting plan as much as is possible. Although 
Chinese PFIPs are traditionally decided by government, it would be helpful if the 
laws allow the public to participate in the preliminary assessment of the feasibility 
of PFIPs. Additionally, the Chinese laws should allow as much private investment 
into the public infrastructure market as possible. With the exception of areas related 
to national security, undesirable restrictions should be removed from Chinese laws 
so that other areas could open market access to private investment. With due caution 
in treating foreign finance, the Chinese criteria would do better to approach 
international standards so that the foreign private finance and high technology would 
participate in Chinese PFIPs. 
 
                                                 
13
 The Legislative Guide, Recommendation 14-39, Chap. III on Selection of the concessioner; and the 
Model Provisions accompanied therein, Chap. II on Selection of the concessioner, Model 
Provision 5-27 
14
 EU regulations on market access are used as supplemental reference. 
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In the selection phase, in order to select the most appropriate concessioner, Chinese 
laws should ensure the competitive selection procedure is used as the primary model, 
while awards without competitive procedure through negotiation are recognised 
only in exceptional cases. Moreover, in light of the features of PFIPs, the laws 
should adjust their regulations to fit to the specific requirements of the PFIP 
concessioner selection procedure (for example, including the pre-selection of 
bidders), ensuring that the whole selection procedure is economical and efficient, 
and performed with integrity, confidence and transparency. 
 
In the post-selection phase, Chinese laws should offer competitors reasonable 
channels through which they might complain about the selection result. On the one 
hand, the bidders could review the decision of the contracting authority for improper 
action during the selection procedure. On the other hand, it is useful to protect the 
bidders from unfair competition with their competitors. An important safeguard of 
complying with the rules of selection is that the laws offer the bidders the right to 
review actions by the contracting authority and other competitors. However, these 
rights should be subject to the public interest, since the concession award may be not 
invalid if the project has already been implemented. In these instances, there should 
be compensation for the injured competitor. 
 
Chinese laws have never referred to unsolicited proposal, but it is obvious that the 
model of unsolicited proposal could help the Public Sector in implementing the PFIP 
model. Referencing the recommendations in the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions, relevant regulations on unsolicited proposal could be considered in the 
reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs.  
 
To sum up, the concessioner selection procedures are very important in their impact 
on the successful completion of PFIPs. The Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions made by UNCITRAL offer very detailed guidelines on establishing laws 
regarding the selection procedures of PFIPs. Although the Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions have their own limitations, they are still useful in the reform of 
Chinese laws on PFIPs. The successful experience of other countries, and unions 
such as the EU, can also offer valuable guidance in the reform of Chinese laws on 
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PFIPs.   
8.5 The answer for the fifth research question  
With reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
15
 
and with supplementary reference to other countries, how should the laws relating to 
the agreements involved in PFIPs be reformed in China?  
 
This question is analysed and discussed in Chapter 6, which concludes that the 
relevant laws referring to the agreements involved in PFIPs in China involve some 
undesirable restrictions that it is necessary to review and reform. 
 
In project agreements, the law should give the concessioner and the contracting 
authority enough flexibility to negotiate a fair contract. However, some mandatory 
rules or some special policies of specific national circumstance are necessary so that 
the contracting authority may not fail in their duty to protect public interests. There 
are six issues discussed in this chapter.  
 The Company Law of China should remove undesirable restrictions. The 
legislation should allow the project agreement to restrict the organisation of 
the project company to some extent, so that the changes to the project 
company can be monitored by the contracting authority. This concept is 
already included in Chinese current provincial regulations, and should be 
retained and improved during the reform of Chinese law on PFIPs. 
 The Land Law of China should remove its undesirable restrictions. The 
legislation should resolve the problem of land requirements in the project. 
Since land in China is only owned by the state rather than by private owners, 
the project agreement should ensure that the contracting authority offers the 
land and the easement of the land required for the project. 
 The Guarantee Law of China should remove its undesirable restrictions. The 
                                                 
15
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. IV on Construction and Operation of infrastructure: Legislative 
framework and Project agreement, Chap. V on Duration, Extension and Termination of the 
Project Agreement; and the Model Provisions accompanied therein, Chap. III on Contents and 
Implementation of the Concession contract, Chap. IV on Duration, Extension and Termination 
of the Concession Contract.  
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Guarantee Law of China strictly prohibits state organs from providing any 
guarantee to commercial entities. However, it should be kept consistent with 
the project agreement. Additionally, the project agreement should clarify 
what physical property or intangible assets may be used by the project 
company to provide security, and what conflict this may have with the 
Chinese Guarantee Law.   
 In Chinese law, a performance guarantee is also required to confirm the 
project agreement, but the guaranteed level of performance is not regulated. 
 The Consumer Law of China should offer more appropriate rules. Although 
the Consumer Law requires the project company to provide equal service to 
all customers, some difference in the treatment of certain customers and the 
price formulated by the competent price authority also needs to be clarified 
in the laws on PFIPs.  
 There is no Chinese law that restricts the exclusive power of the municipal 
government if it rejects a project extension. Also, there is no proper Chinese 
law that deals with the consequences of the decision by one of the parties to 
terminate the project in PFIPs. 
 
Although concluding the finance agreement should aim to make raising finance 
convenient, its content could not be against the relevant law and some finance 
arrangements need the approval of the contracting authority. 
 
Although the Consumer Law could be used to protect the users of PFIPs, the 
provider of public service should be restricted by a user agreement that grants more 
protection to customers in Chinese laws on PFIPs. 
 
Aside from the approval of the contracting authority, subcontracting agreements 
should also be controlled by the conflict of interest provisions in Company Law. 
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8.6 The answer for the sixth research question 
With reference to the guidelines of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions
16
 
and with supplementary reference to other countries
17
, how should the laws relating 
to the settlement of disputes in PFIPs be reformed in China?  
 
This question is analysed and discussed in Chapter 7, which concludes that the 
current Chinese laws on investment dispute settlement are not satisfactory to solve 
the disputes that may arise in PFIPs and therefore an improvement is necessary. 
 
The principle of dispute settlement in PFIPs is to solve the dispute in an efficient 
and fair way. The solution proceedings should be quick and professional, ensure a 
fair and transparent decision, and allow the project to continue during the dispute 
settlement process.  
 
For disputes between the contracting authority and the concessioner, the Legislative 
Guide and the Model Provisions recommend two types of dispute settlement: one 
uses conciliatory methods such as conciliation and mediation; the other uses 
antagonistic method, i.e. litigation and arbitration. The conciliatory settlements to 
dispute would be optional, according to the law of the host country.  Considering 
one of the parties of a project agreement is the public authority and the subject of the 
agreement refers to infrastructure with close connection to the public interest, 
whether the project agreement is considered a public contract or a private contract 
may differ in different countries. In China, the nature of project agreement defined 
as “public” or “private” will affect the option of the dispute settlements. If the 
project agreement is identified as a public contract, the dispute on the project 
agreement would be an administrative dispute over which the host country has 
exclusive jurisdiction and only its administrative law applies. This means that 
arbitration cannot be used. If the project agreement is identified as a private contract, 
the dispute on project agreement would be a dispute of a general commercial 
                                                 
16
 The Legislative Guide, Chap. VI on Settlement of Disputes; and the Model Provisions 
accompanied therein, Chap. V on Settlement of Disputes. 
17
 The definition of public contract in Britain is broad. 
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contract. The dispute settlement will be confirmed by the agreement of the parties, 
but obey certain mandatory rules. In Chinese PFIPs practice, due to the vague nature 
of the project agreement, no arbitration has been applied to resolve disputes on the 
project agreement of PFIPs so far. Most of these disputes are solved by mediation or 
litigation. To sum up, if China intends to facilitate PFIPs and enhance the confidence 
of the foreign investors, Chinese law should clarify the nature of the project 
agreement and remove improper mandatory rules.  
 
For disputes between the concessioner and other parties who are equal subjects in 
law, or among equal parties, the Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions 
recommends a solution by a settlement agreed between the parties. In Chinese PFIPs, 
the way to solve this type of dispute is consistent with the recommendations of the 
Legislative Guide and the Model Provisions. 
 
For disputes between the concessioner and the users, the Legislative Guide and the 
Model Provisions recommend that simple and efficient mechanisms should be 
offered to individual persons while the general dispute settlement for normal 
commercial contracts should be offered to entities, excepting when the entity is the 
public authority or a state-owned enterprise when the contract may be considered to 
be an administrative contract. In Chinese PFIPs, all user agreements are considered 
to be normal purchase agreements no matter the nature of the entity. 
 
Although it is expected that all the disputes could be solved with the same settlement 
in case of a conflict of decision, it is impossible in practice. 
Conclusion 
This thesis is the most detailed and systemic response to the reform of Chinese laws 
on PFIPs to date. It analyses and discusses how the Legislative Guide and the Model 
Provisions made by UNCITRAL may be adopted in the reform of Chinese laws on 
PFIPs, including responses to aspects of the general legislative and institutional 
framework, the selection of the concessioner, the various agreements in PFIPs and 
the settlement of disputes. In those moments where the Legislative Guide and the 
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Model Provisions have not referred to some special issues that pertain to China, this 
thesis uses other countries or international organisations as a precedent to 
supplement its discussion of PFIP reform in China. 
 
This thesis offers a strong theoretical basis for the development of PFIPs in China, 
and suggestions to aid the reform of Chinese laws on PFIPs. It also offers itself as a 
general reference for any other country expecting to reform its law on PFIPs. 
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